The countries of the Horn of Africa suffer from violence and insecurity. The region is a hub on the trade and migration route in the Red Sea, bordering the unstable regions of the Sahel and Central Africa, and is of strategic importance to the European Union. The EU has adopted an integrated framework to align various foreign policy programs and tools aimed at securing the region. However, conflicts between the concerned states make it more difficult to achieve stability in the Horn of Africa.
The Horn of Africa, as a relatively recent geographical and political term, has various interpretations regarding the exact definition of the geographical area referred to as the Horn of Africa. Naturally, the geopolitical concept is the closest for understanding and analyzing current interactions, as it also includes countries located along the Red Sea coast that control the southern entrance to this sea, especially Somalia and Yemen, and also the Arabian Gulf. The strategic importance of the Horn of Africa is emphasized in geopolitical theories. However, the importance of the Horn of Africa is not limited to location considerations only, but also to natural resources.
The term “Horn of Africa” refers to that prominent protrusion on the map of the continent, which takes the shape of a horn in the far northeast of East Africa. This horn is a triangle with a base that starts from the center of the Republic of Djibouti, located at Bab al-Mandab in the north, and extends through Ethiopian territory west of the Ogaden region. It extends into Kenya to the Tana River in the southern part of northeastern Kenya. According to this anthropological definition, the Horn of Africa covers an area of 450,000 square miles. Disagreements have arisen in determining the number of countries that make up the Horn of Africa region, with geographers identifying it from Eritrea in the north to the Gulf of Aden in the east and from the Indian Ocean in the south including Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Somalia to Kenya in the north.
Origins of Al-Shabaab?
Al-Shabaab is an extremist Islamist group based in Somalia. It took control of the capital, Mogadishu, in the late 2000s, but a military campaign led by the African Union and supported by the United States and other Western partners pushed it out of major population centers. The group has demonstrated resilience and remains the primary security challenge in Somalia. It controls large parts of the south and continues to launch deadly attacks against international forces and civilians in the region. The threat posed by Al-Shabaab has prompted the African Union to reconsider its withdrawal and complicated U.S. counterterrorism operations, which have fluctuated in recent years.
International Security – Risks of Sudan Sliding into Chaos and Its Impact on Regional and International Security
Somalia is considered one of the poorest countries in the world and has seen extremist groups come and go over decades of political turmoil. Al-Shabaab serves as an incubator for many extremist elements, including Al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI), or the “Union of Islam,” a hardline Salafi “jihadist” group that peaked in the 1990s after the fall of Siad Barre’s regime (1969–1991) and the outbreak of civil war. The core of AIAI consisted of Somali extremists educated in the Middle East and was partially funded and armed by Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden.
The general situation in Somalia is extremely fragile. With the election of President Mohamed Abdullahi “Farmaajo” and the formation of a new government in 2017, there was hope for sustainable improvement in security and humanitarian conditions. However, a power struggle ensued between President Farmaajo and Prime Minister Roble. Al-Shabaab remains highly active, regularly carrying out violent attacks in large parts of the country, including the capital, Mogadishu. The African Union peacekeeping mission AMISOM, funded by the European Union, was converted into the new ATMIS mission in early April 2022. Its goal is to transfer full security responsibility to Somali forces by the end of 2024.
Patterns of Extremism
Al-Shabaab’s violence increased in 2022, with the group involved in more than 2,400 political violence events, including over 1,700 battles and around 300 incidents targeting civilians – a 19% and 41% increase respectively compared to 2021. Active in Somalia for nearly two decades, Al-Shabaab was especially active in the Banadir, Lower Shabelle, and Lower Juba regions, where rebels clashed with Somali security forces and international troops. The targeting of civilians was highest in Banadir, Lower Shabelle, and Hiran, with increases of 17%, 95%, and 366%, respectively, compared to 2021. The group also expanded the scale and scope of attacks on civilians, particularly in Hiran and Lower Shabelle.
China-Africa Cooperation
China’s systematic security agenda across Africa was outlined during the 2018 China-Africa Cooperation Forum Summit, whose Action Plan (2019–2021) called for establishing 50 separate programs to strengthen security coordination between China and its African partners across the continent. This includes the China-Africa Peace and Security Forum and the China-Africa Forum on Law Enforcement and Security. Chinese state-owned enterprises are already spending $10 billion globally on security, with a large portion allocated to Africa for Chinese security support ranging from regular military and civilian police to “private” security companies.
Beijing began some serious military spending in Africa in 2015 – and more investment could also signal a transformative new role in Africa’s political and economic development. Regardless, the continued retreat of the U.S. and Europe from economic engagement with Africa compared to China will come with increasing geopolitical costs.
The U.S. announced that it has resumed its limited military presence in Somalia after the previous administration withdrew its forces in 2020. The mission of the American troops, which number between 450 and 500, remains unchanged from the past 15+ years: to advise and assist Somali forces. It is worth noting that U.S. forces do not directly participate in combat.
Redeployment in Somalia
During his campaign, President Joe Biden pledged to avoid “forever wars” against terrorism, ongoing since 2002. None of these wars have ever been won. In light of U.S. efforts to restructure its military to confront threats from China, this decision is better explained by the renewed emphasis on the old rivalry with Russia following its intervention in Ukraine.
