Book Review: War of the Worlds – The Return of Geopolitics and the Clash of Empires

Original Title: La Guerre des mondes: Le retour de la géopolitique et le choc des empires

Author: Bruno Tertrais
Publisher: Le Spectator Publications
Publication Date: October 2023
Language: French
Edition: First
Number of Pages: 288

Geopolitical Context and Researcher’s Background

The book’s subject matter is not new, but its manifestations have become more pronounced in the international polarization landscape, thus increasing the appetite for research and foresight. French strategic expert Bruno Tertrais charts the awakening of empires contesting the United States’ monopoly on global leadership in “War of the Worlds: The Return of Geopolitics and the Clash of Empires.” The book’s introduction states: “The geopolitical tectonic plates are moving again. New empires have awakened from their slumber, questioning the international system. China and Russia seek revenge against the West, aiming to reshape the world according to their vision.”

For the researcher, the world appears as a multi-front battleground, from Ukraine to Taiwan, from the depths of the seas to outer space, in lithium mines, and in cyberspace. The clash this time is between a liberal Western bloc and an authoritarian Eurasian bloc. It is a struggle for global influence, interspersed with crises and regional conflicts.

These are new data points that feed into the dialectic: “the West and the others.” The West is refreshing its adversaries in my battles over material power, as well as over values. It’s notable that the author begins his analysis of this polarization from 1999, invoking NATO’s bombing of Belgrade. For him, China and Russia will not forget this event that befell a former communist capital.

Undoubtedly, as the author chooses a title for his book in international relations, he invokes an enduring and referential literary title, the novel “War of the Worlds” by English writer H.G. Wells, first serialized in 1897 and published simultaneously in Pearson’s magazine in the UK and Cosmopolitan magazine in the US, before being published as a book by William Heinemann in London in 1898.

The science fiction novel narrates a story of an extraterrestrial invasion of Earth by Martians. This intertextuality refers to the fear for the world’s fate due to a devastating war—the difference being the source of the threat. Bruno Tertrais analyzes trends in international conflict and anticipates the possibilities of a major clash between the world’s powers within the context of the competition for global leadership.

This book is a culmination of Bruno Tertrais’s research efforts as a French expert specializing in geopolitical and strategic analysis. He has long studied crises, conflicts, US strategies, transatlantic relations, security in the Middle East and Asia, and nuclear deterrence.

A graduate of the Paris Institute of Political Studies, he earned his PhD from the European Institute of Political Studies in Paris with a thesis on “NATO’s Nuclear Strategy: Extended Deterrence and the Role of US Nuclear Weapons in Europe, 1949-1992,” supervised by renowned strategic analyst Pierre Hassner.

Tertrais’s professional career is characterized by a blend of academic work and political consultancy, lending a notable pragmatic realism to his writings. He began his professional life in the Strategic Affairs Directorate of the French Ministry of Defense (1993-2001), served as a scientific advisor to the High Commissioner for Planning, and, during the 2017 presidential campaign, was part of the expert group advising Emmanuel Macron on diplomatic and military issues. Readers may note that this professional background significantly influences his analysis and the objectivity of his approach in general.

The researcher has previous works including: “Nuclear Weapons After the Cold War: Europe, NATO, and the Future of Deterrence” (1994), “Nuclear Policies in Europe” (1999), “The War that Never Ends” (2004), “Four Years to Change the World: Bush America, 2005-2008” (2005), “Europe/United States: Common Values or Cultural Divorce?” (2006), “Iran, The Coming War” (2007), “The End of the World is Not Tomorrow” (2011), and “The Revenge of History” (2017).

Tectonic Shifts in the Geopolitical Landscape

“War of the Worlds” is a prime reflection of international strategic context. In critical moments of international relations and escalating competition among great powers and perturbations in geopolitical balances, forward-looking analyses thrive regarding the emergent system from competition and the roster of winners and losers, what the author calls the tectonic shifts in geopolitics. The book prompts a revisiting of the post-Soviet collapse stage and the surge of publications surrounding the fate of the unipolar moment led by the United States and its sustainability, along with the rising powers. Today, analysts almost unanimously identify these emerging powers as an Asian force in China and a Eurasian force in Russia.

