Determinants of U.S. Strategy Towards the Middle East and Its Consequences: The Case of Iraq (2003-2023)

The Middle East region holds significant geopolitical weight for various major powers around the world. This considerable and growing interest from major powers in the Middle East is due to several factors, with the exceptional geographical location of the Middle East, which is considered the heart of the world, being at the top of the list. Other factors include the diversity of landscapes, the wealth of numerous water bodies and important shipping routes, as well as the vast natural and human resources concentrated in this region, notably its vast oil and natural gas reserves, which attract the attention of all major industrial powers, primarily the United States. Consequently, Iraq has represented a major strategic importance for the United States. The current reality in Iraq is the result of over 30 years of U.S. intervention, which has had its various factors and determinants. Furthermore, Iraq’s growing role as a regional power posed a threat to U.S. influence since the beginning of Saddam Hussein’s regime.

However, when the far-right (George W. Bush) came to power in the United States, U.S. policy changed, and the linkage of the concept of regional stability to the peace process diminished. The idea of the Iraqi invasion then emerged as a top priority for the U.S., particularly after the events of September 11, which marked a pivotal turning point in U.S. strategy toward the Middle East in general, and Iraq in particular, as it became the most pressing file for the United States. This necessitated taking security measures commensurate with the plans that were already in place prior to the incident.

The administrations of George Bush and Obama were engaged in a war against Iraq, but the context, arenas, and the degree of conflict varied, which will be clarified through a comparison between the two administrations at both the security and strategic levels. This study will also highlight the administrations of Donald Trump and Joe Biden to elucidate the change in U.S. strategy toward the Middle East, especially Iraq. Hence, the research problem of this study revolves around the nature of U.S. strategy toward Iraq and what this strategy has led to. This will result in several sub-questions:

• What is the U.S. strategy toward the Middle East?
• What was the reality in Iraq before the war? What caused it?
• How was Iraq under U.S. administration?
• What was the reaction of international and regional organizations to the U.S. invasion of Iraq, and what were the repercussions that affected them?
• What strategy was followed regarding the Middle East, particularly Iraq, during the administrations of Presidents George W. Bush, Barack Obama, Donald Trump, and Joe Biden?
• What are the repercussions and outcomes of the U.S. strategy on the reality in Iraq in 2023?
• The American withdrawal from Iraq: what are the mechanisms, reasons, and results?

Studying strategic issues is among the most important studies that allow researchers to track the strategy of the state under examination and understand the impact of that strategy on its positions on existing internal, regional, and international issues. Therefore, the study of U.S. strategy towards the Middle East, particularly toward Iraq, has been of utmost importance to the researcher.

Conceptual Framework of the Study:

Strategy:

The classical analysis of the origin of the term “strategy” leads to its presence in various European languages, including German (strategie) and Russian (strategija). The term “strategy” is divided into two parts:

• “Stratos,” which refers to armies in a state of war, i.e., the troops camped in a certain area.
• “Age,” which refers to advancing forward.

The combination of the two parts gives us a linguistic concept represented by the army that is pushed forward. Additionally, the term strategema is derived from it, which has another meaning in Latin, referring to a trick or means in war. Many thinkers trace the origin of the word strategy back to the Greek word “strategos,” which means military security during the era of Greek democracy. However, this does not prevent the enumeration of many definitions that attempt to establish a meaning for this term. Among the most prominent definitions:

• von Clausewitz: Defines strategy as the art of using encounters to achieve the goals of war.
• Lettrie: Art of preparing a war plan, guiding armies in critical areas, and identifying points where the largest number of sectors should be mobilized to ensure success in battles.
• von der Goltz: Broad measures used to mobilize forces to the critical area in the most favorable circumstances, which can be called the science of command.
• Liddell Hart: The art of distributing and using various military means to achieve the objectives of policy.
• Raymond Aron: The leadership and direction of all military operations; diplomacy guides relations with other countries, and both strategy and diplomacy are subordinate to policy.

The American concept: The 1959 U.S. Armed Forces Joint Staff Guide defines strategy as “the art and science of employing the armed forces of the state to achieve the goals of public policy through the use of force or the threat of its use.”

The current definition of strategy in the American military terminology dictionary states that the meaning of the word strategy has deviated greatly from its original meanings. However, despite all this, the essence of the original meaning and concept still constitutes a part of the current definition, which states that strategy “is the art and science of preparing and using political, economic, psychological, and military forces as needed in peace and war, to achieve the maximum possible support for policies.”

Eastern School:

Lenin, explaining the term strategy, said that “the correct strategy is one that involves delaying operations until the moment of moral collapse, making victory easy and feasible.” Kozlov defines it as “the process of creating military means to achieve objectives.” Furthermore, “Krasilnikov,” a former Soviet officer, defines military strategy as being directly dependent on politics and subordinate to it, where strategic war plans are designed based on the objectives set by politics. Mao Zedong describes it as the study of the laws of the total situation of war.

The Arabic School:

• The Egyptian School: Defines strategy as the highest realm in the art of war, studying the nature, planning, preparation, and management of armed conflict, employing a scientific theoretical and practical approach that examines military preparation and its use in war based on military policy foundations. It also includes the activities of high military leadership to achieve the strategic objectives of the armed conflict to defeat the enemy.
• The Iraqi School: Defines it as the art of preparing and distributing armed forces and using them or threatening to use them within the framework of the overall strategy to achieve policy goals.

Formation and Development:

The concept and definition of strategy have evolved throughout various military history epochs in accordance with the changes and developments in military technology in each era and according to the ideologies and political distinctions of each leader and thinker. Hence, it is challenging to provide a comprehensive and definitive definition for strategy, as there is no unified and precise definition of this term.

The term strategy is one of the most widely circulated and common terms. However, many who have used this term have been unaware of its true meaning. Originally, the word “strategy” is derived from the Greek “Strategos,” meaning leader, also referring to the art of commanding troops. For a long time, it was known as the art of senior military leaders. Its understanding has been passed down through generations in narrow bounds; thus, the art of military command has been the meaning that aligned with the concept of strategy in ancient times. The history of strategy goes back to the writings of the Chinese thinker Sun Tzu, who guided military leaders through his book “The Art of War” to plan in warfare for victory, expressing his views on strategy with phrases that hold significant meanings such as “appear in the east and strike in the west.”

He also notes, “The most distinguished of leaders among us are those who are the wisest and most foresighted.” Twenty centuries after his saying, the Japanese military law deeply influenced this idea, requiring military leaders to “know both the military arts and theories.” Then comes “Frederick the Great” in Europe to assert that reading literature and beautiful letters is necessary for those in military life.