Counterterrorism – The Threat of Extremist Groups in Africa to International Security
Upon announcing the redeployment, the Pentagon claimed it was partly for operational security. After its 2020 withdrawal, U.S. special forces continued training Somali soldiers outside Somalia and occasionally entered and exited the country. The Department of Defense said the redeployment would eliminate the need to establish bases inside Somalia.
The European Union – A New Strategy
How is the EU dealing with the new strategy of terrorist and criminal networks? In December 2020, the EU Council extended the mandate of Operation Atalanta. The operation also helped enforce the UN arms embargo on Somalia and combat illicit drug trafficking. Its main focus remains protecting ships carrying World Food Programme shipments and supporting the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). This includes securing international shipping off Somalia’s coast and combating piracy.
Why is the Horn of Africa Important to Europe?
Around 40% of global shipping lanes and 25% of the EU’s maritime supplies pass through the Gulf of Aden. Although piracy has largely been contained through international efforts, particularly the EU’s Operation ATLANTA, it remains a fundamental threat to maritime security, including illegal trafficking and trade. The security situation remains unstable, with continued activity from the two terrorist groups: Al-Shabaab and ISIS.
Counterterrorism – EU Efforts in Africa
European Union – Geopolitical Competition
In the context of growing geopolitical competition, the EU must urgently recognize that Africa could be one of the most legitimate partners for achieving its goal of “strategic autonomy.” Europeans have already realized that their southern neighbors can help meet new energy and raw material needs amid the U.S.-China trade war and sanctions on Russia. It is now time to take a more proactive stance toward African political concerns to strengthen the resilience of its communities and institutions. Furthermore, Africa is not just a substitute for strategic rivals or unreliable partners – it is also a gateway to the broader Global South. By strengthening its ties with the African continent, Europe may regain credibility in other developing and emerging countries, from Latin America to Asia.
Regarding the movement of people, despite efforts to enhance cooperation with the African Union and the United Nations on migrants and refugees stranded in Libya and the ambition to address the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement, the EU’s core efforts remain focused on limiting arrivals to European shores, combating smuggling in the Mediterranean, and increasing returns to countries of origin in Africa. The EU-Africa relationship urgently needs a new strategy, one based on a significantly changed international context, a more balanced distribution of benefits and responsibilities, and a long-term vision.
Assessment
- The Horn of Africa remains of strategic importance both regionally and internationally. This drives major and global powers – especially the U.S., China, Russia, and European countries – to maintain a military and security presence to protect their economic interests in the Horn of Africa, the Red Sea, and Bab al-Mandab.
- What concerns international and regional actors is that the coastal or nearby countries of the Horn of Africa suffer from significant fragility and instability, notably Somalia. This has prompted the U.S. and others to base their operations in Djibouti to protect maritime navigation and curb extremist groups, especially Al-Shabaab.
- The U.S. relies heavily on drones for targeting extremist groups and reconnaissance rather than deploying ground forces due to the chaos there. This is not a real solution and does not reduce the capacity of extremist groups or their threat to maritime navigation in the Horn of Africa.
- The spread of chaos in Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia, and potentially other countries leads to the emergence of extremist groups exploiting such chaos for their benefit. This is becoming more likely in the absence of proactive measures by international and regional actors.
- The EU has no real influence in the Horn of Africa despite the presence of Operation ATLANTA. This is due to national interests, particularly France’s, and the operation not being strong enough to serve as a European decision-making force. The EU’s role remains limited and subordinate to American power.
- The chaos in Sudan is likely to persist and spill across borders, meaning developments in Sudan will have significant security implications for the Sahel region and the Horn of Africa, as well as West Africa via Chad. The chaos in Sudan could revive extremist group activities in the Sahel and threaten international maritime routes. The Horn of Africa has previously witnessed numerous piracy acts off Somalia’s coast, threatening global shipping. This calls for proactive steps by international actors to find a political solution in Sudan and adopt security and military measures in the Horn of Africa.
- Despite the EU’s preoccupation with the war in Ukraine, it is expected to increase its attention and strengthen its military and naval presence in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea, given the economic importance of these areas to Europe and the world during a time of major economic crises.
What the EU needs is to continue its efforts in the Horn of Africa to promote stability and security. There is a need to address the root causes of extremism and terrorism through humanitarian aid programs, cooperation on governance and the rule of law, peacebuilding, social inclusion, education, and climate change adaptation.
References
[1] GEOPOLITICS OF THE HORN OF AFRICA: IMPORTANCE AND DIMENSIONSbit.ly/42BAx3J [2] Al-Shabaab | Council on Foreign Relations
bit.ly/42AQaZ6 [3] Horn of Africa and East Africa
bit.ly/44MvA9Z [4] Context Assessment: Heightened Political Violence in Somalia
bit.ly/3Bs7SCN [5] China’s new military base in Africa: What it means for Europe and America | ECFR
bit.ly/3LPZbqA [6] What US re-entry into Somalia means for the Horn of Africa and for bigger powers
bit.ly/3nMC7RC [7] Horn of Africa: Bundeswehr mission off the Somali coast to continue
bit.ly/3LFo5ZS [8] Building Somalia’s state and security and stabilising the Horn of Africa | EEAS
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