The Ukrainian crisis has become a sensitive intersection in the race to gain positioning on the ladder of great powers, with varied interpretations: some see it as a successful test for Putin’s Russia, while others view it as a genuine brake that has stalled the Russian imperial dream. Following the example of Russia’s war on Ukraine, the author and other analysts propose simulations with a hypothetical Chinese invasion of Taiwan, potentially signaling a formal ascent of China to global leadership, at the expense of the United States and the West generally, or, failing a decisive military resolution, a quagmire that could stymie or delay China’s efforts toward world leadership, as envisioned for the centenary of the communist revolution in 2049.

Tertrais does not introduce a wholly new thesis when he narrows down the list of contenders for global leadership to the American, Chinese, and Russian triad. This is the same list that Lebanese-French researcher Gilbert Achcar nominated a quarter-century ago in his book “The New Cold War” (1999) subtitled “The World After Kosovo.” One might propose a subtitle for Tertrais’s book reflecting a decisive geopolitical shift: “The World After the Ukrainian War.” The developments of the past decade in Russia’s geopolitical environment, from the annexation of Crimea to the invasion of Ukraine, alongside China’s geopolitical and geoeconomic context—marked by increasing assertive behavior regarding Taiwan and its “aggressive” practices in the economic exchange markets—prompt the researcher to speak of a “warm world war” with possibilities of hot clashes at the interface of imperial influence domains.

New Empires and Historical Revenge

The author prefers to start from the mental framework governing strategic decision-making in Russia and China, detailing the vivid memories of humiliation that haunt the minds and hearts of Moscow and Beijing leaders since the events of 1999 in the Yugoslav arena. NATO bombed Belgrade in March 1999, just five days before Vladimir Putin, then Director of the KGB, was appointed Secretary General of the Russian National Security Council. American aircraft bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in May of the same year. “Moscow and Beijing have not forgotten the Kosovo War and the bombing of Belgrade. It is a capital that embodies the legacy of the old communist world, as well as Slavic Orthodoxy for Russia and non-alignment for China. What is the lesson for them? It is that the West won’t hesitate to use force to serve its interests, even without the approval of the United Nations.” The author cites Putin himself: “From there, everything began.” He even recalled in 2022 the Kosovo precedent to justify the recognition of the Donbas Republic. China inaugurated one of its largest cultural centers in Europe in 2023 at the site of its embassy in Belgrade. These elements comprise what the researcher terms “foundational myths” for revenge against history in Beijing and Moscow.

Connected to this psychological-cultural factor is the reversal of the ideological, military, and economic supremacy of the West in the 1990s to the dominant representations portraying Western weakness and loss of appeal of its universal model. It marks a new eruption of nationalisms against globalization and against Westernization and modernization, contrasting sharply with the missionary notion of the “end of history” as proposed by Francis Fukuyama. From the financial and monetary shock of 2008 to the US management’s failure to handle crises from Syria to Ukraine, a feeling has emerged that the West is in decline. In contrast to doubts about the effectiveness and sustainability of the Western liberal model, a nationalistic sentiment has revived, elevating values of leadership, order, and tradition. The challenge in countries outside the Western geographic and civilizational domain, such as Brazil and India, centers on “regaining control of affairs” against the encroachment of globalization and the chaos of false democracy.

The author quotes Raymond Aron’s dictum: “Those who believe that peoples follow their interests and not their feelings have understood nothing of the twentieth century,” which seems to explain the dominance of the sentiment of revenge for Western humiliations and revives Hobbesian theory regarding the effectiveness of two fundamental emotions in human beings: fear and honor. Here, Bruno Tertrais, under Aron’s cloak, does not escape a critical Western legacy that posits cultural and psychological explanations for the behaviors of non-Western populations and elites, based on irrational motivations. In this section, as in others, there is no deviation from the arrogant Western centrism whereby anti-Western actions appear as expressions of ideological, psychological, and cultural grievances. It echoes the notion that democracies do not go to war while others act out of a desire for revenge.