U.S. Foreign Policy:

Foreign policy refers to the conduct of one state internationally, adopted by decision-makers in that state to achieve limited objectives. It does not involve interaction with other international entities, unlike international relations, which entails a continuous process of action and reaction. True, a state’s position and behavior can be responses to external influences; however, the essence of foreign policy originates from the initiative of the concerned state to fulfill its limited objectives according to a predetermined agenda or plan. According to American foreign policy journals, it defines American foreign policy as “a set of political goals outlining how this country will interact with other nations around the world,” designed to assist countries in protecting their national interests and security, serving ideological goals and economic prosperity, achieved through peaceful cooperation or through violence and war.

Military Tool:

Military capabilities are considered a fundamental determinant of a state’s stature regionally and internationally and are also a significant tool for executing foreign policy. The military tool may be conventionally used, represented by conducting military assaults for expansion and control over the resources of a state, a model that was prevalent until World War II when states began to criminalize war, making resorting to it a violation of international law. However, some states still resort to attack and war as the best means for defense and achieving national objectives.

War:

War is defined linguistically, as mentioned in the Comprehensive Dictionary of Meanings, as fighting between two factions and is pluralized as ‘wars,’ whereas its opposite is ‘peace.’ In international law, the conventional definition of war is an armed conflict between two teams from different states where the warring states defend their interests, goals, and rights. War can only occur between states; however, disputes between groups from the same state, or conflict between a group of individuals against a foreign state, or a revolution against the government where they reside, are not considered wars and do not concern international law but fall under criminal law. Modern definitions of war have expanded to include any armed conflict, even if the armed group does not possess state characteristics, whether the dispute arises from a state’s behalf or for their own interest rather than the collective.

Now, civil wars occurring within the same state fall under the term war, indicating that war today is an outcome of critical disputes linked to the economic and social entities of the warring states, typically achieved through coercion and fighting after peaceful resolutions fail. Thus, each state involved in the conflict claims the right to be the principal judge with supreme authority in any dispute for the purpose of defending their national interests and goals. Therefore, the term ‘war’ linguistically signifies fighting, and it does not have to be just but may arise from aggression by one party against another, referring to the struggle where each side seeks to overcome and destroy the other’s strength and entity, taking on various and disparate forms:

Blitzkrieg: Usually offensive in nature, where a state launches a sudden attack on the enemy’s gathering point using quick and mobile weapons.

War of Attrition: This type does not just focus on the military aspect but also includes economic and political aspects, characterized by duration and differing types of weapons used, alongside combat tactics, unlike blitzwar.

Preemptive War: Defined as the transition from responding to an actual attack to initiating an attack to prevent a potential strike if intelligence detects early intentions of the opponent to undertake hostile actions.

Preventive War: Based on potential adversarial intentions where the threat is neither certain nor imminent, but rather a possibility that could happen in the future. The American administration’s concept of preventive strikes works to move the battle to the enemy before it manifests. The difference between preemptive and preventive war is that the former occurs in case of a real war, where the enemy is evident and specific—only the first strike need be directed at them. The latter depends on the idea that a war will happen later, thus necessitating the first strike before its occurrence.

Deterrence:

Deterrence is among the most notable uses of the military tool, where the mere threat of its use is often sufficient to achieve desired objectives, and it can also be used as leverage, compelling others to comply with state demands without actual use of force. Therefore, it emphasizes the importance of a state possessing substantial military capabilities without actually employing them. Not using military capabilities in defensive or offensive war does not imply their ineffectiveness; rather, utilizing them in peace for leverage and deterrence exceeds their actual use in war.

Concept of the Middle East:

The term Middle East is one of the most contentious among experts in international relations, specifically for those studying the Middle East. This term, Western in origin, is closely associated with the interests of Western colonial schemes that intersect with Zionist objectives for a homeland in Palestine. The term effectively replaced “Arab homeland,” which helps evoke Arab identity and push for Arab unity. Consequently, the Middle East metaphorically represents a political and strategic term; it is not derived from the region’s inherent nature but from its relations to the outside world. The Middle East is considered “middle eastern” concerning Europe. The term was first used in 1902 by U.S. naval officer Alfred Mahan without specifying the countries it encompasses.

Theoretical Framework of the Study:

Realist School:

Realism emerged in American circles between the First and Second World Wars, with philosophical roots in Greek thought, particularly in Thucydides’ writings on the Peloponnesian War. Many realist theorists, such as Hans Morgenthau, Nicholas Spykman, Kenneth Waltz, Machiavelli, and James Durkheim, are prominent figures in this school.

Realists argue that the international system is anarchic due to the absence of a supreme authority regulating relationships among states. Thus, they view conflict and competition as natural occurrences, explaining that the American invasion of Iraq stemmed from an anarchic international system lacking a central authority to regulate relationships peacefully. Furthermore, they contend that international politics represents a struggle for power involving maintaining the current state’s strength while aiming to maximize it. Inter-state competition tends to make them potential enemies if not actual ones.

Realists assert that the state is the primary actor in international relations and downplay the role of international organizations. Reflecting on the Syrian crisis shows the validity of this assumption; the United Nations’ role in peacekeeping diminished due to the dominance of major powers over its decisions, notably exhibited when Russia and the U.S. exploited the UN to legitimize their stances on Syria. Similarly, the UN’s diminished role in the Iraq crisis of 2003 illustrates this point.

Political realism believes understanding and interpreting international relations hinge on laws stemming from human nature, which remain constant through time and space. In this regard, realists view human nature as inherently self-interested and flawed, affecting politics and international relations, emphasizing the inevitability of conflict, asserting that politics is a tool of strife.

National interest, from a realist perspective, lies at the core of policy. Morgenthau posits that national interest dictates state behavior; states perform internationally and regionally to achieve their national interests. Realists reject the idealists’ notion of harmony between states’ interests, recognizing that national interests vary from one state to another. Some states that barely exceed the minimum threshold for stability, security, and sovereignty prioritize achieving stability and security. Conversely, states that have surpassed this strive for their interests through asserting dominance and influence, as discussed in this study concerning U.S. strategy towards the Middle East, deemed a strategic sphere of influence.

Thus, officially, Morgenthau defines national interest as power, with no supposition of a peaceful world or inevitable warfare, but rather a constant struggle for power coupled with effective diplomacy to mitigate the threat of war.

Realists assert that the state continuously seeks to enhance its self-defense capabilities by developing its resources of power. States aim to acquire, project, or retain power and status, which sometimes clarifies existing global conflicts. For instance, in the case of competition between the U.S. and Russia, the latter strives to restore its influence and position in the region while the U.S. seeks to maintain its supremacy. This assumption forms the basis for analyzing U.S. strategy towards Iraq over an extended duration; U.S. control over Iraq manifested its quest to acquire power and sustain its regional status without allowing new regional forces like Iraq to rise.

Realists view power as a means to achieve national interests, particularly military strength, considering military power a tool for exerting regional and international influence to protect national interests.

