In West Africa, self-defense groups are proliferating as a reaction to the escalation of violence and crime and the state’s inability, through all its institutions and agencies, to contain it. This phenomenon reflects local communities—especially in peripheral villages and rural areas—taking responsibility for the safety of their residents and property in a context marked by a near-total absence of state authority. This phenomenon can transcend national borders, affecting several neighboring countries that face the same issues of insecurity, weak state capacity to assert its authority over remote areas, alongside the rise of theft, organized crime, land disputes, competition among ethnic groups over resources, and the escalation of armed insurgent and terrorist movements. In regions where official agencies struggle with control, the state initially accepted community security initiatives, later adopted and encouraged them, ultimately integrating them into its security strategies.
These groups emerged as local self-defense response mechanisms, driven by community initiatives. They also represent resilience against organized crime and a form of adaptability to the consequences of state absence, either acting independently or in coordination with the state. However, they risk evolving into parallel authorities that undermine official power and refuse cooperation, leading to further disputes among ethnic groups making up the social fabric. Notably, the incidence of ethnic violence has increased, resulting in civilian casualties rising from 750 in 2021 to 1500 in 2023, with these incidents attributed to violent acts by the military or supporting civil — quasi-military forces.
In this research paper, we will study the self-defense groups in Burkina Faso, reviewing their history, the factors that led to their emergence, the state’s role in that process, how they are addressing terrorist groups, and the nature of the issues that have arisen from this experience. We will also explore the historical roots of these groups, their justifications for their actions, whether they have succeeded in presenting themselves as heirs to traditional “leadership” systems, or if they have ultimately turned into civil tools supporting the administration and official military. Additionally, we will consider whether they have sometimes been used as “private security and protection” agencies, and what their relationship with political elites and ethnic conflicts entails.
Stages of Emergence of Self-Defense Groups
Historically, the state has sought to involve locals in supporting security efforts. One notable phase was the establishment of “Vigilance Committees” in the 1970s, which cooperated with the municipality of Bobo Dioulasso. The second phase involved the “Revolutionary Defense Committees” established in 1983. Finally, in 2010, the authority created what it termed “Community Police.” However, these initiatives did not receive the desired response from the communities, as they were top-down official initiatives rather than born from local grassroots will.
At that stage, there was a significant need for such initiatives due to various factors, most notably, insecurity. When discussing insecurity that disrupts public life and social balances in Burkina Faso, it is often general without specific data on the numbers of security and police forces or their equitable geographical distribution. The country is divided into 350 regional divisions, with at least one police station in 85 of them and one gendarmerie unit. Additionally, 109 divisions have either a gendarmerie unit or police station, while 156 have no internal security forces. These estimates are based on official data from 2018.
Some relatively accurate data from estimates published in 2022 indicate weak coverage percentages and a significant shortage in the number of security and gendarmerie personnel, as well as obvious disorganization and lack of coordination between them and the national army. Security forces are absent in 36% of municipalities, and the ratio of gendarmerie and police personnel is one for every 758 residents nationally, while the international standard is 1:400. The total number of gendarmerie personnel is estimated at 2,195 and about 22,000 police officers, raising the total number of Burkinabé general security forces to around 27,219 personnel. However, discrepancies exist between the numbers of security forces and military personnel. Some sources indicate that in 2024, the number of soldiers in the armed forces ranged between 15,000 to 20,000, supported by about 50,000 national defense volunteers. Similarly, in 2023, about 10,500 soldiers and approximately 5,000 gendarmerie and police personnel were reported.
The crucial factors behind the emergence of local security initiatives stem from widespread insecurity and political instability. In Burkina Faso, there exists a dialectical relationship between deteriorating security conditions and instability, often leading to military coups and popular uprisings. The inability of ruling political elites to navigate phases since the country’s independence, to achieve inclusive and stable agreements, has resulted in numerous military coups, with Burkina Faso experiencing eight coups since independence from France in 1960, the latest being conducted by current President Ibrahim Traore on September 30, 2022. Military coups often do not only target civilian regimes unable to confront security collapses in some areas but also aim at military authorities that have failed in addressing these security and political collapses, leading to a perception that the state and its political-security institutions represent a model of a failed state that has abandoned its sovereign functions at the expense of non-state actors.
Regarding the actual historical beginnings of self-defense groups, sources differ in pinpointing their emergence date, especially for what can be termed “Vigilance Committees,” particularly the “koglweogo.” This divergence often stems from a lack of agreement on defining the phenomenon and clarifying its context, origins, and whether the justifications for their formation are social-security related or driven by political events related to the deterioration of security situations amid state institution failure in ensuring peaceful transitions of power and later, their incapacity to confront terrorist movements.