The Collapse of Global Peace Illusions

The author discusses the collapse of illusions offered by globalization that promised progress, modernization, and well-being beyond national borders. Globalization has become a problem after having been a solution, and the coupling of development with democracy and modernization with Westernization has faltered. The experiences of Turkey, India, and China have revealed the simplistic nature of these ideas. The notion that the end of the Cold War would lead to world peace and the establishment of a multilateral cooperative system has crumbled, with the nation-state regaining importance over international institutions and multinational corporations, while economic interdependence was thought to bring peace.

He questions: Who is to blame for the collapse of these illusions? Accordingly, he calls for a more nuanced perspective on blaming the West for the failures of globalization, the decline in the attractiveness of liberal thought, the resurgence of nationalisms, and the new authoritarianism, as well as the resentment of southern elites against the West on the backdrop of its military and non-military interventions. The researcher poses a strange query in an attempt to justify the unjustifiable: “What would the outcome have been if there had been no intervention in Kuwait, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, or Mali?” He states that it is illogical to hold the West accountable for both supporting and then toppling dictatorships. One might be surprised by such an “academic” interpretation of a clear principle in international law: non-intervention. What is illogical about criticizing the West for supporting dictatorships or intervening to overthrow them? In both cases, there is a violation of people’s rights and the principles of international law. Notably, within the Western system itself, many voices in the scientific and intellectual fields absolve the West of betraying itself.

This justifying tone continues in the author’s analysis of the escalation of tensions at the Russia-West interface. Regarding NATO expansion, he asserts that former Warsaw Pact nations knocked on NATO’s door, not the other way around. Who believes such a naive superficial reading? As if the acceptance of these countries’ membership came from embarrassment in responding to a guest rather than an overt strategic calculation for containing Russia and extending the umbrella of “American peace” eastward.

With the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war, the researcher claims that the world has returned to its “normal” state, reinforcing Henry Kissinger’s view of international reality defined by conflict and rivalry. This suggests that the calculations of political realism have regained their dominance. It highlights the reality of geopolitics against the dreams of global governance. Bruno Tertrais argues that the new empires (i.e., China and Russia) no longer care for the rules of the game that they themselves helped establish: respect for borders, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, arms limitation, freedom of navigation in high seas, and reciprocal trade. The reader may wonder if these violations began with Russia and China.

Tertrais asserts that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine shattered three taboos in Europe: the return of major wars among neighbors, the redrawing of borders by force, and the explicit emergence of nuclear threats. This represents a counterattack by wounded empires: Russia and China, alongside Turkey and Iran, according to Jeffrey Mankoff.

The author seeks to find structural commonalities between Russia and China, noting their shared worship of personality, elimination of dissent, and admiration for Stalin, suggesting both nations believe the circumstances are favorable for eastward and southward expansion for Russia and for maritime expansion (South China Sea and West Pacific) for China.

While the author excels in analyzing and synthesizing elements to assess power balances and the maneuvers of actors within the international system’s hierarchy, there is a tendency for value judgments when describing the conduct of the investigated powers like Russia and China (alongside India and Turkey), using terms such as “rape” of Ukraine, “predatory” empires, and “mafia-like” practices akin to Russia’s behavior in Africa, which he refers to as exploitation, forgetting that European interventions historically did not represent a flowering of democracy and development and that southern governments are not naive for seeking partnerships with Chinese and Russian cooperation offers.

