Coexistence or Collision? The New Trumpism and the Future of US-China Relations

Since the return of U.S. President Donald Trump to the White House on January 20, 2025, the world’s attention is keenly focused on the evolving relationship between the United States and China due to its significant political, economic, military, and technological implications for most countries globally, if not all of them. These relations, which bind the two largest economies in the world, are viewed by many international relations experts as the dynamic that will define global power positions in the 21st century, especially as they are fraught with confrontations and disputes across many critical fronts, ranging from trade and advanced technology to the Taiwan issue and escalating military skirmishes and an arms race in the South China Sea.

As of this writing, the drums of a “new cold war” between Washington and Beijing have not yet been sounded, a term Trump himself coined during his first presidency and which continued during former President Joe Biden’s term, marked by a series of tariffs on Chinese exports exceeding $300 billion, in addition to strengthening security and strategic alliances with Washington’s allies in the Indo-Pacific region.

Unexpectedly, Trump refrained from imposing tariffs on China on his first day after returning to the White House, leaving the door open for new negotiations with the world’s second-largest economy. In his inaugural speech, he also avoided labeling China as a “serious threat.” Trump further postponed a ban on the Chinese-owned short video app TikTok, suggesting, in an unprecedented move, that the U.S. could hold a 50% stake in the app’s operations in the United States, stating, “The company could be worth hundreds of billions of dollars.”

Moreover, Trump initiated a “conciliatory step” toward Beijing by inviting Chinese President Xi Jinping to his inauguration; a gesture that Xi responded to by sending his vice president instead, indicating a willingness from Beijing to improve relations, considering that China had previously only been represented by its ambassador at the inaugurations of the two preceding U.S. presidents.

In their meeting the day before Trump’s inauguration, the Chinese Vice President told Elon Musk, whom Trump appointed to lead a department aimed at creating a more efficient U.S. government and who has extensive business interests in China as the CEO of Tesla, that Beijing “welcomes Tesla and other American companies” to participate in the benefits of Chinese development and contribute to advancing U.S.-China relations. The two presidents also agreed during a phone conversation shortly before Trump’s inauguration to establish a strategic communication channel regarding “key issues,” with the president-elect indicating he might travel to China as early as this year.

Escalation on the Horizon:

Despite the apparent easing toward Beijing from Trump in the early days of his second term, the future of U.S.-China relations seems to be at a crucial crossroads. Many observers expect the new cold war between the two countries to persist as long as Trump remains in power; the American Republican Party, to which he belongs, has always viewed the rise of China’s economic and military power as a significant threat to U.S. national security. This was particularly evident during Trump’s first presidency, where his administration was determined to contain the rise of Chinese power by all available and possible commercial and military means.

During his recent electoral campaign, Trump also repeatedly announced his intention to impose hefty tariffs of 60% on goods made in China to compel American and foreign companies manufacturing their products in China to quickly relocate supply chains to the U.S., which would help revitalize the American economy by creating new job opportunities.

In this context, many experts assert that Trump’s decision to appoint Marco Rubio as Secretary of State and Michael Waltz as National Security Advisor strongly indicates that his administration “will adopt a tougher and more forceful approach toward China.” They note that while Trump views his personal relationship with President Xi as “a means of negotiation,” he is likely to rely on Waltz and Rubio to formulate a “tougher” policy toward China, especially since both men are known for their hardline stances on Beijing. For instance, Michael Waltz has repeatedly praised the Biden administration’s strategic cooperation with allies in the Indo-Pacific region, asserting that smaller security partnerships like AUKUS, the QUAD, and other agreements involving the U.S., Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines provide the necessary foundation to overcome “potential disruptions with China in the future.”

Furthermore, the new U.S. Secretary of State emphasized in his recent confirmation hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that China is “the strongest and most dangerous adversary the American nation has ever faced,” accusing Beijing of “lying, infiltrating, and cheating its way to becoming a superpower.” Rubio also highlighted the urgent need to finalize delayed arms sales to Taiwan and to reduce U.S. economic dependence on China.

In this context, it was not surprising for Rubio, just one day after Trump assumed office, to host a meeting in Washington with his counterparts from India, Australia, and Japan in the QUAD group, signaling that confronting the “Chinese dragon” is a top priority for the new president. This group had previously met several times during the Biden administration to counter Beijing’s military and economic activities in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly in the South China Sea. In turn, China condemned the Quad group, describing it as a “Cold War creation,” noting that the Quad alliance would exacerbate regional arms races and thereby undermine regional security and stability.