The history of these groups can be traced back to the early 2000s, particularly from 2013, with roots that predate the modern formation of local communities. They benefit from old customary traditions related to traditional leadership in pre-modern societies, which held many local sovereign functions in peripheral rural areas. It has often been observed that these groups enter villages with the cooperation and supervision of local customary leaders, although they may approach official authorities with a degree of caution.
In essence, traditional village organizations that persisted in some form during the colonial period and were utilized by colonial administration as village self-defense committees transformed during nation-building into official, but informal, calls for citizens to assume an acknowledged “security” role. This emerged prominently in the 1970s with “Vigilance Committees” in some cities handling night security duties without carrying firearms—a voluntary task that did not entail salaries or payments from the state.
Conversely, some academic sources note similarities in the history of the emergence and evolution of “koglweogo” groups with the actions taken during Thomas Sankara’s presidency in the 1980s. In 1983, Sankara decided to establish “Revolutionary Defense Committees” through a process referred to as “security decentralization,” granting citizens the authority to perform certain security roles, allowing them weapon possession with state permission. Although this represents an official acknowledgment of utilizing groups resembling “militia” to bolster official efforts in security and fill governmental shortcomings, Sankara viewed the work of the “Revolutionary Defense Committees” as a temporary measure and not officially recognized within state operations. Other sources assert that modern self-defense factions emerged in the 1990s and proliferated in the early 2000s, leading to state recognition by 2005.
The surge of local security initiatives is directly linked to the fall of President Blaise Compaoré’s regime in 2014, following a popular uprising that ended his 27-year rule. The regime’s collapse resulted in the disintegration of authoritative connections and attached entities in rural areas, creating an environment of insecurity and widespread social violence even in major cities. Burkina Faso entered a transitional phase marked by the dissolution of social relations and connections, as civil society organizations and parties undertook the task of securing transitional power—this culminated in a failed military coup attempt led by General Gilbert Diendéré against the transitional government in September 2015.
Despite the attempted efforts, it remains clear that the security forces (police and gendarmerie) lack the capacity, requisite training, or necessary resources to ensure the safety of individuals and property. Consequently, community security initiatives—including private security firms—receive considerable popular engagement and support. President Roch Marc Christian Kaboré noted in 2016, “80% of rural residents approve of their existence—these self-defense initiatives—and feel satisfied with the security measures they implement.” Thus, the authority at that time deemed these community security initiatives beneficial for both their communities and the state, especially if compliant with laws.
However, it is appropriate to state that “koglweogo” groups and similar associations have experienced varied developmental stages in their history, adjusting to diverse social and political circumstances, which complicates their study as a socio-political phenomenon.
Major Factions of Self-Defense Groups: “Koglweogo and Dozo”
The proliferation of these associations has sparked an academic discussion among university and research elites, while also prompting local and community dialogues, particularly among local political and media elites, regarding the factors behind their emergence, their rapid spread, the nature of their work, tools, and the implications of their incursion into spheres considered sovereign functions of the state; most notably, the legitimacy of violence and armed possession, and the repercussions of their involvement in local or ethnic disputes and anti-terrorism efforts.
Some sources mention the existence of at least ten thousand villages or neighborhoods in Burkina Faso, with at least one local security initiative present in 90% of these villages. Notably, three-quarters of the population—according to the 2019 official census—is classified as rural, making rural areas most relevant to local community security initiatives. Here, we will address the most crucial local security structures and their interactions with official authorities and state agencies.
Security groups involved in local or regional fields can be classified into three factions: the aforementioned Koglweogo, which is the most important and may be foundational for others; the second faction comprises “Dozo” hunter militias active in the western part of the country, such as the “Dan Nan Ambassagou” militia operating mainly in the northern and central regions; and third, the “Rugas” associations, which are professional groups of livestock herders. This discussion will focus primarily on the first two groups.
A- Koglweogo Groups
The term “Koglweogo” is derived from the verb “Kogl” in the Moore language—language of the Mossi ethnicity—meaning “to preserve or protect,” and “Weogo,” meaning “the bush/country.” The Koglweogo phenomenon has significantly evolved in terms of field importance, functional diversity, and spread; initially, its members acted as “informants” for local authorities, handing over captured thieves or suspects to the police. However, due to perceived inaction from security agencies, they began to conduct searches, arrests, investigations, trials, and imprison thieves themselves, even establishing checkpoints along routes in forests.
