Determinants of China’s Position on the Renewed War on Gaza

On the dawn of March 18, 2025, Israel resumed its war on Gaza, disregarding the ceasefire agreement after violating its obligations under the first phase of the deal. This Israeli action, coordinated in advance with the United States, provoked global reactions. China’s stance toward Israel’s actions remained consistent with its broader perspective—not only regarding the escalation that began on October 7, 2023, and the subsequent starvation, destruction, and forced displacement of Palestinians, but also concerning the entire Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the approach to resolving it in a way that guarantees Palestinian rights.

China’s Emphasis on a Ceasefire

Throughout the 15 months of war, China persistently stressed the necessity of a ceasefire. The first point in its position paper—issued less than two months after the outbreak of the latest Gaza war—called for a “comprehensive ceasefire and cessation of hostilities”, urging the implementation of relevant international resolutions, including UN Security Council Resolution 2712 (November 15, 2023). When a ceasefire agreement was reached on January 15, 2025, Beijing welcomed it, hoping for effective implementation to achieve a “comprehensive and permanent ceasefire”.

China also reaffirmed its commitment to humanitarian aid and readiness to assist in Gaza’s reconstruction, aligning with the third point of its position paper: ensuring humanitarian relief so that civilians in Gaza are not deprived of “essential supplies and services for survival” (as stated in Resolution 2712). Beijing further urged the Security Council to encourage increased aid amid deteriorating conditions, support UN-coordinated assistance (including through UNRWA, which faces constant Israeli attacks), and push for Gaza’s post-war reconstruction.

China’s Principled Stance on Palestinian Rights

China’s position stems from its conviction that Palestinians must attain their legitimate rights. Beijing categorically rejected proposals to displace Gazans, emphasizing the principle of “Palestinians governing Palestine.” It endorsed the Egyptian-led Arab summit plan (March 4, 2025), supporting Arab efforts to enforce the ceasefire, sustain aid flows, and restore regional stability.

China condemned Israel’s military resurgence, demanding an end to:

• Operations in the West Bank, including forced displacements and home demolitions.
• Settlement expansion and settler violence.
• Any annexation plans for the West Bank or Gaza.

China’s Characterization of Israeli Actions

On the day Israel resumed strikes, China responded:

“We hope relevant parties will ensure the continued and effective implementation of the ceasefire agreement, avoid escalation, and prevent a worsening humanitarian catastrophe.”

While the U.S. (the primary “relevant party”) had greenlit Israel’s operations, China criticized:

• Israel’s “obsession with force”, undermining the hard-won ceasefire.
• The futility of military solutions, stressing negotiations as the only path.
• Politicization of aid, urging Israel (as the occupying power) to ensure full humanitarian access.

Beyond Rhetoric: What Can China Do?

China’s principled clarity contrasts with U.S. actions—unconditional arms shipments, naval deployments, and diplomatic shielding for Israel. Yet Beijing faces critiques for not matching rhetoric with concrete measures.

Key constraints on China’s role:

1. Pragmatic foreign policy: Prefers diplomatic over military leverage.
2. U.S.-China tensions: Limits confrontational steps to avoid broader clashes.
3. Deference to regional actors: Prioritizes Arab leadership on Palestine.

Regional Integration of China’s Stance

China’s Palestinian policy aligns with its broader Middle East approach, including:

• Hosting Russia-Iran talks (March 14, 2025) on de-escalating the Iran nuclear issue.
• Warning against Israeli violations in Lebanon/Syria and Houthi threats to Red Sea shipping.

Conclusion

China’s consistent framework on Gaza—rooted in ceasefire advocacy, anti-annexation, and humanitarian relief—offers a basis for Arab-Chinese coordination. However, its non-interventionist pragmatism tempers expectations of U.S.-style activism, leaving room for diplomacy over direct confrontation.