Russia: Violence as its DNA

The author seeks to extract the roots of violence from the structure of the Russian political system, seemingly attempting to present ananticipated necessity in Russian behavior towards its regional and international surroundings. For him, Russia is a mixture of Tsarist and Stalinist systems, an autocracy haunted by paranoia and violence. This is Russia’s “political DNA.” From this perspective, Moscow – according to Tertrais – systematically seeks to amplify the external (Western) threat and to “invent” it. Putin is obsessed with the moment of the communist system’s collapse and is terrorized by the prospect of a similar tragedy repeating itself.

The new Russian foreign policy, set in 2023, lays out a bouquet of strategic objectives focused on dismantling the pillars of American domination and antagonistic states in global affairs and neutralizing attempts to impose purportedly humanitarian and neoliberal ideological principles. In this context, the author cites a summary by former US National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, who asserts, “Without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be a Eurasian empire.” Ukraine is everything: grain, gas, steel industries, and far more on the geostrategic front.

The author delves into Putin’s mindset, invoking Crimea’s historical role in the birth of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, and adopting a reading of history that places Kyiv at the center of Russian glory while considering the establishment of Ukraine as a product of a Western conspiracy. This is the Kremlin narrative that harbors another underlying motive, namely demographic pressure: the annexation of Crimea has bolstered the Russian social fabric, which suffers from declining fertility rates.

The author’s exaggerations in personalizing and interpreting psychological motives lead him to employ non-scientific terms and at times lack clarity, exemplified by his characterization of Putin as a husband who cannot bear to be abandoned by his wife.

The map of the Russian project includes the annexation of Crimea, punishing Armenian leadership, consolidating power in the Caucasus, and subjugating Belarus. These are geopolitical objectives that the author soon frames as a personal project of Putin’s. He recalls comments from Donald Trump’s advisor Fiona Hill: “It is a personal matter. His legacy, his self-image, his vision of Russian history. Putin sees himself as a hero in Russian history, walking in the footsteps of past Russian leaders who sought to unify what they considered Russian land.” The reality that testimony from a Trump advisor does not lend credibility to such an analysis is indeed telling.

Putin’s personal stance is intricately tied to the civilizational dimension of the conflict. Here, Bruno Tertrais argues that Samuel Huntington erred by classifying Russia within the Western sphere. The contemporary situation is a battleground between liberal West and authoritarian Eurasia. This perspective is supported by right-wing Russian thought, as epitomized by theorist Alexander Dugin, who proclaims that the final battle between light and darkness has begun. According to the author, the glorification of violence is deeply entrenched in the Russian self-conception, portraying others as devils to be tirelessly fought against. In this light, Ukraine embodies evil. We may observe that these descriptions apply equally to America and the West in general, as seen from a central perspective portraying others as “barbarians” causing eternal terror, reminiscent of what Bulgarian-French thinker and critic Tzvetan Todorov reveals in his book “Fear of the Barbarians.”

Bruno Tertrais’s reading hastens Russia’s fall into the Ukrainian quagmire. In a chapter titled “The Final Collapse,” the author asserts that the invasion of Ukraine to reshape Russia’s sphere of influence has turned into a disaster. Conversely, the state is spiraling towards fascism. It marks the second death of the Soviet Union, indicating the collapse of Russia’s new imperial project. The decline is evident not only in hard power but also in soft power. Small nations within Russia’s sphere of influence are gripped by fear of Russian intentions and the sanctions that have become defining traits of the Russian economy, with the oligarch class’s wealth fleeing to safer havens, and demographics in decline, with the country losing a million people annually. The researcher does not hesitate to label Russia as the “sick man of Eurasia,” speaking of a North Korean-like scenario of isolation and rigidity following defeat, and the possibility of Russia imploding from within and falling into the abyss.

The Chinese Challenge: Deciding on Taiwan

While Russia has become a fascist state, China, according to the author, is presented as a totalitarian state. While Moscow resorts to direct military interventions, Beijing operates more stealthily and patiently. Russia plays a short-term tactical game while China embodies the long-term strategic dimension.