In conclusion, the realist perspective offers numerous insights that can explain much of what this study has covered, particularly concerning constructing and structuring various American strategies towards the Middle East, specifically Iraq, and elucidating the most pivotal turning point in this strategy—namely, the American invasion of Iraq in 2003.

Methodological Framework of the Study:

Historical Method:

This method aims to study historical events and analyze related facts to understand the circumstances surrounding the evolution of U.S. strategy in the Middle East in general and Iraq in particular. To study the nature of relationships, it is crucial to return to past events and facts, presenting, analyzing, and interpreting them. This assists in explaining current events and problems while identifying various developments.

Decision-Making Method:

Decision-making refers to the interaction process among all participants, both formally and informally, in shaping public policies. Decision preparation is a crucial part of political institutions’ behavior, leading these institutions to opt for one alternative to solve emerging issues through evaluation involving discussion and preference.

National Interest Method:

The national interest approach is one of the most critical research methodologies in international relations, as the ultimate goal of any state is to achieve its national interest. Hence, various international interactions can be summarized and understood through analyzing the national interests of the actors in these interactions. Given the study’s focus on U.S. strategy toward the Middle East and Iraq, the national interest approach has been selected, as all adopted U.S. strategies toward the region were fundamentally based on the principle of U.S. national interest.

American Foreign Policy Towards the Middle East:

The Middle East region is witnessing significant developments in the strategic landscape reflecting geopolitical changes in the regional environment. These changes have led to variations in the political scene in the region, capturing the attention of the current U.S. administration and forming an important area for reorganizing American priorities towards developments in the Middle East. This contributes to enhancing the U.S. position to play a significant role in how to deter and confront challenges.

Moreover, the Middle East has been, and will remain, an important strategic domain for U.S. national security. The U.S. administration began re-evaluating its foreign policy toward the region with Joe Biden’s arrival, adopting a principles-based approach highlighting various idealistic and value-driven dimensions while strengthening its relations with strategic allies, fundamentally increasing U.S. commitment to affirm its role and adapt to changes in the regional environment. The importance of the Middle East to American foreign policy lies in its being a primary resource for American energy and a part of the strategic competition between the U.S., Russia, and China.

Internal Determinants of U.S. Foreign Policy Towards the Middle East:

Formal Internal Determinants:

The internal determinants of U.S. foreign policy, given the nature of the American political system, divide into two parts: the first part is the U.S. Congress, and the second part is the U.S. Presidency—as an institution, not merely the person. A deep reader of the American constitution will find that it assigns each of the aforementioned institutions a set of characteristics and powers through which they can undertake their tasks in shaping public policies, including foreign policy. An essential point when discussing the U.S. Constitution is its significant balance in distributing powers between both institutions. This balance arises from the flexibility feature of the American constitution, which often plays a vital role in producing more positive policies. When discussing the U.S. Presidency, the foreign policy-making task is distributed among each of (the President, the State Department, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Defense Department).

It is well established regarding foreign policy-making in the U.S. Congress that the Constitution organizes it by granting the right to conduct trade with foreign countries, declare war, authorize retaliation against aggression, approve the state budget, and constrain the President’s power to enter treaties with other nations, requiring the approval of two-thirds of the present Senate members.

Informal Internal Determinants:

Informal forces play a significant role in the American political system in general and are a key determinant concerning U.S. foreign policy. When discussing informal determinants, we should primarily consider the substantial role played by interest groups, the media, and American public opinion. Attempting to confine informal internal determinants to these three forces represents an effort to identify the most prominent actors influencing U.S. foreign policy. However, undoubtedly, each of the three produces numerous smaller actors. For instance, interest groups yield unions, federations, and membership organizations…etc., all of which are highly influential in American foreign policy.

When discussing the media, it suffices to say it is the fastest and most important means of communicating with the public, simultaneously influencing and affected by other powers within the American political system. Additionally, American public opinion forms a principal component of policymaking. This study revealed that American public opinion played a substantial role in altering U.S. strategy regarding Iraq during the tenure of former President Barack Obama.

External Determinants of U.S. Foreign Policy:

External determinants consist of factors and variables that have a direct or indirect role and impact on a state’s policymaking. The main external determinants of U.S. foreign policy can be summarized in several key points:

• The international system: which we highlighted in the theoretical framework as anarchic, complex, and continuously fluctuating, prompting every state to pursue its interests. The United States is one of the most prominent actors in this international system with policies varying between Democratic and Republican administrations. Notably, the Democratic Party tends to favor elements of dialogue and cooperation to achieve American interests, while the Republican Party leans towards enforcing interests through power, which was the principle followed by Donald Trump. We illustrated the tools of this principle by employing economic hegemony, constraining adversarial states, and establishing Zionist presence, among others.
• Oil: Oil plays a pivotal role and serves as a principal determinant in shaping U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East, based on the fact that the region is the largest oil producer in the world, while the United States is the largest oil consumer globally. Within the context of U.S. national security, oil has become a crucial issue, with U.S. strategy directed toward the Middle East as a priority for American national security.
• International Terrorism and its Impact on the United States: The events of September 11 represented a significant shock to the U.S. government and its populace. This incident destabilized the belief that they resided in a secure state. Following these events, the U.S. imposed a maximum emergency state nationwide, condemned the terrorist act, and then President Bush announced that the U.S. had entered a state of war, asserting that there were conspirators working against the U.S. in collaboration with the terrorist leader Osama bin Laden. Notably, the United States began to direct accusations toward specific individuals and countries in its official statements, indicating that al-Qaeda and its leader Osama bin Laden were responsible for this terrorist act, and that the countries collaborating with them included Afghanistan, Yemen, Sudan, Somalia, and Iraq. A thorough examination of these countries and the trajectory of al-Qaeda following the September 11 events will reveal that the United States did not spare any of them from facing severe repercussions, either directly or indirectly.

Reality in Iraq Before the American Occupation in 2003:

The process of draining Iraq lasted over 12 years, during which the United States fully controlled this process politically and economically. Starting in 1990, the U.S. sought to weaken Iraq through an economic blockade following Security Council Resolution 661 (excluding humanitarian provisions for medical supplies and food), and established a Security Council committee to ensure sanctions were effectively imposed. However, the Security Council later issued Resolution 670 in September 1990, imposing sanctions on all air and maritime transport means, thus placing Iraq under an economic blockade in all aspects. The U.S. didn’t aim to realize economic sanctions as an “end” but merely as a strategic means to achieve long-term goals by dominating Iraqi oil through its military presence in the Arabian Peninsula. In 1995, Resolution 986 was issued to alleviate the siege’s effects through the “oil-for-food” program, which had the objective of exerting pressure on the Iraqi people and ensuring complete control over oil while manipulating matters in the region according to its interests.

