The book “Putin’s War on Ukraine: The Russian Campaign for Comprehensive Counter-Revolution,” authored by Samuel Ramani, discusses the roots and reasons behind the Russian war in Ukraine, documenting the daily events and twists of this conflict. It presents a comprehensive overview of Russia’s diplomatic relations worldwide in light of Western efforts to isolate Moscow, and the Russians’ attempts to diversify their trade partnerships and build bridges of friendship with non-Western international powers and countries in Latin America and Africa.
Released in mid-April 2023 by the British publisher Hurst Publishers, which specializes in strategic studies and studies of wars and conflicts, Ramani is a professor of political science and international relations at the University of Oxford and a researcher at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). He is one of the prominent academic voices in Britain providing analyses of the war’s trajectory and its reflections in major global media outlets such as Al Jazeera English, CNN, BBC, The Washington Post, and Foreign Policy.
The importance of Ramani’s book on the Ukraine war stems from its juxtaposition of the discussion of the conflict’s roots with the trajectory it has taken since late 2013, while also capturing the war’s daily developments and repercussions up to early 2023 within Russia and Western governance circles (with nearly 700 citations of statements and articles from Russian, Ukrainian, Western officials, and analyses of battle progress). It also provides an analysis of the impact of economic sanctions on the evolution of Moscow’s positions. The book places particular emphasis on Moscow’s ambitions to reaffirm its influence in the post-Soviet space, mitigate American-Western unipolar dominance, and understand how international powers, emerging forces, and countries of the Global South respond to these ambitions.
Retaliation Against Revolutions and Rejection of Western Liberal Values
The book opens with a discussion of the hypotheses circulating in Western media and think tanks regarding Putin’s motivations for launching a large-scale attack on Ukraine, such as security concerns stemming from NATO’s expansion and the potential joining of Ukraine to NATO, coupled with Ukrainian-American maneuvers in the Black Sea in 2021, along with fears regarding the internal situation in Russia and beyond. It discusses Moscow’s justifications for the war, particularly the request for military support from the Donetsk and Luhansk Republics in the face of “Ukrainian aggression.” However, the book distances itself from these readings and proposes a justification that it sees as more deeply rooted in Russia’s political legitimacy and a more authentic expression of its new identity. This involves Russia’s declaration, based on a doctrine established by Putin, of its identity as a cosmic power fighting against the spread of the liberal model propagated by the United States and resisting the revolutions that this model incites in the post-Soviet space. This identity is seen as having been established upon Putin’s break with liberal currents and his suppression of visions regarding the nature of governance, parameters of nationalism, and the stability of geographic borders amidst the contradictions experienced by post-Soviet Russia.
The book traces the genealogy of the rejection of revolutions in Russia’s political practice back to the days of the czars and throughout the Soviet era (including resisting labor revolutions in East Germany and crushing the Prague Spring). It also tracks Moscow’s efforts to keep Kyiv under its orbit using economic tools such as preferential gas deals, which helped create a Ukrainian oligarchy crucial to the rise of pro-Moscow politicians, including former President Viktor Yanukovych.
The Setting Sun of Russia from Kyiv’s “Maidan” and Its Rise in Crimea and Donbas
After his ally Yanukovych fled Kyiv at the end of February 2014 under pressure from demonstrations demanding stronger ties with the European Union, Putin did not hesitate to begin escalatory actions by seizing the Crimean Peninsula, justifying this by claiming to protect Russian speakers. The author describes this move as an ideological and media strike that was welcomed in Russia, even by some of Putin’s fiercest opponents. Two months later, Moscow loyalists seized a security services building in Donetsk, and the following day the same occurred in Luhansk. These Moscow supporters conducted referendums in the two Russian-speaking provinces, which endorsed autonomy.
To consolidate this new reality, Moscow sought to strengthen its influence in the post-Soviet space, particularly in Belarus, Azerbaijan, and Armenia. Concurrently, it started to develop and modernize its defense systems, increasing military spending from 2.3% of its GDP to 4.3% during the first three years of Putin’s third term. The revival of the naval base in Sevastopol in Crimea and the establishment of the Russian space forces are two prominent examples of these efforts.
