As international conflicts and wars intensify and technological and biological advancements become increasingly accessible worldwide, concerns have grown about the potential resurgence of chemical and biological weapons. This has sparked international debate over the effectiveness of controlling the export of dual-use technologies that could be related to the development and production of these weapons.
In this context, the role of the “Australia Group” emerges. This informal forum of countries seeks to harmonize export control measures to ensure that exports do not contribute to the development of chemical and biological weapons. It also helps align national control measures, enabling participants to meet their obligations under the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
The significance of the research paper by Jean Pascal Zanders and others, published by the Strategic Research Foundation in April 2024, lies in its evaluation of the opportunities and challenges facing the Australia Group in preventing the emergence of chemical and biological weapons. The paper examines the group’s future role in light of global geopolitical shifts and the evolving threats posed by emerging technologies. It also explores the possibility of developing formal international law and its relationship with informal arrangements in preventing the proliferation of these weapons.
Multiple Roles:
In 1984, a UN investigation confirmed Iraq’s use of mustard gas, documenting the expansion of Iraqi chemical warfare against Iranian forces and Kurdish rebels. Recognizing that Iraqi chemical technologies originated from Western companies, the Australia Group was established in 1985 as an informal coalition to develop harmonized export regulations to prevent the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons. Thus, it complements the work of the chemical and biological weapons conventions.
More than three decades after its founding, the Australia Group’s role in preventing the spread of chemical and biological weapons is being reassessed. The challenges it faces include its informal nature, which makes its decisions non-binding, as well as other challenges arising from geopolitical developments and changes in life sciences, biotechnology, chemistry, and their industrial and commercial applications.
The research paper questions whether the Australia Group, in its current form, is equipped to handle these challenges, especially with the emergence of new technologies that pose advanced threats through the expanded accessibility of technology and misinformation. Given the group’s connection to the chemical and biological weapons conventions, its focus remains on preventing the re-emergence of these weapons. It can address issues related to tangible and intangible technologies not covered by the conventions or their guidelines by implementing a comprehensive mechanism and updating shared watch lists.
Although the Australia Group cannot make binding decisions, its informal nature offers several advantages, such as fostering general consensus among participants and collaborating with non-member countries to enhance its watch lists and guidelines as standards for technology transfer. However, several measures could better equip the group for the future, such as increasing cooperation with other export control arrangements, which would enhance the group’s advisory impact, and engaging in dialogue with stakeholder communities.
On the other hand, expanding participation in the Australia Group could weaken its internal cohesion and vision. To overcome this, the internal decision-making process could be revisited, following successful examples like the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to balance maintaining similarity and cohesion in selecting a group of like-minded countries while enhancing its guidelines and controls as a desirable global standard.
Toward an Informal International Law:
With geopolitical changes in the world over recent decades, the use of traditional international law mechanisms has been questioned in effectively responding to new threats, such as the rise of violent non-state actors or the impact of emerging technologies. The differing political and economic interests of countries make it challenging to represent their interests fairly and reach multilateral agreements that keep pace with these challenges.
This has reignited the debate over the role of non-binding law mechanisms in the international arena, particularly in controlling the export of dual-use technologies. Non-binding guidelines and recommendations can be continuously adapted to the ever-changing international environment. This situation affects the international transfer of chemical and biological technologies, most of which have dual-use potential for the development and production of chemical and biological weapons.
Non-binding mechanisms have increasingly influenced international policy discussions regarding the content and scope of export controls. The Australia Group is a clear expression of this trend, contributing significantly, albeit incompletely, to the continuous adaptation of export control policies to support the international norm against the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons, as expressed in international agreements.
The research paper highlights the growing importance of multilateral export control arrangements—especially the Australia Group—and their additional contribution to the development of international law to accommodate technological and scientific advancements, economic prosperity, and national security. Globalization has changed how international trade is understood, yet this must not come at the expense of international security. A more flexible approach to international lawmaking is needed, one that moves away from the binary system of binding and non-binding law toward a system where both paths work together.