According to prominent studies, the formal establishment of Koglweogo dates back to 2005 with the formation of its first rural factions in the Yatenga region, located in the northern area bordering the Republic of Mali. An urban group was established in the capital, Ouagadougou, in 2013, and following the fall of President Blaise Compaoré’s regime in 2014, Koglweogo groups spread to numerous areas.
Estimates suggest that by 2020, approximately 45,000 members were involved, with a significant majority being men, and women participating only occasionally. These groups emerge from grassroots initiatives, combining youth and inexperienced individuals in self-security with those having prior experience—who mentor the former. By 2020, the estimated number of Koglweogo units was around 4,400 dispersed across the country. These groups primarily recruit men from pastoralist and farming communities, historically evolving from remote rural areas towards more semi-urban centers. Geographically, they are mainly concentrated in the northern central, eastern, and some southern regions, generally found in eastern and northern territories and parts of the center. However, in other parts of the country, they face competition from distinct ethnic groups, although Koglweogo denies any ethnic affiliations, striving to mobilize members from various social sectors.
It appears that some individuals from these groups may have been “criminals” who have transformed into protectors or guards, especially as they understand the intricacies of criminal society. These groups also mediate disputes between individuals or groups; thus, the state often relies on them for enforcement and gathering criminal intelligence.
The relationship with the state, in general, and its local institutions has fluctuated between cooperation, integration, caution, neglect, and sometimes conflict. This variability differs across regions and groups, thus making it inappropriate to generalize the nature of the relationship between state institutions and all Koglweogo groups; moreover, cooperation often hinges on the prevailing conditions in the country, the nature of the challenges faced, and the perspectives of traditional leadership evaluating their stages, including potential gains or risks.
For instance, during Sankara’s era, the state fostered a climate hostile to traditional leaders, viewed as “backward and reactionary powers.” Notably, traditional leadership networks, whether social or religious in rural areas, were the driving force behind the establishment of self-defense groups. Conversely, the regime established by Sankara relied on “Revolutionary Defense Committees.” While the mechanisms were similar, the utilization process differed, demonstrating each time the state sought popular support due to its failure to fulfill sovereign tasks.
The state’s recognition of its limited ability to perform its security roles not only implied an acknowledgment of these groups but also acceptance of the effectiveness of Koglweogo’s work in the security domain. In this context, the statement by the Minister of State for Internal Security on March 7, 2016, highlighted that “the Koglweogo self-defense groups must operate completely legally and begin to seek recognition; we cannot think for a moment that the central state can deploy gendarmerie units in every village as our human and material resources are limited.” He also noted, “There are 8,900 villages in the country, and security forces cannot be everywhere; thus, we need support from militias, but they must be organized.” At the time the minister made these comments, the state was absent in a quarter of the country’s territory. He further stated, “The security and judicial systems established by the state in many localities do not allow for the protection of people and their property, leaving the residents to face deviants alone; this provides a certain legitimacy to self-defense groups.”
B- Dozo Hunter Groups
The “Dozo” hunting associations, namesake for “hunters” in the Bambara language, are present across several West African countries, such as Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, and Burkina Faso. In Burkina Faso, they are particularly concentrated in the western region; hence, some sources note that in 2016, Koglweogo groups were widespread across the country, except in the western region and the Cascades region, where Dozo groups operate.
Culturally, most Dozo belong to Manding-speaking peoples, so they do not represent a specific ethnic affiliation, coming from different ethnic groups. Additionally, membership in Dozo is typically hereditary but not exclusive, making it an open group that lends to social and cultural tradition more than a closed ethnic identity. They are notably recognized for their extensive knowledge of medicinal plants in their regions, justifying the label “Dozo culture,” which also reflects their engagement in traditional medicine. This cultural backdrop impacts their rituals and customs before combat; hence some field studies yield negative conclusions about them, suggesting they are not skilled fighters, partly due to their reliance on customs and rituals akin to magic and divination, rather than combat training.
Dozo culture embodies a fusion of inherited African revitalization rituals and Islamic culture, though not all members adhere to Islamic faith; some associate with Christianity, while others follow traditional African beliefs. Nonetheless, “values of hunters as protectors of the flora and fauna” bind them together. Some local sources trace the origins of the Dozo group to foundational African myths, suggesting their emergence and beginnings could date back to the 13th century, when they assumed security and regulatory functions in their areas due to weak state presence or effectiveness.
According to some reports, the number of Dozo hunters was around 5,000 in 2023 in the western part of the country, although Dozo association leaders report much higher figures; the National Dozo Union, led by Ali Konaté, claims member counts stand at 17,000 across 172 brotherhood associations. Ultimately, Dozo members often transform into combatants alongside the national army, similar to Koglweogo groups.
