Chad, located within the Sahel region of Africa, has recently witnessed radical security shifts concerning counter-terrorism efforts. This is primarily linked to President Mahamat Idriss Déby’s threat to withdraw from the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) established to combat Boko Haram, following an attack on a Chadian military base in the Barkaram area near Lake Chad on October 27, 2024, which resulted in the deaths of at least 40 Chadian soldiers. In response, President Déby announced the initiation of a military operation named “Haskaneet” to confront these terrorist threats. This development has raised concerns regarding the implications of Chad’s potential withdrawal from this task force and the possible future trajectories resulting from such a decision.
Key Implications
Several key implications accompany President Mahamat Idriss Déby’s indication of a withdrawal from the MNJTF to combat Boko Haram:
Escalation of Terrorism Activities: This is exemplified by the recent attack on a Chadian army base by Boko Haram militants in Barkaram, a region within Chad’s Lake Province. The assault led to the death of around 40 Chadian soldiers, marking it as one of the most violent attacks against Chad in 2024. This comes after the Chadian army inflicted significant losses on Boko Haram’s faction loyal to ISIS, known as “ISIS West Africa”.
Chad’s Disillusionment with the MNJTF’s Effectiveness: President Déby directly cited the task force’s failure to combat terrorism in Chad on November 3, 2024. He underscored the lack of coordinated efforts against the enemy, despite the force’s establishment aimed at pooling resources and intelligence. The roots of this force date back to 1994, initiated by Nigeria to tackle cross-border banditry in the Lake Chad Basin and facilitate free movement across Nigeria’s northeastern borders. It initially consisted solely of Nigerian military forces but later expanded to include troops from Chad, aimed at addressing shared security challenges in the region. The task force’s mandate was broadened in April 2012 to include counter-insurgency and disruption of sabotage efforts.
Preference for Independent National Military Operations: This is reflected in the recent military operation named “Haskaneet,” announced by President Déby in October 2024. The operation’s name is derived from “hask,” an Arabic word referring to a highly resilient thorny plant, commonly found in desert areas and known for its drought-resistant characteristics. President Déby, as the supreme commander of the armed forces and a former general, emphasized re-organizing defense forces to adapt to the asymmetric warfare tactics used by terrorist groups, while also strengthening border security and protecting citizens.
Crisis Management Strategy by the Ruling Regime: This approach revolves around the idea of “moving forward” by diverting public attention away from internal political crises toward external threats. This strategy is particularly relevant as Chad is approaching legislative elections at the end of December 2024—an election boycotted by opposition parties citing unfavorable conditions for free and transparent elections. Notably, the recent climate of security has been strained by rising terrorist attacks along the borders with Nigeria and Niger, coupled with internal conflict in Sudan since April 15, 2023.
Possible Pathways
There are several potential pathways associated with Chad’s possible withdrawal from the MNJTF in combating Boko Haram:
Shift from Security Coordination with France: This stems from growing discontent regarding France’s ineffective security roles, evident in the gradual military withdrawal from Sahelian countries, including the termination of Operation Barkhane in Mali in August 2022 and the Sabre operation in Burkina Faso in February 2023, concluding with the closure of the military base in Niger in December 2023.
Potential Security Alignment with the United States: The U.S. military’s announcement to redeploy forces to Chad at the latter’s request, as stated by American General Kenneth Ekman from AFRICOM on September 20, 2024, supports this notion. He clarified that while exact timelines for redeployment are still being determined, limited special forces would be deployed due to growing local animosity toward foreign military bases.
Increasing Security Ties with Russia: This appears reinforced by recent collaborative actions, including a joint military operation by Russian forces and the Chadian army in May 2024 that freed around 21 Chadian soldiers held hostage by extremist groups. The significance of security cooperation was emphasized during Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s visit to Chad in June 2024—the first in about 60 years.
Engagement in Emerging Regional Security Arrangements: This relates to the fragmentation faced by traditional multilateral regional arrangements in the Sahel, notably the G5 Sahel group, which now only includes Chad and Mauritania after the exit of Mali and Burkina Faso in 2022 and Niger in 2023. Chad is seeking security ties with the nascent “Sahel Alliance” and participated in military exercises in May 2024 aimed at boosting operational capabilities against potential threats.
In conclusion, Chad’s potential withdrawal from the Multinational Joint Task Force could raise fundamental issues regarding the effectiveness of this force in addressing security threats, especially terrorism, within the Lake Chad Basin region. It could further impose operational pressures on the Chadian army amidst growing threats from terrorist groups and indicate Chad’s movement toward establishing new security relationships with entities like the Sahel Alliance and Russia, while cautiously engaging with the United States.