Today, the author portrays China as a personalized dictatorship based on the party-state, with Xi Jinping as a heir apparent to Mao Zedong. According to the party’s charter, China is still in the primary stage of socialism on its way to achieving communism. Bruno Tertrais sums up that the Chinese case is a refutation of Fukuyama’s thesis regarding the end of history. It now offers an alternative model of modernity outside the Western orbit since the 2008 financial crisis, and its policy of non-intervention attracts southern nations and peoples.

China seeks to swallow Taiwan after digesting Hong Kong, believing its time has come. In 2013, it launched the New Silk Road, embodying these global aspirations. It has woven a network of economic, financial, and military relations angled at counterbalancing Western alliances. By 2010, China had become a massive lender to developing countries, a development that is not without significance.

As in other sections, the author excels in compiling facts and elements but does not escape his Western biases when he claims that China’s rising power rests on plundering natural and intellectual resources and that it is the primary source of greenhouse gases. His argument here does not differ from narratives circulating in European and American media regarding China’s supposed attempts to swamp its partners with debt and bind their futures, even as Western powers continue to claim dominion over the riches of their former colonies, and as international institutions devour the lion’s share of poor countries’ budgets.

The author observes that the American-Chinese race accelerated in the 1990s with the exposure of Chinese espionage in the US and its role in spreading nuclear technology, with its expansive maneuvers in the South China Sea awakening American responses. In 2018, Vice President Mike Pence’s speech reflected the launch of a new containment policy aimed at China. From the perspective of military power, the author believes that while China has achieved advantages in trade volume, it now suffers from declining demographic trends, whereas the US excels in military capabilities and even in soft power, with China’s image dwindling in the West. It could be mentioned that America’s image is not as flawless as presumed in the consciousness of Western intellectual elites, despite strong political and economic ties. On the level of mental representations in the south, it is undeniable that the scales continue to tip in favor of China, as a new partner without a history of aggression against countries and peoples.

The extent and outcome of the American competition with China and Russia are largely determined by the level and momentum of the Chinese-Russian relationship. Is it a temporary alliance or a sustainable strategic partnership? The reality is that this relationship has endured for many years, despite the weight of memories of conflicts that at some points have been more acute than those with America. In this context, the author recalls Alice Ekman’s assertion: “Today, there are enough elements to say that this is not merely a temporary rapprochement or a marriage of convenience.” Nevertheless, the author insists on labeling the Chinese-Russian relationship as cautious collusion, portraying the situation as though China is about to devour Russia.

Others in the Polarization Struggle

The author is betting on a geopolitical awakening of Europe so that it no longer remains, as Josep Borrell, former high representative of the EU for foreign affairs and security, described, “a garden in the midst of a forest.” In this regard, he observes that the European Union has intensified its criticism of China within the World Trade Organization, imposing stricter scrutiny on Chinese investments, as indicators of Europe beginning to shed illusions of liberalism and interdependence and accepting the reality of confrontation as a natural state within the international system.

A comprehensive study indicates that over the past decade, democratic societies find themselves closer to the United States, while the popularity of Russia and China is on the rise in the developing world. Notably, the author contrasts a political system (democracies) with a geoeconomic concept (the developing world). It appears that the author adopts a dogmatic inevitability linking democracy with progress and prosperity, implying that backwardness is a fateful condition in the south. China is seducing members of the Group of 77. From South Africa to India, Moscow remains an ally in anti-colonialism while Western nations are viewed as a source of economic problems in former colonies.

Europe has turned to America and Norway for gas supplies instead of Russian supplies and halted the signing of a free trade agreement with China in 2021. In the game of polarization, India’s position remains decisive. Traditionally, it has ideological and military ties with Russia, yet it has a longstanding feud with China over certain border areas. It is also the largest country to ban TikTok. Its stance will significantly influence future trends in confrontations between the poles.

The Danger of Competition Turning into Conflict

What about the risk of a Third World War? The specter that has loomed over the world since the 1950s has re-emerged. According to the author, it may be time for the Chinese and Russian avenging moment for past insults.