The sanctions imposed by Western countries on Russia did not satisfy Kyiv’s new ruler, Petro Poroshenko, with the Russian Foreign Relations Committee remaining divided on the distance from the West until 2015, despite the economic repercussions of these sanctions (26.7 billion dollars in 2014, according to Dmitry Medvedev, the Deputy Chairman of the National Security Council). Moscow attempted to mitigate the effects of official positions in Western capitals by strengthening its ties with far-right and far-left political elites and movements, evidenced by the loan obtained by Marine Le Pen, leader of France’s far-right National Rally from a bank in Moscow, as she stated at the end of 2014, and the support of the Alternative for Germany party for the annexation of Crimea, as well as the Syriza party in Greece’s relationship with Putin’s foreign policy theorist, Alexander Dugin.
To alleviate the consequences of Western sanctions, Moscow strengthened its relations with non-Western international powers such as China and India. This was exemplified by an agreement reached in 2014 for thirty years between Russian Gazprom and China’s national oil company to supply gas pipelines from Siberia worth $400 billion. The cooperation between the two countries extended beyond economic fields, with the Russian RT media network signing an exchange agreement with Chinese news agency Xinhua, allowing Moscow and Beijing to unify their media discourse calling for a multipolar world and countering criticisms faced by both countries in Western media.
While Russian intervention in Syria hindered the development of relations with pivotal Middle Eastern countries like Turkey and Saudi Arabia, it managed to establish a foothold in Africa and Latin America amidst the backlash from the annexation of Crimea, as seen with Sudan under Omar al-Bashir, Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe, and ventures in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Cuba.
Minsk Protocol: Agreements No Longer Russian Swords to Their Sheaths
The Minsk II agreements signed by both Russian and Ukrainian parties in Belarus at the start of 2015 contributed to what the book describes as a “freezing of the conflict” for five years. In the final days of Petro Poroshenko’s rule, Kyiv’s position against the Russian Orthodox Church’s behavior in Ukraine would surface, and a crisis erupted in the Sea of Azov. Subsequently, the new Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky, sought a peaceful resolution to the conflict in the Donbas region while simultaneously taking rapid steps to enhance security cooperation with the West and crush those he described as Russian agents in Ukraine. Despite a ceasefire agreement being signed, the period following Zelensky’s ascent to power was marked by escalated tensions, including Russia granting passports to over 200,000 residents from Donbas, Zelensky hastening his steps to pave the way for his country to join the European Union and NATO through constitutional amendments, while tightening the noose around opponents of this approach.
The success of Russian intervention in supporting Alexander Lukashenko in Belarus, the sharp deterioration in Moscow’s relations with the West, U.S. President Joe Biden’s attempts to unify Western countries against Russia, and Putin’s iron grip on internal affairs in Russia all created favorable conditions for the initiation of this war. The Russian defensive maneuvers on the Ukrainian border and in the Black Sea in 2021, followed by a maintained large military presence on the border, according to the Ukrainian narrative, marked a significant escalation. This coincided with an intensification of Russian rhetoric regarding the historical ties between Russians and Ukrainians, culminating in articles by Putin and his deputy in the National Security Council, Dmitry Medvedev. By the end of 2021 and early 2022, Moscow had ramped up military preparations at the Ukrainian border, officially recognizing the Donbas republics (Luhansk and Donetsk) on February 22, signing treaties of friendship and cooperation with them, and initiating what it termed a “special military operation” two days later.
The “Special Military Operation” and Western Sanctions
The book discusses in its fourth chapter the trajectory of the war and the slogans Moscow raised to justify it, most notably disarming Ukraine through destroying Kyiv’s military infrastructure, eliminating its stockpile of Western weapons, and neutralizing its potential biological and chemical capabilities to thwart its joint projects with Washington for launching a biological war, as claimed by Moscow. The author asserts that Western countries continued to supply arms to Kyiv in spite of Putin’s escalating threat rhetoric and his order to place strategic nuclear forces on heightened alert. Regarding the development of chemical weapons, he cites the refutation of the United Nations and the United States, while acknowledging its role in stoking anti-Western sentiments in Russia. Another prominent Russian slogan was the eradication of Nazism in Ukraine, which generated much ink among Russian theorists of the war, dominating statements from officials in Moscow, as a Russian attempt, according to the author, to link this war with World War II.