Combating Terrorist Movements and the Emergence of National Defense Volunteers
Terrorist activities in Burkina Faso began intensifying around 2015-2016, carried out primarily by the “Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims,” which is affiliated with Al-Qaeda and the “Islamic State” (ISIS—Sahel Province). With the formation of the “National Defense Volunteers” militia, three conflicting factions emerged: the Burkinabé army, armed “jihadist” groups, and the civil militias being mobilized.
Regarding what is referred to as the auxiliary army: the “Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland” (VDP), Koglweogo groups found themselves facing terrorist movements since 2017. As the state struggled to contain the armed operations of extremist groups, it turned to mobilize Koglweogo and Dozo groups, recognizing them as organized and armed entities, albeit rudimentarily, and widespread across the national territory. The status of the “Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland” was formalized under a law dated January 21, 2020, classifying volunteers as “Burkinabé nationals assisting defense and security forces (FDS), voluntarily serving the security interests of their villages or areas of residence.” This initiative responded to deteriorating security conditions due to the proliferation of operations by armed extremist groups.
The duties of the VDP formations, as defined by the authority, include supporting and assisting officials and security forces and the army in reconnaissance, intelligence gathering, and anticipating terrorist operations at the local level.
Their numbers were estimated at 28,000 in 2022, established under a decree from President Roch Kaboré following an operation by the “Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims” that resulted in 40 fatalities. The state’s approach represented a grassroots mobilization to protect the country from armed extremism, placing these groups under the Ministry of Defense’s oversight. The new formation of “Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland” included individuals from various local communities, primarily from the Mossi ethnicity. These groups were divided into two sections: one operating at the national level and the other focused at the local level; however, as events evolved, emphasis shifted towards urban areas due to terrorist threats, while volunteers were directed toward rural areas closely situated to open fronts of terrorism. The establishment and arming of these civilian groups align with the strategy to enhance security forces, incorporating local structures of self-defense initiatives into a broader strategy to confront national security challenges.
The state has exerted substantial efforts to combat terrorism; during Colonel Lieutenant Jean Paul Damiba’s brief eight-month rule, there was an escalation in aerial strikes (approximately 200 airstrikes, eliminating over 1,300 insurgents) targeting bases of rebel movements; however, reliance on fighters from the National Defense Volunteers was limited.
Nonetheless, government efforts to repel hostile armed attacks have largely been unsuccessful, as the national defense strategy has encountered failures in crucial locations against operations by the “Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims,” which seized control of the city of Solenzo, the capital of the Banwa province in August 2022. The government also suffered a severe blow in late September 2022 during an ambush set by this group in the village of Jaskind, resulting in many casualties among army members and National Defense Volunteers, marking a massacre against an army convoy heading to supply Djibo in northern Burkina Faso, besieged by fighters from the group. This incident, along with prior bloody events, raised numerous questions about the extent of coherence and coordination among various armed forces, as well as existing disagreements between military and political elites. This incident may have contributed to the eventual coup against Damiba, given that his strategy hinged on military confrontation, paired with some political initiatives aimed at negotiating with certain armed groups. The assessment of the reliance on National Defense Volunteers has been predominantly negative and aligns with the context of the coup led by Captain Ibrahim Traore.
Traore implemented a radical shift in the confrontation strategy, calling for broad mobilization against armed groups and pushing leadership towards recruiting 50,000 fighters into the National Defense Volunteers, with enhanced focus on their material, training, and arming conditions. This official call witnessed significant public response, as some sources reported 90,000 individuals expressing willingness to volunteer, leading to the formation of the “Patriotic Vigilance and National Defense” unit.
Captain Ibrahim Traore may redefine the role and tasks of National Defense formations, elevating them from mere reconnaissance and local intelligence gathering duties to frontline combat positions. From the outset, criticism of the civilian arming plan concerned inexperience, inadequate arming, and poor material conditions; the training period was limited to two weeks, and state capacity to provide weapons and ammunition for such a large number of fighters may not suffice.
Although there may be some results from this extensive reliance on the armed volunteer corps, especially on the fronts and military achievements, these remain limited; however, it is clear that this strategy has fueled and intensified ethnic disputes, particularly as the Fulani perceive themselves as more targeted than others by the “Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland” due to “suspicions” of their support for extremist groups. This is especially highlighted as almost all members of the Masina Liberation Front—an element of the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims—are from the Fulani. The situation also targeted residents of villages that resisted participating in the general mobilization announced by the president, resulting in violent reactions from rebel fighters against villages believed to have actively contributed to the “Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland.” Overall, from the outset in 2020, there was a confusion between the Fulani and jihadist elements; thus, in some areas, Fulani ethnicity was excluded from participating in the National Defense Volunteers due to suspicions about their intentions, leading authorities to conduct background checks on each individual aspiring to join these newly established armed civilian formations. This trend mirrors that, as of 2022, most enrollees in the National Defense Volunteers’ units stemmed from the Mossi, Gourmanché, and Fulfude ethnic groups. Consequently, the national army has gradually transformed, principally shifting from a professional institution to one heavily reliant on numerous low-quality and ethnically differentiated groups.
