Over the past decade, journalists and experts in Middle Eastern foreign policy have closely scrutinized the Arab revolutions and their repercussions, including proxy wars in the region, leadership contests, and geopolitical maneuvers among regional powers. During this period, while the United States debated its role in the Middle East, Russia and China sought to expand their influence in the area. In this context, a study titled “Great Power Competition in the Middle East” by Steven Cook, Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies at the Eni Enrico Mattei Foundation, was published by the American Foreign Relations Council in March 2021.
Cook discusses how great power competition alters the dynamics of conflict management in the Middle East, emphasizing that Washington should aim to avoid types of conflicts and strategic miscalculations that have historically provided opportunities for other major powers—especially Russia and China—to undermine U.S. policy. These countries—along with India and the European Union to a lesser extent—have sought greater influence in the region. Although competition among major powers has not yet led to direct confrontation, powerful actors are continually trying to establish, expand, and enhance their influence and prestige at one another’s expense. Meanwhile, cooperation remains sporadic and situational.
Cook further adds that the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East is continually evolving, with developments far outside the region—such as in Europe and the South China Sea—potentially altering power dynamics and partnerships in ways that either intensify competition or pave the way for greater cooperation. Given the unpredictability of events, it is impossible to pinpoint specific factors or changes that will contribute to either outcome. Despite this uncertainty, one clear trend has emerged: the American moment of regional dominance has ended, when no state or coalition of states dared to challenge U.S. power and influence. The Middle East is now ripe for takeover by a diverse array of regional powers and external actors, including the United States. This vacuum has made the region less secure. Moreover, competition between major powers—between great powers and regional rivals—has significantly influenced the trajectory of conflicts in the region, particularly in Syria and Libya, as well as in Yemen and to a lesser extent in Lebanon.
Regional Actors:
The study asserts that the United Arab Emirates (UAE) plays a significant role in the region, as it is a security partner of the United States and has shared interests with Russia while deepening its economic ties with China.
For Egypt, the primary concerns of its leaders now focus on economic development and social stability. The approach the Egyptian leadership has taken to achieve these goals aligns closely with the views and objectives of Beijing and Moscow, even as Cairo seeks to balance these evolving relationships with its long-standing relationships with Washington.
In this context, the study addresses other regional powers, noting that Turkey’s relations and interests are the most dynamic, as Turkish leaders pursue a more independent foreign policy from the United States and NATO to cement Turkey’s position in the Middle East. As a result, Turkey has played a key role in regional conflicts, such as those in Libya and Syria, leading to clashes and cooperation with major powers, especially the U.S. and Russia.
Lastly, Iran aspires to be a regional leader as well and has sought to undermine the United States and its regional partners. The Iranian leadership has bolstered this aim through strategic cooperation with Russia, particularly in Syria, while also developing economic relations with China.
Russia’s Resurgence:
The study notes that Russia is the most evident major power in the Middle East. Although Moscow’s influence in the region significantly diminished after the Soviet Union’s collapse, Russia renewed its role when President Vladimir Putin ordered its armed forces to intervene in Syria in 2015. The Russian military strength stabilized the battlefield, effectively saving Syrian President Bashar al-Assad from defeat. Since then, government forces, with Russian assistance, have regained most of Syrian territory. In this process, the Russian Navy has developed its long-term base in Tartus and established an air force presence at the Hmeimim air base in Syria.
In this context, the fact that Egypt and Russia are on the same side of the conflict in Syria and Libya has helped expand bilateral relations between the two countries. The Russians have not necessarily sought to alienate the Egyptians and pull them into Moscow’s orbit; rather, they aimed to distance Egypt from the United States enough to complicate American efforts in the region—especially given the then-existing rift between Washington and Cairo over the Arab-Israeli peace process and UN sanctions on Iraq. All of these issues compounded mistrust between the two countries, allowing Moscow an opportunity to present itself as at least a partial alternative to Washington.
Similarly, a comparable dynamic emerged in Turkey, where a long list of geopolitical issues has undermined relations with the U.S. Much of the anger toward the U.S. in Turkey centers on the Syrian conflict. There is also the issue of Fethullah Gülen, the U.S.-based cleric whom Ankara officials allege masterminded the failed coup in 2016, for which the Turkish government seeks his extradition. For the U.S., Turkey’s role in helping Iran evade international sanctions and Turkey’s purchase of the Russian S-400 air defense system have undermined trust between the two governments. Moscow exploited tensions in the bilateral relationship to negotiate a deal on the S-400. Although there are divergent interests in Libya, Syria, and Nagorno-Karabakh, Ankara and Moscow have managed to compartmentalize their disagreements in ways that have allowed them to establish diplomatic, economic, and defense ties.