The book states that Moscow suffered strategic setbacks despite achieving tactical victories, attributing this to the incapacity of its air force to impose absolute control over Ukrainian airspace, the rigid hierarchy within the Russian army, and the limited performance of supporting combat battalions (Wagner, Chechen Kadyrov troops, and militias from the Donetsk and Luhansk republics), along with a miscalculation of the anticipated reception of its intervention in Ukraine. In the early phase of the war, Moscow sought to encircle the capital, Kyiv, creating suitable conditions for installing a pro-Moscow figure as president. In the southern and eastern regions, Russia advanced on the Kherson front after seizing Snake Island, capturing Melitopol, while in the east, it extended its control over large areas of the Donetsk Republic and most of the Luhansk People’s Republic, except for Siverodonetsk and Lysychansk.
Western countries ignored concerns, such as those expressed by German Chancellor Olaf Scholz regarding energy supplies to Europe, and began to impose economic sanctions that the author describes as painful for the Russian economy. By March 2022, around a billion dollars’ worth of Russian assets had been frozen. The author notes that Putin’s refusal to adopt isolationist calls for freezing Western companies’ assets in Russia and his extension of the liberal-minded Elvira Nabiullina’s term at the central bank contributed to limiting the contraction of the Russian economy to about 3% in 2022, after some estimates (from the International Institute for Finance) suggested it could reach 15%.
The nationalist narrative in Russia overshadowed the rising clampdown on anti-war discourse, manifesting itself in increasing mentions of a “fifth column,” the use of the symbol “Z” on military vehicles, and the banning of Twitter and Meta platforms. It appeared that the circles surrounding Putin remained cohesive in their support for the war, with the notable exception of the disavowal of the Russian climate change envoy—no senior officials resigned in protest against the war. As Russia and Ukraine, backed by Western nations, continued to escalate conflict levels, Turkey’s role became prominent, hosting negotiations in Istanbul at the end of March, which were the most significant since the war began. Despite the failure of Turkish mediation to halt the war, it successfully opened humanitarian corridors.
Russia’s Summer War: “Small Victories”
The Russian control over Lysychansk, the second-largest city in the Luhansk Republic during the summer, was, as the book states, a costly victory. In Donetsk, Russia recorded its second most important achievement in the war by capturing Siversk, following its acquisition of Mariupol. The book mentions what it describes as war crimes, citing the execution of more than fifty detained Ukrainian Azov Battalion soldiers in Olenivka at the end of July, with the pro-Moscow authorities in Donetsk claiming the Ukrainians were responsible for their deaths to silence them regarding orders they received from Kyiv.
With the influx of Western weapons (American air defense systems and British anti-tank missiles), Ukraine launched a counter-offensive that allowed it to regain Snake Island and reassert control over approximately 15% of Kherson province, which the author believes its residents resisted Russia’s attempts to integrate them into the Russian sphere (by adopting the ruble and imposing Russian passports and work permits for job applications).
Wheat, Nuclear, and Gas
The book aligns with the Western belief that Moscow used grain as a weapon in its war against Ukraine, bringing the world to the brink of famine due to its targeting of Ukrainian grain export ports, especially the port of Odesa, prior to signing a grain deal mediated by Turkey and overseen by the UN on July 22, 2022. It cites sources from Western media like Bloomberg, reporting that Moscow seized the grain harvest from Kherson to export it via Crimea, which saw its wheat production increase by more than 100% between 2021 and 2022. In a significant turning point in the conflict, skirmishes erupted around the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant, which Russia controlled in early March 2022, with both sides exchanging accusations, culminating in damage to energy supplies and radiation control systems in August, prior to agreeing on a visit from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) delegation to the site.
By mid-2022, Russia reduced its gas flow through the “Nord Stream” pipeline to 20% of its capacity, justifying this with Canada’s refusal to return a turbine that was under maintenance—a measure not accepted by European countries, as the turbine was not on the list of Western sanctions against Moscow, as noted in the book. Western countries intensified measures against Moscow, starting to reduce their reliance on Russian gas and implementing a cap on the price of Russian oil in international markets, prompting Moscow to halt gas exports via “Nord Stream” in September 2022.
In the summer of 2022, Ukraine enhanced its capabilities to strike targets on the Russian border, as exemplified by events in the Russian Kursk province.
Ukrainian Counteroffensive vs. Russian Mobilization
At the end of September 2022, Ukraine launched a counter-offensive on the Kherson front, recovering some territory lost at the onset of the Russian invasion in southern areas and regaining Kharkiv province in the east. Putin remained cautious about declaring a full military mobilization, despite calls from figures like Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov. Russian officials settled for a partial mobilization, which was met with some resistance and led many of the targeted youth to flee to foreign countries, enabling Moscow to recruit private companies, notably Wagner, and open prisons to enlist fighters among convicted Russians. In September, Putin announced the annexation of four regions over which he had partial or full control in eastern and southern Ukraine (Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson) following referendums supervised by Moscow.