The American-British Blockade on Iraq:

Following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and the deployment of Iraqi forces near the Saudi border, the U.S. deployed its troops in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait as part of Operation Desert Shield in 1991. As Saddam used “chemical” weapons to suppress uprisings of Kurds in northern Iraq and Shiites in the south, the international community believed that Iraq possessed “Weapons of Mass Destruction.”

Accordingly, the UN Security Council mandated Iraq to eliminate all chemical weapons, not develop nuclear weapons, and destroy ballistic missiles with a range exceeding 150 kilometers. Following the crackdown, the UN established “no-fly zones” in the northern and southern two-thirds of Iraq, barring the Iraqi air force from operations while conducting American and British air patrols in these areas. The Iraqi air defense was attacked, leading to the launch of Operation Desert Fox in 1998 (an ongoing bombing campaign against Iraqi air defenses), representing one of the gravest threats to the Iraqi military capability. The mission aimed to weaken Iraq’s military capabilities and compel Saddam to adhere to international resolutions, with no specific political goal but merely weakening the opposing party since weakening an adversary increases the other’s strength. Thus, the comprehensive U.S. policy for a slow control of Iraq persisted for 13 years to fulfill its strategic objectives, culminating in the American invasion of Iraq in 2003.

Preliminary Signs of the American Invasion of Iraq in 2003:

The American invasion of Iraq is a subject of debate in international relations, where America cloaked its actions under humanitarian rights and the war on terrorism. The war was a direct application of the American preemptive strategy, as it attempted to justify the war through various rationale for the international community and the American public. The primary rationales include:

Direct Reasons:

Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Bush administration’s strategy was to weaken Iraq by accusing Hussein’s regime of possessing weapons of mass destruction, particularly chemical and biological ones, which led to Security Council Resolution 687 mandating the destruction of these weapons. Inspection regimes (UNSCOM and later UNMOVIC) were established for monitoring and ensuring disarmament compliance, but Iraq’s refusal led to the decision to employ military force for destroying Iraq’s WMDs. Under U.S. pressure, the Security Council issued Resolution 1441, providing for necessary means to maintain international peace and security. Despite Iraq’s response to the pressure from the U.S. and the Security Council, there was a prevailing belief that this reason was not genuine and served merely as a façade to prevent Iraq from rebuilding its military capabilities. Furthermore, a report to the U.S. State Department indicated the lack of solid evidence of Iraq’s possession of nuclear weapons, but this report was not welcomed by the State Department, as it could hinder war efforts.

The Events of September 11, 2001: September 11 serves as one of the most significant events of the 21st century, marking a monumental shift in U.S. foreign policy. The American strategy became one of “exporting shock” abroad, necessitating a “foe” on which to place responsibility. Consequently, Iraq was spotlighted, and the “war on terror” policy aimed at demolishing Saddam Hussein’s regime gained momentum. Paradoxically, after blaming Osama bin Laden for the incident, Iraq was also accused of collusion, although such claims were dismissed during Saddam’s trial in 2005.

War on Terrorism: The Bush administration operated within an imperial scheme to link Saddam Hussein with terrorism while asserting that Iraq possessed WMDs. In his political endeavors to influence public opinion and the U.S. Congress, Bush continually correlated the aftermath of September 11 with the potential threats posed by WMDs, employing the term “terrorism” that included the axis of evil (Iraq, Iran, and North Korea), positioning Iraq as the first accused member. After the war in Afghanistan, the Bush administration recognized the next inevitable step was invading Iraq, even though in 2002, the head of U.S. intelligence declared Iraq’s non-involvement in the terrorist attack—a fact insufficient to thwart the invasion.

Indirect Reasons:

Seizing Oil: Iraq owns the second-largest oil reserves globally, characterized by its geostrategic significance and rich natural resources, primarily oil. Consequently, it became an essential strategic target for major industrial nations, especially the U.S. The initial presence in the Middle East aimed at controlling oil trade in the region, particularly as the U.S. was the dominant economic and industrial power. Achieving its aims through Iraq was pivotal in reaffirming U.S. interests, especially regarding the unlimited ambitions associated with cementing dollar-based oil transactions.

Israeli Interests: The American intervention in Iraq related directly to preserving Israeli strategic security in the region, relying on President George Bush’s declaration that America was restoring regional balance favorable to Israel. Iraq’s military and strategic strength posed a threat to Israeli presence in the Middle East; hence, Bush’s policy intertwined U.S. security with Israel’s while perceiving Iraq’s alleged WMD production as a threat necessitating proactive measures. Moreover, Iraqi animosity toward Israel symbolized enmity towards the U.S. too, leading to a policy of diminishing the other party to empower the designated party needing protection.

Ideological Reasons: The George Bush administration was built on a somewhat radical religious thought, with neoconservatives dominating its ideology. Post-September 11, this mentality deepened, framing U.S. policy as analogous to a conflict between good and evil, categorizing “Islamic jihad” or “jihadis” as terrorism. Iraq symbolized the application point for this doctrine, coupled with Bush’s Methodist background (Christian Zionism), which believed that certain events must occur before the return of Christ, such as the establishment of Israel, the demolition of Al-Aqsa Mosque, building the Jewish temple in its place, and the conflict between Christians and Jews against Muslims (the Battle of Armageddon). What should not be overlooked is the belief that Saddam Hussein symbolized evil for them; thus, the American war in Iraq was portrayed as one against Islam, as articulated by Bush himself as a “Crusade” under the pretext of combating terrorism. Therefore, religion significantly constituted a fundamental element in decision-making during President George Bush’s tenure, characterized by military ideologies rooted in assertiveness.

American Strategic Thought Regarding Iraq:

The strategic thought of George Bush’s White House: The George Bush administration arrived with renewed ideas in the field of defense and national security, signaling a fundamental change in American national security strategy centered around three main areas (building military strength, power achieving national security objectives, and identifying sources of threats). Accordingly, defensive policy underwent transformations in national security strategy touchstones (focusing on increasing military capabilities, a focus on “missile defense” programs, attention to international spheres in Asia, and modifying nuclear policy). Concurrently, U.S. foreign policy was oriented towards preventive military strategies.

Preemptive War: The American preemptive war policy during George Bush’s era revolved around several core pillars, the most notable being the shock element, effectively nullifying the difference between defense and attack; that is, it becomes indistinguishable whether the dominating power’s behavior constitutes a defense or an attack. The political ramifications of this complicate international behavior and require inquiry into theoretical aspects while necessitating the application of science to define the needed level of deterrence and appropriate diplomatic strategies and tools. This phase saw the concept of preventive defense emerge, serving as a defense strategy with political military lines, relying on foreign policy tools across political, economic, and military administrations. Following the events of September 11, George Bush articulated the “preventive war” theory, wherein military force would be employed against any state or terrorist organization likely to threaten U.S. interests. Notably, Congress approved Bush’s request for military force under preemptive strike assertions to defend American national security, marking the theory of preventive war as a crucial component of U.S. foreign policy—derived legitimacy from the self-defense premise against any threat, or acquiring an advantage in conflict.

