Since the signing of the ceasefire agreement between Israel and Lebanon on November 26, 2024, the frontline between the two sides has not quieted down. Mutual strikes continue without causing the agreement to collapse, although they pose a threat to it in the short term. This threat derives from several sources, including provisions in the agreement itself, some of which contain vague language that can be interpreted contradictory by both sides, and tasks assigned to the Lebanese state that it cannot practically implement. Additionally, there was a parallel agreement between Israel and the United States concerning assurances from Washington regarding Israel’s right to break the agreement under certain circumstances. Finally, the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria may affect the implementation of this agreement due to the interplay between the Syrian and Lebanese fronts for Israel, which believes that Hezbollah and Iran are using Syrian territory to manufacture and store weapons.
All these factors, together with the ongoing violations of the agreement by both sides after its signing, raise significant doubts about the possibility of its endurance and actual implementation before the scheduled completion date on January 26. However, there are counteracting factors that may contribute to the survival of the agreement.
Observations on the Agreement:
The agreement signed between Israel and the Lebanese government (the legitimate party in the agreement in understanding with Hezbollah) consists of 13 provisions, most of which reflect reasons for describing it as fragile, summarized as follows:
Vague Provisions: Among these are the following: a. The third provision states that “Israel and Lebanon recognize the importance of Security Council Resolution 1701”. This wording does not indicate a specific meaning for the term “importance of the international resolution,” and it was phrased this way to overcome unresolved disagreements during the negotiation process. Israel interpreted the resolution as including a ban on the return of residents of Southern Lebanon who had fled their homes during the war, claiming that the inhabitants of the border areas belong to Hezbollah forces. Meanwhile, the Lebanese negotiator maintained that the resolution only addressed the military presence of Hezbollah; thus, the right of civilian residents to return to their homes after displacement should be protected unconditionally. b. The fourth provision states that “both parties reserve the right to defend themselves according to international covenants.” This wording fundamentally contradicts the nature of ceasefire agreements in general, as it allows Israel the right, without referring to any party, to strike sites suspected of gathering or movements by Hezbollah that may pose a threat to Tel Aviv during the ceasefire. While Lebanon was granted the same right, practically it favored Israel alone, as Hezbollah lost many of its leaders and fighters during the war, meaning it was no longer capable of posing a significant threat to Israel while Israel remains capable of conducting military operations throughout Lebanese territory.
Lack of Implementation Mechanism: Provisions five through eight, which relate to the evacuation of Southern Lebanon from Hezbollah forces and any other allied groups, lack a realistic mechanism for implementation. It assigned to the Lebanese state the task of overseeing the sale or supply or production of arms or materials used in their manufacture and preventing any other entity inside Lebanon from participating in such activities. It goes without saying that the Lebanese state, which is suffering from multiple economic, military, and political crises, may not be able to undertake such a mission because of its limited capabilities and the threat this obligation poses to social peace by entering into direct confrontation with Hezbollah and its large social base.
Practically Ineffective Provisions: The ninth and tenth provisions refer to the establishment of a monitoring committee for the agreement, whose role is limited to receiving complaints from both sides when violations occur, without mentioning the actions that will be taken against violators. This does not provide a real deterrent for either party to refrain from breaching the agreement, as evidenced by the previous committee formed after the 2006 war between the two sides, whose activities in documenting violations did not reduce the frequency of breaches by either side.
American Commitments to Israel:
An additional reason for describing the ceasefire agreement between Israel and Lebanon as fragile is the commitments the United States made to Israel, which contradict the latter’s obligations in the agreement. According to various reports circulating in the American media, these commitments include the following:
- The U.S. and Israel will exchange sensitive intelligence related to violations, including those concerning the infiltration of Hezbollah members into Lebanese army sites.
- The U.S. may share information provided by Israel with third parties, including the monitoring committee and the Lebanese government, to urge them to ensure the implementation of the agreement.
- The U.S. will cooperate to prevent the transfer of weapons and personnel from Iran to Lebanon.
- The U.S. acknowledges Israel’s right to respond to threats from Lebanon.
- Israel can act at any time against violations in Southern Lebanon.
- Israel can take action anywhere in Lebanon if Lebanon is unwilling or unable to halt the violations, including illegal arms transfers to Lebanon.