Moscow’s loss of control over areas, including the town of Lyman in Donetsk and the Ukrainian attack on the Kerch Strait in Crimea, sparked waves of criticism about the war’s trajectory, prompting Moscow to escalate its strikes to target Kyiv at the beginning of October 2022. Subsequently, Russia withdrew from Kherson to the east bank of the Dnieper River in November, while the front line between the two sides froze. Concurrently, Russia intensified its rhetoric, hinting at nuclear deterrence if Russian territories were threatened.
Russia’s Isolation from the West and the Post-Soviet Space
Western countries relentlessly sought to trim Russia’s claws and reduce its influence, pressuring prominent political figures to sever connections with Russian companies and institutions, such as the German Chancellor and former French Prime Minister Gerhard Schröder and François Fillon. With Moscow losing these diplomatic assets, its influence became confined to far-right and far-left movements, with some cautious stances against Western sanctions in Italy, Hungary, and Greece. In Northern Europe, Russia warned against Finland and Sweden’s NATO ambitions and the implications for regional stability.
In the Black Sea area, having expanded its presence by annexing Crimea in 2014, European sanctions on Moscow were met with some caution. The book attributes this attitude in Bulgaria to friendly sentiments towards Russia due to its historical role in removing Ottoman dominance from the country, as well as economic motivations. In contrast, Romania permitted the United States to deploy airlift forces on its territory. Moldova distanced itself from supporting sanctions against Russia, with Moscow being decisive in rejecting any NATO engagement in Moldova’s weak flank (Transnistria), which declared independence unilaterally and is populated by Russian speakers. In Georgia, where Moscow recognizes the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the country’s north, the ongoing war in Ukraine has seen some shifts towards the Western side. In the Western Balkans, the book notes “Russian attempts aimed at destabilization” in the region, exploiting ethnic and border crises, the alignment between Moscow and Belgrade, cooperation between them, and the friendly sentiments held by Serbian political and media elites towards Russia, along with the repercussions of NATO intervention during the disintegration of Yugoslavia.
In Belarus, the author describes it as a “war partner restraining itself to avoid Western sanctions,” advocating against cornering Moscow to prevent a nuclear catastrophe. In the South Caucasus and Central Asia, Armenia adopted a neutral stance with ambiguous positions on the war that also affected Azerbaijan’s position, while Kazakhstan contented itself with providing humanitarian support to Ukraine.
As Russia turns its face eastward
Statements from Chinese officials regarding U.S. responsibility for escalating the situation in Ukraine, their refusal to describe Russia’s actions as an invasion, solidarity with Moscow against Western sanctions, and the trade exchanges between Moscow and Beijing increasing by over 132.3% during the first eight months of 2022 indicate a tilt toward mutual reliance. The cooperation agreements between Russian Gazprom and Chinese national oil and between the media entities RT and Xinhua exemplify this growing closeness. The “Vostok” joint military exercises in August 2022 marked an unprecedented event. Nevertheless, the author points to Beijing’s caution in fully aligning with Moscow, as China consistently seeks to present itself as a voice calling for de-escalation and a potential mediator between the warring parties. India, which has maintained neutrality, another reason put forth by the book, can trace its position to historical roots dating back to the Soviet era, as Moscow then supported New Delhi’s demands in Jammu and Kashmir, alongside economic cooperation, relying on Moscow for its military systems, particularly air defense systems. Moscow has successfully drawn Beijing and New Delhi closer to its positions, despite existing tensions in Sino-Indian relations due to their border disputes.
Tehran echoes the Russian discourse rejecting NATO’s expansion and its implications for Eurasia’s security. The shared experience of both countries under American sanctions has further expanded cooperation on various levels, particularly on military aspects. The book cites Western media reporting on Iran supplying Russia with military equipment, including anti-tank missiles and Shahed drones.