Recognizing this strategy’s critical role, neoconservatives regularly advocated for adopting it through the “National Security Strategy,” announced in September 2002 following which, according to this new strategy, the U.S. defense doctrine became fundamentally rooted in “preemptive strikes” while abandoning the doctrine of containment.

Strategic and Military Superiority: Within the White House, aggressive elements exerted pressure for altering the American system. Notable among the advocates for war was “Paul Wolfowitz,” Deputy Secretary of Defense, aligning with George Bush’s emphasis during a speech at the UN General Assembly on the urgency for the Security Council to resolve the Iraqi issue. This initiated the marketing campaign for “the Iraq war” following this speech on September 19, 2002, emphasizing the need to amplify efforts for broad public support against potential military intervention, highlighting perceived threats and asserting the necessity and legitimacy of war when American security is at stake.

Thus, to secure a legal basis for the invasion of Iraq, dubbed “the Joint Resolution for the Authorization of the Use of U.S. Armed Forces against Iraq 2002,” the administration aligned it with reasons including (non-compliance with UN resolutions, possession of WMDs, ties to al-Qaeda, and sheltering terrorist groups). Furthermore, the U.S. foreign policy focused on deposing Saddam Hussein in Iraq. Concurrently, the White House strategy centered around three principles: transitioning from deterrence to preemptive military action against terrorism, proliferation of WMDs, and shifting from containment toward regime change, driven by the notion that authoritarian regimes pose inherent risks to U.S. national interests while fostering public consensus linking intended actions to national stability and security.

Role of the U.S. Department of Defense (Pentagon): Before 2002, the CIA was the primary supporter of George Bush’s administration concerning Iraq, but a unit within the Pentagon called the Office of Special Plans was established under Paul Wolfowitz and Douglas Feith, initially aimed at confirming the link between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda, as well as WMDs. This unit’s objectives included: eliminating Iraqi WMDs and preventing their use to avert Iraq from escaping containment and ending the Iraqi threat to the Middle East, stopping the Iraqi government from oppressing its citizens while severing Iraq’s ties to international terrorism, preserving Iraq’s unity and territorial integrity, and liberating the Iraqi people in support of a moderate, pluralistic, and democratic society.

The objectives laid out sought to foster coherence among planners within U.S. government positions, with military plans not formulated in the Pentagon but rather by combat command officers. For Iraq, that command was CENTCOM; the president and civil defense secretary represented the only means of military leadership. The plan for the invasion was categorized into four phases (preparations for potential invasion, setting the battle area beginning from air operations, large-scale offensive and fighting operations, and reconstruction alongside stabilizing efforts).

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld maintained that the root of the Iraqi issue stemmed from long-standing build-ups resulting in muddled thinking around Iraq. As the current issue arose, accusations about past actions versus responsibilities emerged, yet he sought a method to analyze the core of Iraq’s problem without delving into secondary discussions, ultimately needing a comprehensive conceptual way of analyzing risks related to (links between terrorist groups and supporting nations—WMDs). The Pentagon endorsed the President’s decision in employing a preemptive strategy as it revises traditional views on sovereignty, claiming that the state does not align with customary international laws while being sovereign enough to operate as it deems fit within its borders.

Consequently, a state could direct its military power against any nation perpetrating cross-border aggression. Additionally, two divergent schools of thought emerged before the Iraq invasion within the Bush administration: one focused on containment through severe sanctions, championed by then-Secretary of State Colin Powell, while the other pursued unilateral action via military might endorsed by the Vice President and Secretary of Defense in differing opinions, which drove military readiness and aggregation efforts.

American Invasion of Iraq in 2003:

Military Invasion of Iraq: George Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair met at the White House to determine a launch date for the invasion of Iraq. Twenty nations joined the United States along with organizations and forces opposing Saddam Hussein’s regime, like Kurdish Peshmerga forces led by Jalal Talabani and Masoud Barzani. Subsequently, George Bush attended a NATO summit, gaining approval from 49 nations for the invasion, designating this coalition as “The Coalition of the Willing.”

Iran cooperated with the U.S. with aircraft passage through its territory, as then-President Mohammad Khatami stated, “Without us, America would not have succeeded in occupying Iraq.” On March 17, 2003, Bush ordered Saddam to leave Iraq within 48 hours. Subsequently, Iraq’s military prepared with existing capabilities alongside eight thousand Arab soldiers; the ground and aerial assault on Iraq commenced from U.S. military bases in Qatar, Kuwait, and Bahrain, penetrating the country from the south and the Kurdish forces from the north. The invasion lasted from March 20 to April 6, 2003, with Baghdad’s fall, followed by Kirkuk and Tikrit, leading to the start of American occupation in early May 2003.

Iraq Under American Occupation: The Iraqi state collapsed in a matter of weeks following American entry in 2003, aided by the international coalition led by the United States. With the U.S. occupying Iraq, the country lost both its political and economic independence, transitioning its political system to one based on sectarianism aimed at fragmenting Iraq into smaller states, which significantly impacted the Arab region. Consequently, scholarly discourse on the political transformations following the American occupation focuses on Iraq’s democratization, resulting from military interventions that toppled the regime, hence discussed under two main pivots.

Firstly, Iraq under civilian governor Paul Bremer: The Iraqi community underwent significant political changes in 2003, starkly differing from previous transformations. The Iraqi society did not align with the radical transformations, leading to a transition to a new system that imposed political and social changes. Democratic institutions were developed and bolstered in Iraq, yet this was alien to the Iraqi populace. Paul Bremer, a U.S. diplomat, was appointed by President George Bush in May 2003 to oversee internal affairs in Iraq, issued a decision for the dissolution of the army, disbanding all institutions associated with national security and terminating the Iraqi army, declaring the establishment of a new Iraqi army. Just days into Bremer’s administration, a power vacuum surfaced, resulting in chaos.

The fall of Saddam Hussein’s tyrannical regime represented half of the declared coalition objectives, leading Iraq into a state of turmoil, devoid of authority, army, or police, with all security forces removed, leading to rampant looting prior to the American occupation. Notably, the U.S. failed to provide adequate protection for critical institutions in Baghdad, successfully securing the oil ministry while targeting its security with tanks—suggesting that one of the most critical motivations for the American occupation stemmed from economic and strategic reasons (oil significance). The American occupation faced armed resistance during Bremer’s rule, with terrorist operations aimed at civilians. Yet all efforts to repel the American invasion seemed insufficient for its time.

A strong discourse from Moktada al-Sadr against the U.S., responded to by Bremer through the closure of the Shiite man’s newspaper, consequent resistance from the Mahdi Army escalated across Baghdad and other areas. The U.S. thus entered a fierce battle in Najaf and Fallujah, employing various types of weaponry. Many resistance members were detained and subjected to harsh torture, igniting political heat among Iraqi politicians.