On the other hand, it does not appear that the second Trump administration will ease its handling of the “Chinese dragon” in the coming period, given several key considerations, including President Xi’s bolstered party standing and absolute political influence in Beijing, especially after he assumed a historic third term, with the possibility of remaining in power for life. Moreover, from the U.S. perspective, China now possesses the world’s largest military and navy. As Trump announced the names of his new administration team, Chinese state media released videos from the largest air show in the country, featuring clips of a new stealth fighter jet, the J-35A. Researchers at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies in California also revealed satellite images indicating that China is advancing its nuclear capability for a new aircraft carrier.

Additionally, several security and military circles in Washington have expressed concerns about China’s expanding military moves around Taiwan and in the South China Sea. They also point out that the increasing coordination between China on the one hand and Russia, North Korea, and Iran on the other represents “a significant security challenge unlike anything the U.S. has faced before.”

Regarding Taiwan, the most sensitive issue in U.S.-China relations, most experts predict that Washington will continue to provide military assistance to Taiwan during Trump’s second term, firstly because it is legally obligated to sell defensive weapons to the island, and secondly because the Trump administration sold more arms to Taiwan than any other administration. This approach is further supported by the fact that China, in recent years under Xi’s leadership, has become more assertive in its regional claims regarding Taiwan and the islands in the South China Sea. Beijing has also significantly increased pressure on Taipei since the Taiwan President Lai Ching-te took office, conducting three major military exercises in the past year, including exercises specifically aimed at enforcing a comprehensive blockade of the island.

Avoiding Hot Confrontations:

Despite prevailing expectations that U.S.-China relations during President Trump’s second term will experience further tensions with intensifying economic, technological, and military competition between Washington and Beijing, it is unlikely that the “cold war” between the American and Chinese giants will transform into “hot war” in the foreseeable future. The United States remains the world’s foremost military power, and China would not risk entering into direct military confrontations with it. Beijing is also well aware that its real strength lies in its political mindset, patience, and precise calculations in employing new standards, methods, and tools, primarily economic development, technological advancement, and artificial intelligence, rather than weaponry.

Moreover, it is crucial to note that the interests of China and the United States have been deeply intertwined for a long time. For instance, trade between the two nations exceeded $660 billion last year, with annual profits for over 70,000 American companies operating in China reaching $50 billion. Conversely, U.S. exports to China alone support approximately 930,000 jobs in the United States, while Chinese goods have enriched American consumer choices and lowered living costs.

Revenue from American companies such as Qualcomm and Intel in the Chinese market constitutes approximately two-thirds and one-quarter of their global revenues, respectively. Additionally, 80% of Apple’s supply chain comes from 200 companies operating in China. Tesla alone captured about 28.6% of the market share for new electric vehicle exports to China in 2024. These figures indicate significant room for cooperation between China and the United States, with the potential for mutual benefits and profitable outcomes for both sides in the future.

Supporting the possibilities of cooperation between Beijing and Washington under Trump’s second presidency is also the notion that the U.S. dealmaker may succeed in reaching understandings with China on sensitive issues, including Taiwan. He also appears to be unenthusiastic about U.S. involvement in foreign wars.

Moreover, Beijing does not seem prepared to face a fierce trade war from Trump in the near term, as its economic position is less suited for more drastic retaliatory responses on all fronts. Additionally, China is already embroiled in several bitter trade disputes with the European Union, its second-largest trading partner after the United States; thus, simultaneously engaging in trade wars with both Washington and Brussels could pose a “serious blow” to the Chinese economy.

At the same time, decision-makers in Beijing may prefer to “wait” regarding confrontation with Washington during Trump’s second term; the stances of the American president, who is more inclined to raise the slogans of “America First” and “extorting” traditional U.S. partners in Asia, raise the prospect of “retreat and withdrawal of security guarantees” from Washington towards Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, creating opportunities that China could exploit, especially given its favorable position as the largest trading partner of the three countries, along with its dominance over supply chains and advanced technologies. Under this ideal scenario for Beijing, China would not only enjoy regional hegemony but could also become the most valuable partner, even for U.S. allies.