Regarding second-tier powers in South Asia and Southeast Asia, Moscow expanded partnerships, achieving some progress; for instance, in Pakistan, where the ousted Prime Minister Imran Khan was more in tune with Putin, contrary to Army Chief Qamar Javed Bajwa’s denunciation of Russia’s war on Ukraine. Bangladesh has displayed a more supportive position towards Moscow, viewing Western sanctions and their consequences on global food security as a violation of human rights, with Russia ramping up partnerships with Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia. Russia has also strengthened ties with countries facing diplomatic isolation globally such as North Korea, which acknowledged Russia’s annexation of the Donbas republics, while Myanmar defended Russia’s war in Ukraine. Although Moscow did not recognize the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, cooperation between the two countries seems poised for growth with Russia appointing an ambassador to the Islamic Emirate.
In the Indo-Pacific region, traditional U.S. allies in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan rejected the war, coinciding with the resurfacing of the dispute between Tokyo and Moscow over the Kuril Islands. The most radical positions towards Moscow came from Australia, which not only implemented trade sanctions and targeted Russian oligarchs but also supplied weapons to Ukraine. The author believes that these positions thwarted Moscow’s ambitions for expansion in a region historically marked by close ties to Washington.
Russia’s Flexible Influence to the South
Turkey managed to play a pivotal role in the Ukrainian conflict by adopting a position rejecting the war and supporting Ukraine’s territorial integrity, expressing concern over the situation of Crimean Tatars of Turkish descent, while simultaneously refraining from imposing sanctions on Moscow or cutting ties with it. Turkey balanced providing humanitarian and military support to Ukraine, including the supply of Bayraktar drones, and hosting war dissenters and critics, alongside enhancing trade exchange with Russia. The book presents Ukraine’s accusations against Ankara regarding its involvement in grain smuggling, concluding that Turkey’s “stubbornness” will allow it to continue mitigating the effects of Western sanctions on Russia, positioning itself as a back channel for communication between the conflict parties.
Israel refrained from imposing sanctions on Russia, attempting to maintain the existing security coordination between the two countries in Syria, though the relationship was not free from media clashes, exemplified by Sergey Lavrov’s comments about Hitler’s Jewish roots, likening the Nazi leader to Zelensky, as well as critical rhetoric regarding Israel’s occupation of Palestine among Russian governance circles following Israel’s vote to expel Russia from the UN Human Rights Council.
In the Arab world, Syria’s position, as expected, was supportive of Russia in its war without any reservations, with Moscow’s military activity in Syria significantly declining, evident in reduced military strikes in the Syrian desert and a drop in casualty numbers from its military actions to their lowest level since 2015.
Despite the close military partnerships between Gulf states and Washington, their stance on the war in Ukraine has been characterized by caution and a reluctance to align fully with Western countries. This was reflected in the Russian-Emirati talks in February of last year (2022) and the presence of both Russian and Ukrainian parties at the Riyadh Defense Expo as an expression of Riyadh’s neutrality and its interest in playing a mediating role in the conflict. The author explains the Gulf Cooperation Council states’ positions as a reflection of their indifference toward the war and their desire for a multipolar world, along with economic ties, particularly for the UAE. In Amman, which did not condemn the war, King Abdullah II’s remarks underscored the importance of Russia’s presence in Syria to create balance against Iranian influence. In Lebanon and Iraq, sectarian divisions emerged, with supporters of Tehran leaning towards supporting Moscow.
In Africa, positions resemble the indifference of Gulf states toward the war, treating it as a European issue, with the exception of the war’s impact on food security on the continent. In contrast to Ukraine’s diplomatic absence in Africa, Russia leveraged its historical presence, making Africa a key focus in 2022 to mitigate the effects of Western sanctions by increasing its trade volume with Africa by 34% in the first half of the year compared to the same period in 2021, while continuing its projects in energy, mining, and military training, particularly in the Al-Dabaa nuclear project in Egypt and the special economic zone in South Africa’s eastern coast. The flow of Sudanese gold, overseen by Rapid Support Forces leader Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo through Dubai, was crucial for the Russian central bank’s resilience against Western sanctions, as reported in the book. At that time, the current chair of the African Union, Senegal’s Macky Sall, praised Russia’s intention to address the grain supply crisis in Africa.
In Latin America, the book notes a shift in the Russian assessment of the continent’s importance as its countries’ stances on Russia’s war in Ukraine evolve, exemplified by the election of a left-leaning president in Colombia. Mexico distanced itself from U.S. positions, and the speeches from former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro echoed Putin’s stance about the brotherhood of Russians and Ukrainians. Consequently, Moscow has reinforced relations with the two most significant powers on the continent: Brazil and Argentina. Traditional allies of Russia opposing U.S. hegemony (Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela) have seen strengthened cooperation through agreements in security, defense, and media exchange, which has facilitated the Russian narrative regarding the war in Ukraine within Latin America. For instance, Venezuela offered to use the Russian ruble in its resorts to attract tourists.