After Ukraine, could Taiwan be the second episode in the continuing saga of challenging the existing order? From a rational perspective, the outbreak of a major war remains a vast illusion considering the intertwined economic interests between China and the West, despite the intensity of competition. It is said in Beijing: “Taiwan is like a crystal cup. We want the cup, not the shattered pieces scattered into a thousand fragments.”

The author contemplates the ally landscape and concludes that the U.S. boasts 60 allies, compared to Russia’s 5 and China’s 1. Russia and China attacked unprotected or disputed territories, but they did not dare to breach territories under explicit security guarantees from the U.S. or NATO generally.

Bruno Tertrais believes nuclear deterrence has proven effective in avoiding major wars; no country under nuclear guarantee has been subjected to significant attack. Statistical studies confirm that nuclear weapons diminish the likelihood of physical provocation by a non-nuclear state. The invasion of Ukraine is no exception as it was not protected by any commitment to defend it. It was without a nuclear umbrella. Stian Tonnesen illustrated in 2015 that economic interdependence and nuclear deterrence could significantly reduce the risk of confrontation between Washington and Beijing.

Nonetheless, the author warns that Xi Jinping has established the reunification of China as a national priority by 2049. The military budget has increased by three-quarters under his rule. Beijing’s leaders are aware of the dangers of invading Taiwan that could break China’s ascent but are also conscious that day by day, Taiwan distances itself from the Chinese imperial embrace. He cautions that the West’s weak responses in 2020 following Hong Kong’s reclamation may encourage Beijing to exploit “the weakness of the West.”

The author stretches the scenario to its furthest predictive limits, stating that in the event of U.S.-China conflict, one of China’s weaknesses is its lack of experience in warfare, coupled with a high spirit of resistance in Taiwan. Supremacy in material and personnel is not a guaranteed success in such theaters.

On the other hand, the hypothesis of internal implosion remains plausible for Russia, given its economic deadlock and demographic decline. Russia faces the risk of collapsing the unifying national myth. The author references researcher Sergey Medvedev’s claim: “There is no Russian nation. There are only people ruled by a state.” The author’s forecasts lean toward wishful thinking more than objective analysis, suggesting that Russia’s downfall will differ from that of the Soviet Union. It will resemble being the sick man of Eurasia, leading to new disputes in that vast continental space.

Conclusion

In response to questions the author posed in his book’s introduction regarding the contemporary moment of imperial rivalry and competition, he concludes that the world is experiencing a reminiscent phase of imperial races akin to the post-1910 moment, facing the threat of fascist states in the 1930s and the Cold War as in 1950. He believes that states seeking to adjust the current balances will be responsible for major conflicts and crises. The world will not be bipolar or multipolar but will be a hybrid world, a stage for a continuous power struggle.

In summary, the author tends towards optimism about the West’s continued dominance led by the United States in the equations. He argues that as China’s economic power grows, its interest in the stability of the international system, freedom of trade, and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons increases. Yes, the dream of universality and global governance has eroded due to the rise of nationalist tendencies, but Fukuyama believes that autocracies are more prone to misjudgments in the absence of top-level discussions and are fragile due to the lack of power distribution. It is, therefore, premature, according to the researcher, to celebrate the rise of powerful states and rejoice in the decline of democratic ones. Liberal democracy remains a system that entails dynamics of self-correction. He recalls that the theories of America’s decline fell with the well-known historian Paul Kennedy’s prediction of the United States’ collapse due to the burden of military expansion and indebtedness.

From the heart of Western strategy, Tertrais emphasizes the necessity for the West to accept confrontation and the struggle of wills and not to automatically seek to deescalate in response to provocations from challenging powers: China and Russia. The author calls for multi-front action plans to consolidate power privileges, including saving democracy and repairing its structures and efficiency, ending the illusion of luring Russia to the West against China, maintaining Europe on a dynamic alliance with Washington, engaging in deterrence efforts against Chinese aggression toward Taiwan, and accepting the reality of Europe’s detachment from Russia.