The security and defense services sector (ESSD) has witnessed significant expansion in recent decades, particularly in the African market. The worsening security crises on the continent, combined with the challenges faced by some African governments in dealing with them, has justified the increasing use of security and defense service companies. In addition to local firms, many foreign security companies have also engaged in the continent, with missions ranging from protecting citizens to supporting operations conducted by local armed forces. In this context, Russian and Chinese companies appear particularly active in Africa. Since the early 21st century, Moscow and Beijing have established themselves as key players in international security, significantly increasing their influence on the African continent.
In this regard, the “Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique” (FRS) in France published a study in 2024 to analyze the Russian and Chinese models in the security and defense services sector and their roles within Africa. It examined the classification of security and defense service companies, alongside an analysis of the historical and legal frameworks of Russian and Chinese security companies, their strategies, and affiliations with state authorities, focusing on comparing the two models to identify differences, cooperation dimensions, and integration.
Classification of Security Companies:
The lack of a universally agreed definition for security and defense service companies and private military companies (PMCs) leads to considerable blending and overlap between very different entities. In this context, Oudi Thomas, Vincent Touret, and Philippe Gross provided a classification of these companies into four categories:
- Consulting Firms: These specialize in consultancy, auditing, research, and training, providing methodological or technical knowledge. They cannot deploy combat units, capabilities, or equipment.
- Specialized Service Companies: These companies can provide commercial services, whether for equipment (including weapons) or specialized human resources. They can also form field teams and ensure logistical services.
- Operational Capability Companies: These are companies capable of performing high-level operational skills on behalf of clients. They differ from specialized service companies by their ability to provide operational functions and ensure their proper operation in a participatory environment. These companies can guarantee command and control (C2) functions, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR), electronic warfare, and more.
- Beyond Security Service Companies: These companies possess highly advanced operational capabilities able to integrate political and strategic activities that go beyond security, such as media activities, political influence, resource exploitation, etc. As a result, these companies enjoy a significant degree of autonomy and maneuverability, allowing them to respond to the interests of their institution and the regime.
Most of the Chinese security and defense service companies operating in Africa belong to the specialized service category, while their Russian counterparts, traditionally referred to as “private military companies” (PMC) such as Convoy, Patriot, Redut, or Wagner, are considered part of the operational capability and beyond security service categories. Wagner (currently the African Legion) is among the most notable companies due to its diverse activities.
The Chinese Companies Model:
In contrast to their Western or Russian counterparts, Chinese security and defense service companies internationalized relatively late, in response to increasing incidents affecting Beijing’s projects in Africa. Despite this delay, Chinese security companies are increasingly prominent in the African market, primarily focusing on protecting Chinese interests in the region. Some key features of these companies include:
- Late but Growing Internationalization: China has one of the largest security service markets globally, with around 16,000 security service companies employing over 6.4 million people compared to roughly 5,700 companies in France employing about 134,000 in 2019. The first security service company in China was established in 1984. For over three decades, Chinese ESSD companies remained under the control of the Public Security apparatus before gradually separating from the government starting in 2006, paving the way for strong sector expansion. The Chinese private security market is primarily focused on domestic demand. Only 57 out of tens of thousands of companies in this sector were active overseas.
- Expanding Presence in Africa: The first Chinese private security companies appeared in Africa in the early 21st century to protect mining projects and Chinese companies against criminal and political violence. However, these were mostly companies or armed militias established by Chinese citizens, not subsidiaries or branches of security and defense companies based in China. In line with the massive expansion of Chinese presence in recent years, dozens of Chinese ESSD companies have been deployed in Africa.
It is estimated that there are currently over 20 Chinese security and defense service companies operating in nearly thirty African countries. The majority belong to the specialized service category, providing commercial services including risk assessment, training, escort, and armed or unarmed site protection. Additionally, several Chinese companies active in the private security market in Africa fall under the consulting company category, offering risk analysis and management without deploying field units. Lastly, Frontier Services Group (FSG) is noted as the only Chinese ESSD company in Africa categorized within operational capability companies, existing in more than 15 countries across the continent.
- Geographic Distribution Linked to Beijing’s Interests: Chinese ESSD companies typically do not operate in high-risk countries such as Mali, the Central African Republic, or Libya due to their lack of experience in areas where security threats prevail. Thus, they may find it challenging to protect their employees (and clients) in the face of sudden deteriorating security situations. Overall, Chinese ESSD companies follow Chinese economic presence to establish their footing on the continent. Nigeria and South Africa, where the Chinese diaspora is largest, house the greatest number of Chinese ESSD companies. These companies are particularly active in the Horn of Africa and East Africa, considering the region’s strategic location and security risks. Some Chinese security companies operate in Central Africa to protect Chinese mining interests. Although some Chinese ESSD companies are active in high-risk environments like the Sahel, Libya, and South Sudan, this remains marginal. Despite the 2009 reforms, China’s Ministry of Public Security still supervises and guides the internationalization of security companies.