Conclusion
In the book’s conclusion, Samuel Ramani offers what could be viewed as a defense asserting Russia’s lack of any pivotal victories in its war against Ukraine. The evidence of this innocence includes its “humiliating” withdrawal from around the capital, Kyiv, its “failure” to attack Odesa, and its “surrender” in Kharkiv, alongside the united front of Western countries in supporting Kyiv. The resilience Russia demonstrates against Western sanctions, according to the author, is attributed to rising energy prices and the unexpected resilience of the Russian ruble.
However, this defense is not the only point of contention a reader might find with the author. Even while temporarily excusing the social scientist’s biases that may color their approach to a complex and profound humanitarian and ethical issue like war, the book contains generalizations that could be described as biased, particularly regarding Russia’s position on the global stage. In its chapter titled “Russia’s Isolation from the West and the Post-Soviet Space,” the main title contradicts both the content and the subheadings. The countries bordering the Black Sea, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia appear, upon further examination of their stances, to be closer to Moscow than to Western Europe, regardless of the reasons and justifications that the author suggests have restrained these countries from conforming to Western efforts aimed at isolating and besieging Russia.
At times, Ramani maintains a distance from this conflict that allows him to observe the stances of Gulf states viewing Russia’s war on Ukraine as an “entirely European matter,” while countries like the UAE and Saudi Arabia do not seem to shy away from diverging from the European-American approach. Yet this distance sometimes narrows, making it seem as if the author is trying to position Moscow’s isolation and sacrificing relations with it as the politically correct stance. For countries that have not aligned with Brussels, London, and Washington in besieging Russia, the author finds himself needing to provide justifications regarding their positions, often related to their economic ties with Moscow or historical ties to the Soviet Union. Consequently, he exerts considerable effort in explaining and dissecting the stances of countries closer to Moscow (especially from the south) in a manner that he does not apply to countries aligned with American and European views on the war. This hints to the reader that the author may be engaging in what could be termed “epistemic violence”—borrowing a concept from Indian philosopher Spivak—in which the process of knowledge production serves as a means to delegitimize the knowledge of the ‘Other,’ namely their political stances and positioning on the map of international alliances.
The book does not ignore Russian claims regarding the rise of Nazism in Ukraine, but it does not delve deeper into this matter than most Western media outlets, asserting the limited extent of nationalist and Nazi sentiments in Ukraine, while extensively analyzing the nature of Putin’s regime, which he perceives as fascist, totalitarian, and individualistic. More often than not, the Russian narrative appears to the author as mere misleading propaganda, whereas the Kyiv narrative is presented without commentary.
While the author traces the increasing role of Russia in Africa, particularly in the Sahel region, he fails to note the growing popularity of Russia and Putin among large segments of youth supportive of military leaders in both Mali and Burkina Faso, as evidenced by numerous demonstrations in both countries over the past two years. He makes an accurate observation about the language gap between Russia and the African continent, where English, French, and Portuguese have predominated for centuries; however, he overlooks Russia’s efforts to bridge this divide, as announced by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov during his tour of West Africa earlier this year. The significance of the African continent in Moscow’s strategy is highlighted by the Russian foreign policy declaration issued in early April 2023. Moscow’s rhetoric promoting respect for African nations’ sovereignty and support for the liberation of the last remnants of Western colonialism (the French Mayotte and the British Chagos Archipelago) resonates positively among many African elites.
Ramani, who published his book three months ago, does not foresee that the current year (2023) will resolve this conflict, asserting that Russia is unable to win the battle and simultaneously cannot afford to lose it. Meanwhile, Ukraine insists on liberating all its territories, including Crimea, and retrieving it may entail the cost of a nuclear war. Thus, Ramani closes the door on any potential solution to the greatest crisis Europe has faced since World War II, predicting that the old continent will undergo another year marked by this conflict, and indeed, that is how things are proceeding thus far.
Book Information
Title: Putin’s War on Ukraine: Russia’s Campaign for Global Counter-Revolution
Author: Samuel Ramani
Publisher: Hurst Publishers
Publication Date: 2023
Language: English
Edition: First
Number of Pages: 592