Notably, Bremer’s decision to dissolve the Iraqi army proved catastrophic, leading to ISIS’s emergence as an offshoot of al-Qaeda post-war.

Bremer established a transitional governing council comprised of seven political parties opposing the Iraqi regime. The Coalition Authority delineated this council’s tasks and responsibilities, aiming to shape state policies and set the national budget while planning to amend the Iraqi constitution.

The council’s presidency rotated monthly among the nine members; ultimately, this governing council represented the first provisional constitution following the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime, laying the groundwork for an established democratic federal system in Iraq’s contemporary history while acknowledging fundamental human rights, ensuring equality among Iraqis, and delineating powers. It set a timeline for political and constitutional issues, such as national assembly elections. Thus, the occupation became an accomplished reality for Iraq but lacked legitimacy for managing the occupied territories or specific powers. Laws were imposed in Iraq by the American administration following a UNSC resolution, assuming its obligations within international law limitations, i.e., the occupier must adhere to the existing laws of the country.

Hence, Iraq faced a new reality; the representation of its multifaceted populace became the most significant issue confronting civil governance in managing the new Iraqi affairs due to losing control over plurality while mistrusting allies, hampering American decisions that stymied numerous interests, complicating the Iraqi political scene.

The occupying forces aimed to directly manage Iraq while announcing intentions to establish a government assisting them in governing both the Iraq delegation and its transitional authority, aiming for full Iraqi authority transition, forming a fully empowered government while initiating fresh conflicts between the occupier and Iraq. It should be noted that the transitional governing council represented one of the steps towards Iraq’s democratization, encompassing diverse sectarian, religious, ethnic, political, and nationalist factions, though it remained largely nominal, deriving its legitimacy from the occupiers—rendering it involuntary by the Iraqi people, granting occupiers a veto over decisions.

A summary of Bremer’s actions during his tenure includes:

• Dissolution of the Ba’ath Party enforced by a decision on May 16, 2003.
• De-registering a thousand Ba’athists from public office.
• The Iraqi army and security apparatus dissolution while depriving significant portions of the population of job opportunities.

Importantly, the Iraqi populace split into two factions: one adversely affected by the American occupation, calling for resistance, and another aligned with the regime’s former opposition, notably including Shiites, Kurds, and minorities aligned with the monarchy before 1958. Thus, the American occupation operated according to specific agendas aimed at achieving U.S. interests, disregarding Iraq and its people, as reflected during the 2004 transitional government.

Consequences of the American War on Iraq:

1. Politically and Security-Wise: Since the onset of American occupation, the U.S. administration has sought to appeal to Shiites at the expense of Sunnis, yet following the war, the Coalition Forces, led by civilian governor Paul Bremer, established a transitional governing council.

• There emerged what was termed as a “democratic government” in Iraq, engendering sectarian conflict, with rising sectarian violence culminating in civil war, state fragmentation, and collapse. Ultimately, U.S. policy fostered sectarianism in Iraqi society, given the discrimination faced by Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds.
• Moreover, many employees were ousted from their positions, significantly impacting security within Iraq, leading many of those to join resistance groups raising arms against the occupation and the Iraqi government.

2. Regionally:

• The American war in Iraq undermined the regional system and failed the Arab League’s collective system represented in safeguarding Arab rights. Additionally, Israel reaped immediate benefits regionally, as Iraq’s weakening relieved it from a major threat, while Iraq’s neighbor increased its regional influence contrary to American and Israeli interests.

3. Internationally:

• The invasion unveiled the ineffectiveness of the UN Security Council and the UN in maintaining international peace and security, as the United States bypassed it when it could not supersede the majority of its members.

4. Economically:

• The American war obliterated Iraq’s national state foundations; it effectively led to the ruination of the Iraqi dinar’s value and resulted in exchanges of 1500-2000 dinars equating to one American dollar.
• Furthermore, Iraqi debts swelled into billions of dollars, and the agricultural sector and Iraq’s infrastructure collapsed. Electricity, drinking water, communication, and housing sectors were utterly destroyed.
• Unemployment rates surged between 30%-40%, malnutrition escalated, and foreign capital fled, alongside rising corruption and a decline in oil production between 2003-2005 due to prolonged resistance operations targeting oil refineries, also attributed to the substantial exploitation of Iraqi oil by the occupation.

5. Culturally and Socially:

Many archaeological museums and documents were looted within Baghdad’s museums.

The Iraqi National Museum was plundered of 170,000 pieces of historic artifacts.

Unemployment rates rose, causing social disintegration, with epidemics and diseases leading to numerous child fatalities.

Temporary authorities appointed by occupying powers, who were widely resented by the Iraqi populace, also enhanced social rifts and instability.

Additionally, an observable phenomenon of human capital migration emerged.

Based on the above, we can conclude from the suffering endured by Iraq during the American war that the conflict contributed to state failure and destruction, increased socioeconomic divisions, and escalated casualties resulting from American interventions in Iraq.

Reactions of Regional and International Organizations to the American Occupation of Iraq:

Arab League:

Amr Moussa, the then Secretary-General of the Arab League, pronounced America’s invasion of Iraq as a sorrowful day for all Arab people. He affirmed the League’s position of bearing clear opposition against any foreign military strike against Arab nations. Moussa also urged the UN Security Council to undertake all responsibilities assigned to it and to adopt all needed measures to preserve international peace and halt the war against Iraq. He held many deliberations and visits with the UN Secretary-General even prior to the invasion to address the situation in Iraq, discovering a prevailing sentiment advocating for the return of nuclear inspectors to affirm Iraq’s lack of nuclear pursuits.

Moussa contended that the Security Council had its role marginalized when deciding to engage in war against Iraq and acknowledged that Arab League members opposed the American occupation of Iraq, viewing it as a precursor for intervention against other Arab nations, as stated by Saeed Kamal, the League’s Assistant Secretary-General.

United Nations:

Despite UN efforts in aiming for international peace and security, its role regarding the American occupation of Iraq was minimally effective, with UN Security Council resolutions failing to authorize UN missions in Iraq to end American presence.

Additionally, the UN played a crucial but limited role in altering the state of affairs in Iraq, primarily focusing on humanitarian missions and national interests, but excluding armed groups which should have been under governmental purview while facilitating relations between Iraq and neighboring states. There were suggestions that if preemptive efforts at ending foreign presence had progressed, the humanitarian situation in Iraq might have faced severe risks due to conflicts and exceptional security incidents.

