Washington’s Retreat: Can Europe Reduce its Defense Dependence on the United States?
The war in Ukraine has highlighted the numerous challenges faced by European militaries and defense industries, as well as their deep reliance on the United States. Analysts predict that a second Trump presidency, should he win, would significantly reduce U.S. defense support for Europe. Consequently, there are increasing calls to bolster European defense autonomy by enhancing European militaries and expanding their manpower and weaponry.
In this context, the European Council on Foreign Relations published a report titled “Defending Europe with Less America,” authored by Camille Grand, a researcher and head of the Defense, Security, and Technology Initiative at the organization. The report indicates that the deteriorating European security environment and the shifting priorities of the United States mean that Europe needs to prepare to take on more responsibility for its own defense. The report emphasizes the need for Europeans to develop a sustainable plan over the next decade that combines immediate efforts to support Ukraine and rebuild readiness with longer-term goals to develop a “full spectrum force package,” including combat support capabilities and key enablers that the United States currently primarily provides.
A Declining Alliance
The report highlights a fundamental and deep trend in U.S. security policy, indicating that Europe will be forced to become less reliant on American support for its security, due to the following factors:
Concerns About Trump’s Anti-Alliance Stance with Europe: According to the report, Trump’s comments in February 2024 that he “would not protect” a NATO ally that does not meet defense spending guidelines, and that he “would encourage [the Russians] to do whatever they want,” were like a “bomb” in Europe. Moreover, in an attempt to turn his statements into policy, think tanks affiliated with Trump’s campaign developed various scenarios, ranging from modest cuts in U.S. commitments to European security to a “dormant NATO,” which implies a quasi-realistic withdrawal of Washington from the European alliance and a halt to further NATO expansion. Robert O’Brien, Trump’s former National Security Advisor, clarified that “Washington must ensure that its European allies understand that continued U.S. defense of Europe depends on Europe doing its part, including in Ukraine.” This suggests that U.S. support for Ukraine and the rest of Europe will be more conditional and uncertain if Trump is re-elected.
Bipartisan Belief in Conditional Foreign Engagement: The report notes that the internal debate in the U.S. is marked by a strong push towards more restraint and reduced foreign engagement, not only among Republicans but also resonating among Democrats. Although recent polls suggest that “Americans are still committed to NATO,” the report predicts that Washington’s foreign commitments will become more conditional, insisting—regardless of the administration—that its allies bear a much larger share of the security burden in the region’s future.
Washington’s Increased Focus on the Indo-Pacific and China: U.S. policymakers across the political spectrum are focusing their foreign and security policies on the Indo-Pacific region and competition with China. Despite the war in Ukraine and the threat posed by Russia, Europe is no longer a priority theater for U.S. defense planning, which receives the largest share of resources. The report cites that for the 2024 fiscal year, the Pentagon allocated $3.6 billion of its budget to the “European Deterrence Initiative,” while $14.7 billion was allocated to the “Pacific Deterrence Initiative.”
Reduction in U.S. Troops and Combat Capabilities in Europe: According to Grand, U.S. presence in Europe has been steadily declining since the end of the Cold War. At its peak in the late 1950s, there were 430,000 U.S. troops stationed in Europe, most of them in West Germany. In 1989, there were still 248,000 U.S. troops in Europe, but this number dropped to 64,000 by 2021. This reduction in U.S. forces was accompanied by a decrease in the number of major combat platforms (including fighter aircraft, tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, artillery, and nuclear weapons) assigned to U.S. European Command.
Continued Signs of Decreasing U.S. Support for Europe: These trends, according to the report, indicate that U.S. commitment to European security will remain at best stable at relatively modest current levels, and is likely to decline or even partially disappear over the coming years. Geopolitical events and the results of the U.S. presidential election could either slow down or accelerate this process. Therefore, “Europe must be capable of defending itself with less reliance on the United States.”
Various Obstacles
The European Union has evolved into a defense player, marshaling resources to train and equip Ukrainian forces, supporting European defense research, and developing capabilities. Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, Europe’s defense industry has increased its ammunition production capacity by 50%, aiming to produce over two million shells annually by the end of 2025, double its capacity in February 2022. However, the industry and European governments have struggled to meet Ukrainian requirements in a timely manner due to several financial and institutional obstacles, along with weak capacity building, as follows:
Decline of European Military and Defense Industries: Decades of peace dividends and defense neglect have led to the atrophy of European military and defense industries, which have focused more on lucrative exports rather than meeting often shrinking domestic demand.
European Defense Budgets Lagging Behind Major Powers: The “Defense Investment Pledge” made by NATO allies at the 2014 Wales Summit set a goal for allies to spend at least 2% of their GDP on defense. The number of countries achieving the 2% goal has risen from 3 to 23 since 2014, with the number of countries exceeding the separate 20% investment goal increasing from seven to 30. However, according to the report, this increase has not been nearly sufficient to make up for years of underinvestment compared to other countries. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) military spending database, Russian defense spending has grown by 360% in constant 2022 dollar terms since 2000, while Chinese defense spending has expanded by 596%. During the same period, U.S. defense spending increased by 60%, remaining the highest in the world. In stark contrast to these nearly global trends, European defense spending either declined or remained relatively stable over the same period until the early 2020s. Compared to 2000, it has now increased by only 50%, largely due to increases since 2015 and especially since 2022. While the recent increases in defense spending will make a difference, the additional funds have yet to enable Europeans to address the consequences of previous cuts and years of shrinking defense budgets. It will require years of sustained efforts to rebuild forces that have, in many cases, become largely hollow.