The study finds that among U.S. allies in the region that have developed ties with Russia, Israel might be the most significant. Over the past five years, Moscow has become a critical actor for Israel concerning security matters, primarily due to Russia’s role in the Syrian conflict. Like Turkey, Israel requires Russian cooperation to protect its interests in Syria, specifically to prevent Iran from establishing a permanent military presence there and to disrupt the flow of advanced weapons from Iran to Hezbollah. Furthermore, Moscow can advance its broader geostrategic interest by weakening the Western alliance through capitalizing on American missteps and Washington’s apparent desire to reduce its commitments in the Middle East. To this end, Russian leaders have portrayed themselves as efficient, non-ideological, and coherent alternatives to the United States at a time when Washington seems anything but that from the perspective of its regional allies.
China’s Expansion:
The study highlights the increasing Chinese activity throughout the region, which is considered a transformative factor due to Beijing’s vast economic resources and military advancements across various domains. Many commentators speculate that with the U.S. reducing its presence, China could be the next great power to play a stabilizing role in the region.
In this context, despite divergent opinions on China’s strategy in the Middle East, Beijing’s approach to the region is widely viewed as a significant departure from the past when China was merely a marginal actor. Historically, the Chinese government supported national liberation and anti-colonial movements from a distance and had little diplomatic engagement with the Arab world, Israel, Iran, and Turkey. For example, Beijing and Riyadh established diplomatic relations only in the 1990s. Since then, relations between China and Saudi Arabia—and indeed the entire region—have significantly grown. China’s rapid economic development, which began in the 1990s, has driven the expansion of its presence in the Middle East, primarily fueled by the country’s demand for energy resources. Between 1990 and 2009, China’s imports of Middle Eastern oil surged from 4.8 million to 47.8 million tons annually. The U.S. Energy Information Administration estimates that between 2019 and 2020, Gulf States accounted for about 40% of China’s oil imports, of which 16% came from Saudi Arabia, making it China’s largest crude oil supplier, while Iran ranked eighth in 2019, supplying around 300,000 barrels of oil per day.
In this context, over the past three decades, the scope of China’s relations with the Middle East has widened beyond energy. Although oil remains Beijing’s primary concern in the region, trade between China and the region has increased significantly, and Beijing has begun investing in infrastructure throughout the Middle East. China is now the largest regional investor and the largest trading partner for eleven Middle Eastern countries. The Chinese leadership clearly recognizes that developing Beijing’s role in the Middle East is critical to the success of the Belt and Road Initiative.
As a result, China has signed deals related to Belt and Road Initiative projects with twenty-one Middle Eastern countries. Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE also enjoy “comprehensive strategic partnerships” with China, a designation the Chinese Foreign Ministry bestows on countries of special significance. Additionally, China has designated Iraq, Jordan, Morocco, Oman, and Qatar as strategic partners and maintains a “strategic cooperation relationship” with Turkey and an “innovative comprehensive partnership” with Israel.
India’s Initiatives:
The study highlights India’s increased investment of diplomatic resources in developing and expanding its relations with the Middle East, particularly with Gulf countries over the past two decades. Since Narendra Modi took office as Prime Minister in 2014, he has worked to strengthen these relations away from the Chinese and Russians. This stems from several issues, such as the close ties between Pakistan and the Gulf Cooperation Council, especially heavyweight states like Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
In this regard, the convergence of election successes for Hindu nationalists in India and the threat of Islamic extremism in the 1990s and early 2000s played a significant role in shaping New Delhi’s engagement with both Israel and Gulf states. Following a wave of attacks by al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia, Gulf leaders discovered they shared a common interest with India in combating this threat.
The study notes that the primary barrier to India’s influence and the main reason for its interest in the region is China. The Indian leadership’s concern over China’s growing influence in this vital area, especially with China’s clear ambition to become a maritime power in the region, has intensified.
European Union Limitations:
The study addresses the role of the European Union (EU) in the region, explaining that EU foreign policy is subject to the rule of consensus, making it difficult for the bloc to pursue a cohesive strategy. Furthermore, the EU’s core objectives in the region focus on seeking a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, preserving the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran, and preventing waves of refugees from conflict areas in the Middle East.
In this context, the study notes that Brussels managed to maintain the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action after the Trump administration withdrew from the agreement, a significant achievement, yet it has not deterred the U.S. from taking that dramatic step or prevented Iran from enriching increasing amounts of uranium. Meanwhile, the EU has not been more successful than other major players in its efforts to end the conflicts in Libya, Syria, and Yemen.
In conclusion, the study points out that few Middle Eastern leaders view the EU as an alternative to other major powers. The EU has neither the interest nor the capability to play a larger role in the region. Middle Eastern leaders tend to see the EU as a source of investment, with individual European countries, particularly France and Germany, viewed as reliable arms suppliers in the Middle Eastern arms market.
Source: Steven A. Cook, “Major Power Rivalry in the Middle East,” Council on Foreign Relations, March 2021. Available at: CFR