Consequences of American Intervention in Iraq:

Past indicators suggest that American intervention in Iraq was not a casual undertaking but part of a systematic American strategy towards the Middle East. This strategy began to crystallize between 2001-2003, after the ousting of Saddam Hussein, forming fundamentally around the overarching theme of “achieving American interests”— by any possible means. The U.S. believed that securing its interests in the region could be facilitated through multiple means, notably complicity from regional states in its favor—indeed, this transpired during the American invasion of Iraq, wherein some regional countries acted as allies, providing support to U.S. forces. Additionally, the creation of a politically unstable environment was crucial for justifying intervention in its affairs while creating a basis for legitimizing such intervention.

The American intervention in Iraq had far-reaching outcomes at regional and international levels resulting from a new approach which America adopted concerning the regional states—the use of brutal military intervention.

American Strategy Towards Iraq During Barack Obama’s Presidency (2009-2017):

The presidency of Barack Obama marked a pivotal period when discussing U.S. strategy in Iraq due to his entry into office in 2009, reinforcing previous strategies towards the Middle East while representing a significant shift in American policy concerning Iraq specifically.

• U.S. Withdrawal from Iraq: 2011: The withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq marked the onset of a shift in American strategy towards the Middle East and Iraq. After a near nine-year conflict, President Obama announced a pullout of the majority of U.S. troops from Iraq, implementing a timeline for this withdrawal. Consequently, it was projected that the U.S. would extract combat forces by the end of August 2010 but retain between 30,000 to 50,000 troops through the end of 2011, as stipulated in the withdrawal agreement. Obama underscored that the rationale for keeping these troops in Iraq was rooted in supporting the new American strategy concerning Iraq, including training the Iraqi army, and protecting American interests and diplomats stationed in Iraq.

As usual, this decision prompted varying responses from Republicans and Democrats; the former welcomed the decision while the latter expressed reservations, finding the retention of such a substantial troop presence in Iraq unnerving and larger than anticipated. Intelligence sources revealed that U.S. Central Command in Iraq held concerns about the ramifications of this withdrawal, with predictions of deteriorating security conditions. International reactions inferred that the withdrawal wouldn’t be straightforward, yet conditions in Iraq appeared to improve under a government of trust (the Maliki government).

Shifts in American Strategy Towards Iraq Under Barack Obama:

Before addressing U.S. strategy towards Iraq during Obama’s presidency, we should consider the temperature and climate that influenced the American strategy, with clear reflections on Iraq’s policy trajectory. Overall, Obama’s strategy underwent multiple transformations heavily influenced by previous plans targeting the Middle East, supporting security, peace, and democracy while also contending that American ambitions faced challenges by the “Arab Spring” revolutions.

These revolutions significantly altered how the United States approached its strategy in the region. The U.S. began to adopt a new strategy marked by a “gradual withdrawal from the Middle East,” leading to a pressing question: What prompted the transformation in American strategy toward this region? Various factors highlight this change, primarily:

1. Oil Discoveries: The U.S. initial interest in the Eastern Mediterranean region was predominantly anchored in securing its interests, particularly amidst heavy reliance on oil in this area. However, upon discovering “shale oil,” the U.S. asserted that it could achieve energy independence, subsequently declining its interest in this region as it lost allure for American policymakers and was thus a key factor in diminishing U.S. engagement in the area.
2. American Public Opinion: This emerged as a significant factor in prompting shifts in American strategy in the region, with public sentiment becoming increasingly averse to foreign intervention due to the extensive economic and human costs incurred by such actions.
3. Arab Spring Revolutions: These events represented a tipping point in shifts within American strategy as they were met with skepticism regarding the U.S. engagement role in the region, as regional populations expressed discontent towards any American involvement.
4. Shifting American Focus Away from the Middle East to Asian Powers: Another essential factor leading to reduced American interest in the Middle East was the U.S. pivot toward the Asian continent, driven by the prevailing atmosphere suggesting that maintaining a role in the Middle East was becoming untenable. The U.S. sought henceforth to contend with the rising influence of other global powers in Asia.

Consequently, a popular rejection of foreign interventions from both sides arose alongside the absence of economic incentives following the shale boom in the U.S.; moreover, an even larger concern emerged regarding the threats posed by the rising powers overshadowing American sovereignty in global dynamics. Thus, the U.S. adapted to these changes and initiated a transformation in its strategy toward the region, issuing a strategic document in January 2012 that outlined a shift in American priorities from the Middle East to the Pacific Basin and Asia while redefining its role and involvement in the Middle East.

Characteristics of the Transition in American Strategy Towards Iraq:

The United States adopted a new approach that emphasized non-interference in Iraq’s internal political affairs without allowing for alternatives to military intervention aimed at preserving American influence amidst encroaching regional forces. The U.S. began banking on the success of its planned withdrawal from Iraq to validate its decision to withdraw forces from Afghanistan. It became clear to Obama that he was contending with a U.S. public opinion exhibiting dual concerns—one segment expressing deep discontent over the human and economic losses endured from external interventions while another cautioned that a hasty withdrawal might create a vacuum easily filled by hostile forces like Iran—historically America’s primary adversary in the region.

Moreover, the United States recognized the ongoing necessity of maintaining its footing in Iraq to control its oil market and set pricing for its allies suitably. Therefore, Obama’s new strategy seemed to reconcile oppositional demands while integrating all the phase requirements. Hence, he didn’t issue an outright withdrawal order from Iraq. In contrast, he shifted his engagement approach, opting for indirect methods by emphasizing advisory roles, training local military and security forces, alongside specific operations. The U.S. ultimately leveraged this strategy effectively, facing immediate challenges when encountering ISIS in Iraq, which successfully captured substantial territory. The U.S. decided that intervention was necessary to thwart ISIS’s ambitions in Iraq yet chose indirect attack strategies, conducting aerial strikes against ISIS positions while deploying military advisors to assist the Iraqi government in countering ISIS alongside supplying and arming Iraqi forces.

American Strategy Towards Iraq During Donald Trump’s Presidency (2017-2021):

Donald Trump’s rise to the presidency heralded a change in U.S. foreign policy towards the Middle East, with the hallmarks of this policy swiftly emerging. Trump adopted a foreign policy reminiscent of his domestic strategies regarding economic hegemony and the consolidation of the Zionist entity within the Arab milieu, coupled with constraining opposing nations through threats of sanctions and crisis creation.

American Strategy Towards the Middle East During Donald Trump’s Presidency: Trump’s ascension marked a pivotal shift in U.S. policy towards the Middle East, thus shedding light on the core principles of this strategy, which focused on U.S. interests regarding the region while subsequently directing spotlight on Iraq’s role and standing within the American strategy at that time. This portion addresses two key demands; the first elucidates U.S. foreign policy towards the Middle East generally, while the second specifically targets U.S. foreign policy concerning Iraq, which fundamentally constituted the pivotal determinant in American strategy during this period.