– Factors and Consequences of the National Army’s Weakness
Burkinabé armed forces have undergone numerous purges following every military coup or radical changes within the state’s highest echelons. This has weakened the army’s capabilities and qualitative readiness. Since the fall of President Blaise Compaoré’s regime, there have been several purging actions against high-ranking military personnel, including during the failed coup attempt in 2015 that led to the dissolution of the presidential security regiment, which—not only provided presidential protection—was also a highly effective intelligence agency representing 10% of the armed forces. Additionally, rivalry between the police and military forces since the transitional period of 2014-2015 has further weakened coordination and operational harmony, which is likely to persist between National Defense Volunteers and military forces to this day due to various reasons, including the poor material conditions of civilian volunteers, their inadequate arming, and their placement on front lines in combat scenarios.
During the coups led by Henri Traore and then Ibrahim Traore, purges of high-ranking officers continued, the last of which involved the removal of sixteen officers close to former President Damiba at the end of October 2024. This led to the collapse of general security systems and significant early losses in the professionalism of security institutions, which the state may continue to suffer from and accumulate for several years to come.
Contextually, in support of the armed forces and supplementing them with new recruits, in late October 2022, the recruitment of three thousand individuals into the national army was announced, marking the second instance within that year that such a level of hiring occurred when army numbers were reportedly about thirty thousand according to local and international sources. President Traore indicated in October 2024 that, since he took power, he had been able to recruit thirty thousand new personnel into the army over two years.
Ibrahim Traore’s recourse to an all-out war on terrorism did not imply that he did not incorporate political frameworks alongside military actions; the complete mobilization of citizens against armed movements also necessitates political mobilization, achievable only through comprehensive national dialogue, especially with various military and combat components, including those of the National Defense Volunteers (VDP), and representatives of political parties and civil society organizations. He called for popular support of the national military effort through community material backing.
Nonetheless, the wave of violence that began in 2015 and 2016 continues to ravage the lives of thousands of civilians. Militias composed of large numbers of civilians or the use of traditional armed community structures against armed rebels might have exacerbated incidents of violence, fueling ethnic conflicts across numerous regions.
UN reports indicate that civilian deaths as a result of armed clashes and retaliatory operations among the warring parties reached 6,000 between January and August 2024, while internally displaced persons due to warfare totaled two million one hundred thousand, alongside an additional two hundred thousand who fled to neighboring countries. Other reports noted that between June 10, 2023, and June 21, 2024, Burkina Faso witnessed 1,542 combat incidents, with the most affected areas in terms of casualties being those populated predominantly by Fulani in the eastern part of the country (1,878 casualties), compared to 1,692 in the Sahel region and 1,409 in the central-north area.
Official sources estimated at the beginning of 2025 that 30% of the country’s territory remained outside state control. There have been reports since 2022 that more than 40% of national territory was under the control of armed movements.
Even in regions successfully regained by the Burkinabé army, such as Djibo in the Sanmatenga province—under siege for three years—we continue to see intense targeting by insurgents, with casualties among National Defense Volunteers and military personnel reported in attacks in early February 2025.
Conclusion
The real conflict that communities in Burkina Faso and its similar countries in West Africa (Mali and Niger) face resides in the absence of communication and convincing dialogue between three circles: state institutions, community security bodies, and vulnerable social groups. The breakdown of dialogue among them has led the latter to feel that they are targeted by both the former and the latter. This situation has similarly engendered feelings among formal and informal institutions of being undermined by marginalized youth and certain ethnic segments. Though collaboration occasionally occurs between “community security tools” and governmental security agencies, often there exists neglect instead of synergy. Additionally, the state has experienced significant absence, leading to a security and institutional vacuum exploited by “traditional and ancestral civic society.” However, this civic sector is propelled by material interests and narrow political agendas, along with traditional authority dynamics and opportunism, influenced by the engagement of various social classes and their material conditions within a complex security and social intertwining. Most critically, the state is responsible for its marginalization through certain policies and numerous procedural intricacies and conflicts among political elites over power and resource distribution. This imbalance in authoritative relationships is among the primary reasons for the exacerbation of terrorism and the failures of national armies and their popular affiliates to confront it effectively.
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