“Digital Balkanization”: Strategies of Major Powers for Global Internet Fragmentation
Although discussions about the global fragmentation of the internet began nearly two decades ago, they have gained momentum in recent years, especially since the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine war. The term “internet fragmentation” refers to the disintegration of the network of networks, or the splitting of the global web into regional networks or the separation of specific parts of the internet. However, it is essential to distinguish between the internet (the infrastructure, i.e., the network of networks) and the “web” (the place where internet users interact), as the logic of fragmentation differs in each context.
In this regard, Julien Nocetti analyzes various forms of internet fragmentation in a 2024 study for the French Institute of International Relations. These include technical, geopolitical, and commercial fragmentation. He also explores the motivations and strategies of major powers such as the United States, China, Russia, India, and the European Union concerning this process and its impact on widening the digital divide between countries. The study also emphasizes the need to consider the role of private actors, particularly large digital platforms.
Forms of Fragmentation:
The roots of “internet fragmentation” or the splitting of the global network into smaller ones stem from the term “Balkanization,” which refers to the division of a state into smaller independent entities. This term first appeared in the United States in 1997 in relation to the internet. In 2001, Clyde Wayne Crews introduced the concept of “Spliinternet,” meaning the division of the global internet into parts of parallel internal networks that do not communicate with each other. Each part is managed separately for technological, commercial, or political reasons, revealing the internet’s unlimited potential. This concept gained significant traction in 2010. Three forms of internet fragmentation can be identified:
Technical Fragmentation: This focuses on the risks affecting the network’s interoperability and the technical barriers that hinder data transfer. Essentially, it results from decisions that, whether intentional or not, permanently or temporarily cut or restrict digital communication between parts of the internet and the rest of the network. Issues such as IP protocol policies were central to this form of fragmentation in the early 2000s.
Geopolitical Fragmentation: Data control is at the core of the political fragmentation of the internet. The free flow of data has become contentious due to the politicization of data localization practices, national sovereignty, and international competition, along with tensions between authoritarian and democratic regimes. Some nations seek to legitimize “regionalization of the internet” to align with their political systems, while others prefer to localize personal data for political and security reasons. This has become evident during military conflicts, where there is either a fight to control the physical infrastructure of a network (as seen in Ukraine) or to destroy the internet infrastructure in a country (as in Gaza, starting in October 2023). This dimension of fragmentation, though not yet fully studied, poses significant risks to the stability and resilience of cyberspace.
Commercial Fragmentation: Economic competition plays a crucial role in justifying internet fragmentation, whether through protective strategies by national authorities, such as in China or the United States, or purely commercial strategies. This commercial dynamic is tied to the economic model of large digital platforms and the revenue from user data. Companies like Meta or Google strengthen their proprietary technological bases to retain users and generate income by controlling data, which they treat as a strategic revenue source. This has led companies like Google and Meta (which owns Facebook, Instagram, and WhatsApp) to prohibit data transfer between their different applications.
This commercial fragmentation is part of the process of “platformization” of the internet, involving key actors in the digital economy who are encouraged to build and own their technical infrastructure. In this way, companies like Google, Meta, or Amazon effectively create their own networks, making them the primary gateways to the global internet. However, concerns remain about fragmentation drivers regarding data, infrastructure, web companies, and telecom actors, particularly concerning net neutrality and intellectual property rights.
American Motivations:
For a long time, American diplomacy has presented the internet as a global infrastructure serving its interests. Now, the exploitation of this framework is one of the primary factors driving internet fragmentation in international forums. Washington is rethinking the internet as a tool of strategic repression, which can be used to extract data covertly (through spyware) or prevent adversaries from exploiting digital flows against the U.S., as seen during the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign. At that time, Western awareness grew of adversaries’ increasing use of the internet (cyberattacks, information manipulation, etc.). Thus, for Washington, internet fragmentation is a means of preventing or cutting off adversaries from accessing critical internet infrastructure.
With the internet’s demographic center of gravity shifting toward Asia and the relative failure of the U.S. to achieve its goals in internet governance forums, Washington has become more interested in accelerating fragmentation to ensure its control over the internet. In 2020, under President Donald Trump, the “Clean Network” program was designed to purge U.S. networks (and those of its partners) of untrustworthy Chinese applications (TikTok, WeChat, Huawei, etc.). This initiative was part of internet fragmentation, despite Washington traditionally opposing it. The Biden administration continues to actively pursue this campaign, particularly against Chinese suppliers like Huawei.