Principles of American Foreign Policy Towards the Middle East: The characteristics and attributes of a country’s leadership unequivocally impact its policies and directions, leading to the emergence of schools in political science regarding the concept of charismatic power and populism, examining the leader’s capacity to rally public opinion behind them. As such, Trump exemplifies a populist and charismatic leader in U.S. history whose underlying principles significantly influenced American policies domestically and externally.

America First Principle: Trump launched his presidency with this foundational principle, emphasizing placing American interests above all else while ensuring internal priorities informed his foreign policy orientation.

Nothing for the Middle East Without a Price: This was a recurring stance in Trump’s official speeches, where he consistently argued that the U.S. would no longer shield others without considerable compensation, asserting that the Middle East holds substantial wealth that necessitated American protection. Trump argued that this protection warranted remuneration.

Skepticism Towards Humanitarian Intervention: Trump’s administration displayed limited interest in intervening in other states’ internal affairs for humanitarian grounds except when U.S. interests were at stake. However, he recognized a particular approach focusing on unilateral military intervention, ignoring ethical considerations in such cases. This perspective was illustrated by the U.S. withdrawal from Syria without consideration for the potential humanitarian crises resulting from the exit.

Isolation Principle: Many political analysts labeled Trump as a successor to former President Monroe concerning isolationist policy, which he argued was critical, positing that the U.S. should not embroil itself in global affairs outside its borders.

Significant Strategic Shift Concerning the Palestinian Issue: The strategic tilt towards the Palestinian problem during Trump’s tenure marked a fundamental alteration in U.S. involvement with this sensitive crisis. Trump’s announced policy signaled away from the U.S. goal of being a neutral mediator in the peace process, breaking from the traditional approaches championed by predecessors like Obama, who steered clear of demonstrating undue favoritism toward Israel. Trump’s policies effectively waived these considerations in favor of endorsing Israeli claims, as exemplified by his declaration of East Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and the directions for relocating the U.S. embassy there. Consequently, the U.S. transformed from a neutral faction attempting to mediate the Palestinian issue into a biased entity favoring one side over the other.

American Foreign Policy Towards Iraq During Donald Trump’s Presidency:

The American strategy towards Iraq under Trump diverged considerably from prior strategies, advocating for a restructuring of the Iraqi situation, likely in response to U.S. success in countering ISIS, confirming again that U.S. policy was firmly driven by national interests. Ultimately, the bases for this strategy predominantly affiliated with:

Control Over Iraqi Oil: U.S. administrations routinely savvy the significance of oil, the chief energy source driving their economic foundation. Trump’s dealings with Iraq reflected its position as a critical player in global oil markets, employing military force aimed at securing Iraqi oil as restitution for the incurred losses from the war.

Limiting Regional Powers’ Influence: In the aftermath of ISIS’s onslaught in 2014, Iraq’s neighbors sought to solidify their influence via varied approaches, aiding Iraq against terrorism while fortifying economic and social ties. Unsurprisingly, this regional expansion caused unease for the U.S., heightening anxiety regarding potential threats to American interests. This contrasted sharply with Obama’s perspective, who perceived affiliated presence in Iraq positively.

Counter-Terrorism Efforts in Iraq: The 2018 U.S. counter-terrorism strategy, seen as one of the most comprehensive and clarifying since Obama’s, steered clear of the retaliatory circumstantials of previous administrations. The focus shifted towards countering violent extremism ideologically while increasing engagement and producing collaborative efforts both military and intelligence-driven against terrorism.

American Strategy Towards Iraq Under Joe Biden (2021-Present):

A historical connection links President Joe Biden with Iraq dating back to 2006 when he proposed a famous plan he referred to as proposing to partition Iraq into Shiite Arab territory in the south, Sunni Arab territory in the center, and Kurdish regions in the north. At that time, he compared his plan to George Bush’s erratic policies, especially under neoconservative influences that failed in Iraq. Undoubtedly, this proposal did not receive favorable reception amidst Arab political currents owing to significant nationalist ideologies opposing partition. Nonetheless, this project resurfaced with the ascent of Democrats under Biden to the U.S. presidency.

The American foreign policy landscape towards Iraq underwent a renewed discussion; Biden sought to diminish U.S. engagement in the Middle East while reprioritizing American national security objectives, emphasizing real threats resident in the challenges posed by China and Russia. Biden depicted continuing U.S. presence in the Middle East as squandered efforts with opportunities better directed toward pressing global matters demanding priority American investments. This view resonated with many Americans, disillusioned by the persistent crises and convoluted struggles that drained American economic resources.

In July 2021, Biden made a significant announcement regarding U.S. intentions to conclude combat mission objectives in Iraq by year’s end, yet retain forces to assist in training the Iraqi military and providing military advisory functions. This declaration elicited dissatisfaction from Iraqi parties close to regional neighbors advocating for complete withdrawal against the continued threat posed by ISIS, while the domestic climate favored the American stance; various Shiite militias actively launched attacks upon military bases hosting U.S. coalition troops, impelling American presences as prevention against existing dangers.

Biden professed multiple times that the Middle East had calmed during his administration—a claim bolstered by Iraq’s hosting significant Saudi-Iranian dialogues alongside notable efforts for government formation. However, he faced critique for performance failures regarding election support in Iraq while also enhancing a multi-sectarian government adept in maintaining sovereignty against the influence of neighboring regional power dynamics.

Conclusion:

A thorough reading of the Iraqi file opens the door to numerous conclusions, primarily indicating that, beyond being a focal point of U.S. influence, Iraq reflected American strategies directed towards the Middle East while serving as a battleground for varied political actors and regional powers. Events from Iraq since 2003 to 2021 symbolize fierce contests shaped into two primary contexts: 1. Political showdowns among varying political currents within the U.S., notably Republicans versus Democrats; and 2. Territorial disputes between the U.S. and Iran being the two predominant forces in the region. The contest between these global players signifies Iraq as a strategic point for both throughout this period.

The culmination of this competition reached its peak during Trump’s presidency; notably, just two months before taking leave from the White House, Trump announced the U.S. plans to withdraw troops from Iraq, while a crucially strategic action involved in the last decade—the assassination of Qassem Soleimani, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard’s elite Quds Force Commander—demonstrated American-Iran terratorial dynamics amidst the ongoing power struggles shaping Iraq’s policy maneuvers.

In summation, the American invasion of Iraq stands as one of the most significant events in the entire region, generating countless questions, particularly those concerning the strategic motives behind such action and whether it indicated a spur of casual U.S. interventions or a segment of a larger strategy concerning the Middle East. This study endeavors to illustrate the strategic reasons behind such moves, delineate shifts in strategy, comprehend their motivations and aftermaths, and gauge the impacts on both nations and the region at large. Additionally, this work transcends mere descriptive examination, offering conclusions and analyses while connecting internal circumstances to each state’s foreign policy maneuvers towards one another.

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