- Significant Gaps in the Chinese Model: Despite the substantial workforce of the Chinese security industry, the supply of staff capable of working abroad is insufficient. Most employees lack the required language or technical skills, and their firearms training is considered inadequate, with a general lack of combat, negotiation, or crisis management experience. Another issue pertains to the institutional and legal boundaries governing Chinese private security companies. The existing regulations, last updated fifteen years ago, remain ambiguous regarding providing security services abroad, and inconsistencies also arise concerning firearms legislation. Furthermore, Chinese companies face increasing and strong competition abroad. They struggle to compete with their Western counterparts in terms of offerings and service quality.
The Russian Companies Model:
Since the early 21st century, the Russian presence in Africa has experienced strong growth, particularly leveraging the ties established during the Cold War with various African countries. Moscow has developed a partnership strategy that serves its foreign policy objectives and geopolitical interests. To implement this strategy, Russia employs unconventional tools, most notably through security and defense companies like the Wagner Group, founded by Yevgeny Prigozhin.
In the 1990s, the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s dissolution led to the emergence of Russian “private military companies.” By the early 21st century, this sector underwent notable expansion. Although private security companies are recognized under Russian law, private military companies involved in combat activities are considered illegal under the Russian constitution, seemingly designed to prevent the establishment of anti-state militias. At least ten Russian ESSD companies have been identified operating in Africa, including Anti-Terror Orel, Convoy, DShRG Redut, Patriot, Russian Imperial Legion, and Wagner. Most of these companies fall under categories 2 and 3 of ESSD, with operations in about twenty African countries.
Wagner has developed a strong influence on the African continent, with a confirmed presence in five countries and suspicions about its existence in seven others, engaging in a range of activities from military support to regime protection and informational influence. Wagner primarily targets countries with Moscow’s interests that have experienced political or security crises, such as Libya, the Central African Republic, Sudan, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mozambique.
On the other hand, while the Kremlin has been able to leverage the Wagner model for an extended period, the armed rebellion following the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin and Dmitry Utkin in the summer of 2023 marked a significant turning point, highlighting the fragility of the older Russian model in relying on ESSD companies, and paving the way for a restructuring of the Russian presence in Africa. The Wagner mutiny allowed the Kremlin to tighten its control over all private military companies, including Wagner.
By the end of 2023, Moscow launched the “African Legion,” a new group aimed at conducting large-scale military operations in Africa to support countries seeking to rid themselves of Western presence. The African Legion has become part of the structure of the Russian Ministry of Defense. Starting in January 2024, Moscow began officially deploying the African Legion in Burkina Faso, followed by Niger later.
Limits of Difference and Agreement:
The Russian and Chinese private security models differ significantly, as while the Russian ESSD companies focus on political and strategic considerations, their Chinese counterparts follow an economically driven logic aimed at protecting Chinese citizens and assets in Africa. While groups like Wagner prefer unstable environments, Chinese companies avoid working in high-risk areas. When they do take action, they largely depend on local security forces to secure the external perimeter. While some Russian companies present themselves as private military firms, Chinese employees lack combat experience, and their maneuverability is also limited due to applicable regulations in China that strictly govern the use of firearms.
Despite these differences, China and Russia actively collaborate in the private security sector. In 2023, some reports revealed that Wagner cooperated with Chinese companies to enhance its space capabilities, relying on an intermediary, TerraTech, for images from the Hisea-1 and Tianxian-1 satellites owned by Spacety. Additionally, entities linked to the Wagner Group continued to import necessary equipment for their operations, especially in Africa, from Chinese companies.
Furthermore, reports have noted the existence of strategic partnerships between Russian and Chinese ESSD companies, although this cooperation seemingly remains focused domestically within the two countries. However, this scope may eventually expand to include other regions such as Africa. Beijing might resort to Russian ESSD companies to protect Chinese interests in high-risk countries like Sudan or the Central African Republic, highlighting the dynamic integration between the two models.
In conclusion, Russian private security and defense companies in Africa pose a direct threat to French interests, as Moscow seeks to diminish Paris’s influence in West Africa. In contrast, Chinese companies in this field do not currently represent a direct threat to French interests; however, the independence of some local Chinese companies raises concerns over increased human rights violations. Therefore, the study ultimately recommends developing a new model for French security and defense companies that is more competitive with Beijing and Moscow. This should be accompanied by enhanced information efforts to bolster French influence in the continent and counter manipulation strategies.
Source:
Djenabou Cisse, et al., Russian and Chinese Security and Defense Service Companies in Africa: Two Competing Models? Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS), June 2024.