- Israel will have the right to conduct reconnaissance flights in Lebanese airspace.
Clearly, these guarantees or commitments act as an absolute mandate for Israel to violate the ceasefire agreement; they can also be seen as a pledge from the United States to partake in Israeli military operations in Lebanese territory (similar to the third provision).
Internal Pressures in Israel:
Despite the ceasefire agreement receiving majority approval in the Israeli Cabinet, Minister of National Security Itamar Ben-Gvir opposed the decision, calling for the continuation of the war to disarm Hezbollah through force rather than stopping just at the Litani River. Ben-Gvir threatened to withdraw his coalition bloc and bring down Benjamin Netanyahu’s government if the agreement failed to achieve its primary goal: enabling residents of northern Israel, who were forced to flee since the outbreak of the war, to return to their places.
Additionally, the agreement has caused a social crisis, as the Israeli public demands equal treatment from the government for southern residents (on the Gaza border) and northern residents (on the Lebanese border), given that the war goals on both fronts include enabling those who left their cities during the conflict to return safely. While the Israeli government resisted pressures from hostage families and their supporters to ceasefire with Hamas in exchange for the hostages’ release, preferring to secure residents of the south and restore their cities over securing the release of hostages, it hastily accepted a ceasefire agreement with Hezbollah that does not guarantee the return of northern residents to their cities amid ongoing violations from both sides of the agreement. This has been perceived as a clear discrimination against northern residents.
Factors Supporting the Agreement’s Durability:
Despite elements that threaten the ceasefire agreement’s longevity, there are counterbalancing factors that could support its survival, including:
- The state of weakness experienced by Hezbollah, following the loss of many of its key field leaders and nearly half of its weapon stockpiles. Israeli estimates suggest that Hezbollah lost at least 2,500 of its fighters, mostly from elite forces. Therefore, it would be in its interest to refrain from threatening the agreement.
- Iran’s limited ability to compensate Hezbollah for the lost weapons and personnel, especially after Israel destroyed the border crossings between Lebanon and Syria, the main transit route for arms shipments coming from Tehran to Hezbollah.
- Domestic pressures from anti-Hezbollah forces in Lebanon demanding its disarmament, especially after the Taif Agreement in 1989 exempted Hezbollah from disarmament like other militias on the grounds that it is a resistance movement against Israel. The current war with Israel has damaged the political legitimacy of Hezbollah’s rhetoric among Lebanese citizens, particularly after it caused widespread displacement in the south, straining central and northern regions that had to absorb a huge influx of refugees while Lebanon grapples with a severe economic crisis.
- The expected public criticism against Hezbollah due to its failure to implement its deterrence strategy, which it attempted to promote in Lebanese society based on two faulty assumptions: that Israel cannot sustain long wars, especially against multiple fronts, and that mutual deterrence is achieved by the party’s possession of weapons capable of hitting deep into Israel, which would prevent Israel from attacking deep into Lebanon.
- The departure of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, which Hezbollah has heavily invested in protecting since 2014, is seen as a substantial loss for the so-called “Resistance Axis.” The lack of intervention from Iran and Hezbollah to rescue Assad’s regime, and Hezbollah’s earlier abandonment of its condition to agree to a ceasefire with Israel concurrent with an end to the war in Gaza, suggest that the party is now focused on self-preservation amid legitimate fears that Israel could escalate military pressure by providing covert material support to jihadist organizations controlling large parts of Syrian territory, which are hostile to Shiites in general and Iran’s affiliates in the region specifically. In other words, Hezbollah must maintain the ceasefire with Israel in anticipation of potential confrontations with jihadist organizations now widespread in Syrian territory.
In conclusion, between the elements threatening the survival of the ceasefire agreement between Israel and Lebanon (on behalf of Hezbollah) and the counter factors that could contribute to its endurance, the likelihood is that the agreement will hold, especially given Israeli estimates indicating that the current armed factions’ goals in Syria are to solidify their control over the governance there and remove the previous regime and also the military presence of Iran and Hezbollah. In this context, it would be in Israel’s interest to alleviate potential pressure on the agreement by limiting attacks against Hezbollah to prevent arms smuggling, allowing the task of potentially neutralizing the party and finally eliminating its threat to Israeli security to be left to its internal Lebanese adversaries and the post-Assad Syria.