Limited Capabilities of Some European Armies: With limited defense budgets and the American security umbrella, many European armies have become so small that they provide only samples of key capabilities rather than large, powerful forces ready for combat. For more than two decades, most European defense plans have neglected the issue of mass, with NATO itself focusing on the ability to rapidly deploy limited forces outside the area in Afghanistan or other crisis management operations rather than on the requirements associated with a potential major conflict in Europe. While a return to the equipment levels available during the Cold War is unlikely and unnecessary, European countries need to rebuild some mass, particularly in the land and air domains, given the return of war to Europe.
Significant Disparities Between European Countries in Military Equipment: The number of major combat platforms in Europe may seem large, but it conceals many disparities between countries, as there is a significant imbalance in the equipment possessed by different countries. For example, 12 European countries have no tanks, and 14 countries have no fighter aircraft, meaning they cannot contribute to key missions. While developing a national fighter air force or armored capability may be difficult for many of these “small” countries, multinational arrangements allow them to be part of a broader project. Compared to Russian and U.S. stockpiles, the absolute number of major platforms in Europe may not be too bad, but relatively few are modern enough or have the appropriate level of readiness.
Decreased Military Manpower: The size of European combat forces has decreased significantly since the Cold War, with conscription ending and military forces shrinking. However, the report notes that “the remaining number of 1.9 million soldiers in NATO European forces is sufficient on paper to meet NATO’s peacetime requirements.” In this context, the report emphasizes the need for these forces to be able to meet the demanding requirements of NATO’s new force model. This force model, agreed upon at the 2022 NATO Summit in Madrid, aims to provide over 300,000 troops to respond to any emergency within 30 days (and over 100,000 troops within 10 days) and to immediately reinforce NATO’s eastern flank in the event of a crisis. This means that a general, large-scale expansion of European armed forces is not necessary, provided that European countries significantly increase the combat readiness of their forces to enable them to deter and defend against any major emergency in Europe.
Policy Development
To make significant progress in policy, the report stresses that Europeans should focus on a short list of priorities, ranging from immediate objectives to long-term efforts to address capability gaps and reform organizational challenges:
Organizing Medium to Long-Term Military Assistance to Ukraine: Given the trend towards declining U.S. support for European defense efforts, it is critically important for Europeans to increase their assistance to Ukraine immediately by developing a joint contingency plan to ensure Ukrainian forces’ survival beyond the next few months. This plan should revolve around three urgent priorities: ensuring the continuous flow of ammunition to maintain the front line, strengthening Ukrainian air and missile defenses to protect cities and infrastructure, and focusing on support and training of Ukrainian forces to enable them to engage in counteroffensive operations for as long as possible. The goal of this new approach should be to shift from crisis management to a structured and predictable approach that builds on Europe’s capacity to support Ukraine. This support will also depend on ramping up European production capacity and speeding up its delivery to the battlefield. In the medium to long term, the European defense industry will need to significantly expand its production capabilities and transform itself to help Ukraine rebuild and prepare for a potentially decades-long confrontation with Russia. This support will be increasingly necessary as U.S. engagement in Europe declines.
Rapidly Rebuilding European Defense Capabilities and Manpower: In light of the European security crisis, it is crucial to strengthen European military capabilities in the medium term. This requires rebuilding military forces to ensure they are well-equipped and trained, and possess sufficient manpower to deter and defend against potential threats. It is also essential to modernize military infrastructure and equipment and focus on building key enablers currently provided by the United States, such as air and missile defense systems, advanced surveillance and intelligence capabilities, and logistics support. Additionally, Europe needs to address the imbalances and disparities in military capabilities between different countries. This could be achieved through multinational arrangements and cooperation, allowing smaller countries to contribute to broader defense projects and enhancing the overall effectiveness of European defense forces.
Enhancing European Defense Cooperation and Strategic Autonomy: To reduce reliance on the United States and build a more autonomous European defense capability, it is essential to strengthen defense cooperation among European countries. This involves pooling resources, sharing capabilities, and developing joint defense initiatives. The European Union and NATO should work together to coordinate defense planning and ensure that European countries are prepared to respond to any security threats. Moreover, Europe should focus on developing its strategic autonomy by investing in defense research and innovation, enhancing defense industrial capabilities, and building a robust defense industry that can meet European defense needs. This includes developing new technologies, such as artificial intelligence, cyber defense, and space capabilities, to address emerging security challenges.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the report emphasizes that Europe must take urgent and decisive action to reduce its reliance on the United States for its defense and security. By developing a sustainable plan to enhance European military capabilities, expanding defense cooperation, and investing in strategic autonomy, Europe can ensure its security and resilience in an increasingly uncertain global environment. The war in Ukraine has underscored the need for Europe to be prepared for any future conflict, and the time to act is now.