Competitors’ Perceptions:
The scenario of internet fragmentation is often presented as a conflict between the West and the rest of the world, which has deepened since the intensification of U.S.-China technological competition and the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war. Understanding how other major competing powers view internet fragmentation is crucial:
China: China aims to catch up technologically, driven by a desire to break U.S. dominance in the digital space. Beijing significantly contributes to global internet fragmentation for domestic political reasons. The “Great Firewall,” established in the early 2000s, is a means of controlling the internet nationally, with major U.S. platforms like Facebook, Twitter, YouTube (since 2009), and Google (since 2010) being banned. In 2018, Huawei announced its “decentralized internet infrastructure” project, arguing that the current internet faces serious issues and critical vulnerabilities due to increasing cyberattacks, centralization, and other deviations. Huawei also holds a central role in the development of the (IPv6+) protocol, proposed in 2019 as an enhanced version of IPv6. Alongside TikTok, WeChat is one of the most successful examples of China’s digital economy exported abroad. The technical characteristics of this app limit the connectivity between different parts of the network, contributing to technical fragmentation. China’s authorities also seek to expand their data management laws beyond national borders, both politically (challenging U.S. legal dominance, defending a specific data sovereignty approach) and economically (supporting the spread of new digital Silk Roads).
Russia: In its antagonism with Washington, Moscow seeks to enshrine the principle of digital sovereignty. Russia aims to reduce its dependence on major U.S. platforms and develop local infrastructure and technologies to allow its network to become self-sufficient and disconnected from the global web. In 2019, Russia passed the “Sovereign Internet” law, enabling authorities to manage information flows within Russia’s cyberspace. This law requires Russian internet service providers to monitor, filter, slow down, or block access to specific websites. The law also mandated the implementation of a Russian version of the Domain Name System (DNS). The Russia-Ukraine war has accelerated internet fragmentation, with Moscow facing the effects of sanctions and the mass exit of global tech companies from the country. Russia banned major U.S. tech platforms before launching (or relaunching) Russian alternatives to Google Play or Instagram, with no other choice but to shift to local devices and software.
India: The U.S.-China rivalry, global disruptions to supply chains, and the Ukraine war have resulted in a contradictory position for India regarding internet fragmentation. While India currently depends on the U.S. and China for equipment, software, and platforms, digital sovereignty remains a pillar of its strategy for addressing digital challenges. India’s key project in the e-government sphere, “India Stack,” focuses on developing digital services like eKYC (electronic Know Your Customer) and the UPI (Unified Payments Interface) system, which have significantly advanced the fintech sector. Although these projects do not fragment the global internet, they are part of a more sovereign approach to national digital governance. New Delhi’s regulatory policies have frequently clashed with American digital platforms, particularly concerning access to encrypted data and content moderation. In 2021, India requested Twitter to block accounts it claimed spread fake news that threatened national security, but the company refused. In response, many officials and executives from the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) abandoned Twitter for Koo, a local competitor. Since the open conflict between Beijing and New Delhi in May 2020, Indian authorities have banned 59 Chinese tech apps, citing national security threats. The list has since grown to include more than 200 apps, such as WeChat, AliExpress, and TikTok. In the telecommunications sector, Huawei and ZTE were excluded from 5G network trials.
European Union: The issue of internet fragmentation remains a limited topic within the EU, which has become the world’s leading source of legal standards aimed at providing a global framework for the digital economy, dominated by the U.S.-China duopoly. The EU has distinguished itself in the international digital space as a “regulatory superpower,” focusing on developing and promoting broad regulatory standards in the digital field. Starting in 2020, a European phase characterized by a wave of institutional and legal publications emerged, including the “Digital Compass” (2021), the Digital Markets Act and Digital Services Act (2023), the Digital Education Action Plan (2021-2027), and the Cybersecurity Act. Notably, some of these texts contradict the interests of the large U.S. platforms. The GAIA-X initiative, launched by Berlin and Paris in 2019, is a European infrastructure project that aims to create a sovereign data space for companies and public institutions by offering cloud services that meet strict EU standards. However, by proposing an alternative vision for the internet’s governance, this strategy implicitly contributes to internet fragmentation, particularly at the commercial level.
Conclusion:
By rethinking the global network of networks, internet fragmentation is gradually becoming the dominant form of internet governance, reflecting deep shifts in global balances. Although fragmentation is not synonymous with the destruction of the internet, it has implications for the freedom of expression, communication, and the exercise of basic rights online. Thus, digital governance will continue to be a contested issue among major global powers, with technical, commercial, and geopolitical interests at play.
Julien Nocetti, «Un Internet en morceaux? Fragmentation d’Internet et strategies de la Chine, la Russie, l’Inde et l’Union européenne», Ifri, février 2024.