Biological and chemical weapons are primarily regulated—unlike nuclear weapons, missile technology, and conventional weapons—by the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions, which define the legitimate uses of potential biological weapons technologies. United Nations Security Council resolutions, particularly Resolution 1540, reinforce disarmament goals, focusing on the role of non-state actors, and obligate all member states to take national measures to control the domestic and international transfer of nuclear, biological, and chemical materials. Therefore, the combination of treaties, the UN Security Council resolution, and the Australia Group means that many countries align with the non-binding legal recommendations made by the group, even without participating in its formulation.
The legal nature of non-binding instruments remains uncertain, but their evolving nature cannot be denied. The impact and importance of non-binding law are real, especially in fast-changing environments and fields like biotechnology. For this purpose, informal mechanisms set the agenda for strategic or dual-use export controls.
Given the new threats and challenges, non-binding legal instruments can be seen as new “sources” of international law, as evident from the relationship between the Australia Group and the European Union’s dual-use control regulations. These export control lists have become a de facto international standard in this context, spreading their lists, guidelines, and practices to non-participating and non-member states. Thus, the coexistence of binding and non-binding law strengthens each other, effectively contributing to greater international cooperation in areas defined by dual-use risks.
Several proposals have been made to bridge the gap between legally binding mechanisms and informal arrangements that enhance security and promote international trade in goods with dual-use potential, especially in the biological and chemical industries. The increasing importance of non-binding law and its integration into non-proliferation requires a continuous learning scenario, where states and stakeholders as a whole are ready to engage in dialogue and negotiations.
The role of non-binding law in preventing the international proliferation of chemical and biological weapons is still under continuous development. Many unknowns remain, including the new risks and threats the future may hold and how international law can best respond, the role of multilateral export control arrangements, whether it makes sense to consider suspending or expelling non-compliant states, and the logic and importance of creating new export control arrangements in line with current realities. Recent events, such as the COVID-19 pandemic or the Russia-Ukraine conflict, undoubtedly pose new challenges to dual-use export controls.
Challenges of Export Controls:
Recent health, climate, and geopolitical crises have raised awareness of the urgent need to develop innovative solutions to address major contemporary challenges, such as the emergence of new diseases, resource scarcity, food insecurity, and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats.
Emerging technologies offer new opportunities to address these challenges, and the COVID-19 pandemic has provided some valuable lessons in this context. However, such progress and new technological trends also raise concerns about security and proliferation. Therefore, participants in the Australia Group must consider these concerns when considering amendments to export controls.
Global changes in the security landscape, the redistribution of scientific and industrial activities across continents, and the emergence of new categories of stakeholders and security actors continuously raise questions about the adequacy of current international arms control treaties and export control measures. The rise of online trade, along with the potential for illicit trade on the dark web, could inadvertently or deliberately circumvent export controls. Additionally, open science and cloud laboratories that enable multiple research institutes to conduct joint remote experiments could create scientific opportunities and vulnerabilities in the proliferation of biological and chemical weapons.
This changing global context presents new challenges in controlling the export of technologies related to the development and production of chemical and biological weapons. This is partly because individual researchers must seek to ensure the good intentions of other participants in scientific projects that may have dual-use potential. Industrial actors and scientists in countries with more recent developments in life sciences and biotechnology are less aware of export control requirements or may be subject to less scrutiny. Therefore, as the process of controlling the trade and transfer of dual-use goods becomes more complex, raising awareness of export control requirements and trade compliance in the medical, pharmaceutical, and biotechnology sectors becomes essential.
Source: Jean Pascal Zanders, Elisande Nexon, Mónica Chinchilla, Esmée de Bruin, “The Australia Group and the prevention of the re-emergence of chemical and biological weapons – Ongoing challenges”, The Foundation for Strategic Research, April, 2024.
