Syrian armed factions, led by a group known as “Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham,” formerly known as “Jabhat al-Nusra” before separating from al-Qaeda, launched extensive attacks against areas controlled by the Syrian government. This initiative, termed “Operation Deterring Aggression,” began on November 27, 2024. The armed factions managed to seize control of Aleppo, the second-largest city in the country, and advanced towards Hama, against the backdrop of efforts by the Syrian government to launch a counteroffensive against these factions.
The armed factions declared that their goal with the surprise attack was to deliver a “preemptive strike” against Syrian government forces, marking the first major assault since the “Turkish-Russian” ceasefire agreement in Syria, signed in March 2020.
Multiple Motivations:
The recent military operations by the armed factions against Syrian government-held areas were driven by several factors, among which the most significant can be highlighted as follows:
Reinvigorating International and Regional Attention on Syria: One motivation behind the recent operations by the armed factions is to revive interest in the Syrian crisis after it had seen a decline in international and regional focus, especially in light of other pressing regional issues such as the Israeli war on Gaza and the conflict in Lebanon. This lack of attention raised concerns among the armed factions, particularly Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, about the potential normalization of the situation in favor of the Syrian government.
Attempts to Slow Regional Engagement with Damascus: There are factions within the armed groups in Syria that perceive the current regional rapprochement with the Syrian government and the trend towards normalizing relations as detrimental to their interests. This rapprochement, particularly evident in the recent interactions between Damascus and several Arab nations, which culminated in the Arab League’s decision in May 2023 to reinstate Syria’s participation, indicates a growing consensus that there is one legitimate Syrian government. This is also true for efforts to improve relations between Damascus and Ankara, which these factions believe create unfavorable conditions for them.
Covering Up Crises in Faction-Controlled Areas: Regions under the control of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, particularly the city of Idlib, are suffering from extremely difficult living conditions. Approximately 91% of families are living below the poverty line, with unemployment exceeding 88%, while inflation rates have reached 75.4%. In Idlib, protests have emerged demanding an end to the military rule of the group, along with calls to release prisoners and those who have been forcibly disappeared. This unrest has led to internal instability, especially as these protests arose amidst Abu Muhammad al-Jolani’s (the leader of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham) restructuring campaign within the group, which resulted in the ousting and arrest of several leaders.
Thus, it is likely that the internal situation is one of the main factors motivating the armed factions, particularly Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, to launch military attacks against Syrian government forces in an effort to divert mounting internal opposition against them.
Reasons for Decline:
The reasons behind the decline in the ranks of Syrian government forces in contrast to the armed factions’ advances can be attributed to several factors, notably:
Failure of Security Institutions to Anticipate the Attack: The armed factions’ attack on Aleppo and parts of Hama may have caught the Syrian government by surprise, indicating a severe miscalculation by security agencies in predicting the assault. This failure is not limited to the Syrian government; it extends to Russia, which also failed to foresee the assault. This attack represents a new failure for the Iranian intelligence apparatus as well. The prior judgment stems from the fact that the operations launched by the armed factions were certainly preceded by military and preparatory arrangements that indicated potential attacks on government-held areas.
Decline in Syrian Army Readiness: Despite Syria not being a direct battlefield in the regional conflict, unlike fronts such as Lebanon and Gaza, the ongoing strife has negatively impacted the security capabilities and combat readiness of Syrian forces. The increasing Israeli strikes since the onset of the conflict against Syrian military centers, primarily aimed at Iranian positions, have nonetheless degraded the military abilities and preparedness of the Syrian army. Furthermore, nearly a decade of continuous conflict has drained the army’s strength and resources.
Weakness of Regional Support Fronts: The conflict with Israel has prompted Iran to reposition its forces in the region. Following targeted assassinations of high-ranking Iranian military leaders in Syria, Iran withdrew these commanders to avoid further losses, believing that stability in the Syrian front was largely intact. Additionally, the Iraqi factions that had supported the Syrian government’s efforts against the armed factions faced escalated tensions with the United States, culminating in the deaths of three American soldiers in January 2024, leading to decreased presence in Syria.
Limited Russian Presence: Russia has been a key supporter of the Syrian government, especially following its pivotal role in 2015 to regain territories lost to armed factions. However, as the war in Ukraine intensified, Russia withdrew a significant portion of its military assets from Syria to support the war effort in Ukraine, depriving Syrian defenses of essential components that had been critical since 2015.
In conclusion, it is likely that the Syrian government will focus most of its efforts on stabilizing the front lines, particularly in Hama, aided by concentrated airstrikes from both the Syrian and Russian air forces, while awaiting a reorganization of Iranian support for Syria, as confirmed by Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi during his visit to Damascus and meeting with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.
In this context, it is unlikely that Iran will involve Hezbollah in the expected counteroffensive in Syria due to Tehran’s desire to allow the party to focus on regaining its influence internally in Lebanon and rebuilding its military forces, likely opting to use Iraqi factions to fill Hezbollah’s role in Syria.
