On October 15, Oxford University Press will release an important book by former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, titled On Xi Jinping: How Xi’s Marxist Nationalism is Shaping China and the World. This book analyzes the worldview of Chinese President Xi Jinping, who now holds almost complete control over the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and is, in effect, a leader for life. The book delves into how this worldview drives China’s behavior, both domestically and on the global stage.
The author argues that Xi Jinping’s outlook is markedly different from that of his predecessors, and this ideological shift is reflected in real-world Chinese politics and behavior. With a focus on China’s domestic politics, political economy, and foreign policy, Rudd describes Xi Jinping’s ideological framework as “Marxist-Leninist nationalism.” According to Rudd, Xi’s version of Leninism has pushed the party and Chinese politics further to the left compared to his predecessors. Xi’s Marxist influence has also shifted China’s economic thought leftward, with a more decisive role for the state, diverging from the private sector’s historical dynamism. However, Chinese nationalism under Xi has moved to the right, toward a more assertive foreign policy vision and a new determination to reshape the international status quo.
Xi Jinping’s worldview is holistic, meaning that his national ideological vision for China’s future cannot be separated from his view of China’s role in the region and the world. These changes are also reflected in Xi Jinping’s broader rehabilitation of the concept of “struggle” as a legitimate means of managing Chinese domestic and foreign policy—struggles that are not necessarily always peaceful. Finally, Xi Jinping’s ideological worldview reflects a new level of nationalist confidence in China’s future. This confidence is rooted in China’s historical and civilizational strengths but is also reinforced by his Marxist-Leninist view of historical inevitability and the belief that the currents of history now favor China. This compelling analysis of the worldview of one of the most important global leaders of our time will be essential reading for anyone interested in how Xi Jinping is transforming both China and the international order—and, more importantly, why.
The introductory chapters of the book aim to define the key concepts and terms before situating Xi’s contemporary global vision within the broader intellectual and ideological legacy of Chinese history. The book then moves on to examine Xi’s core ideological texts and how they have been reflected in changes to Chinese policy, economy, and foreign policy since 2012. The book then explores Xi Jinping’s efforts to consolidate his Marxist nationalism within the new framework of “Xi Jinping Thought,” before analyzing more recent developments and the potential consequences of Xi’s clear intention to double down on his hardline ideological stance into the 2030s. The book concludes with a chapter on “China after Xi Jinping.”
The second chapter defines the terminology used throughout the text, examining the assumptions underpinning these key concepts. These discussions include the complex debate surrounding the meanings of “ideology” and “ideological worldview,” both in the broader social sciences literature and in their specific application to the intellectual world of the Chinese Communist Party. The chapter also provides practical definitions for other terms, such as “Marxism,” “Leninism,” and “nationalism,” each of which has generated vast and contentious literature. It also examines and defines the concepts of “left,” “right,” and “national assertiveness,” both in general usage and in their specific applications within the CCP.
Chapter three situates Xi Jinping’s ideological framework within the broader spectrum of Chinese worldviews over time. The chapter analyzes China’s evolving understanding of the world, during both the classical and communist eras. This includes traditional Chinese concepts such as “All Under Heaven” and “tributary states,” classical realism, Mao Zedong’s “Theory of the Three Worlds,” and the “Reform and Opening Up” period after 1978. The chapter argues that Xi inherited three worldviews from the past: a classical Chinese nationalist worldview; a Marxist framework grounded in active struggle, albeit within a deterministic vision of history; and all of this tempered by a strategic realism that still recognizes political and military risks.
In chapter four, the book examines five key articles and speeches by Xi Jinping that emphasize the centrality of ideology to his regime, his definition of the ideological struggle he believes he is engaged in both domestically and internationally, and the Marxist-Leninist worldview’s importance in understanding this conflict. Most significantly, it explores his redefinition of the Communist Party’s “central contradiction” for the “New Era” he now leads. These documents include Xi’s 2013 speech to the Central Propaganda Work Conference (which was consolidated into an internal party document known as Document No. 9), Politburo study sessions on dialectical materialism and historical materialism in 2013 and 2015 respectively, his speech at the 19th Party Congress in 2017, and his landmark 2018 speech marking the bicentennial of Karl Marx’s birth. These form the basis for the book’s subsequent analysis of ideological shifts in Xi’s approach to Chinese politics, economic policy, and foreign relations during his tenure.
Chapter five explores Xi Jinping’s shift of Chinese politics toward the Leninist left. It argues that his rehabilitation of the classic Leninist party has occurred over ten years across critical areas: a new demand for political loyalty to the party center that supersedes all other loyalties; a parallel demand for absolute loyalty to Xi personally as the “core leader”; a radically reduced space for political opposition within the party; the purging of any perceived personal or political opposition; increased policymaking power for the party center at the expense of the State Council, especially in implementing economic policy; an internal “purification” of Xi’s Leninist party through a comprehensive anti-corruption campaign post-2013; a wider political purge via a “rectification campaign” launched in 2020 across the party’s entire political-legal apparatus; and the party’s new agenda for “securitizing” everything, including reasserting party control over the People’s Liberation Army and transferring the People’s Armed Police under party control instead of the State Council, as well as major changes in cybersecurity control and party surveillance.
Chapter six examines the gradual shift of Chinese economic policy toward the Marxist left under Xi Jinping. It explores the role of ideology in shaping overall economic policy discourse in China by analyzing the evolution of several key terms that indicate a shift in macroeconomic policy direction. The chapter explores how this process has been uneven over time, beginning with a more market-accepting approach during Xi’s first term, as reflected in the 2013 “Decision,” his concept of the “new normal,” and the early phase of “supply-side structural reform.” It also analyzes a key speech by Xi in April 2021, in which he retrospectively explained his economic decisions from 2012 to 2017, including a reassessment of Deng Xiaoping’s 1982 ideological proposition that China remains in the “primary stage of socialism.” This was the ideological foundation for Deng’s “Reform and Opening Up,” including the party’s willingness to tolerate high levels of economic inequality while unleashing the factors of production, with less focus on “relations of production” related to class equality and inequality.
Chapter seven addresses the deeper ideological shifts in the economy that emerged at the 19th Party Congress in 2017 with Xi Jinping’s declaration of the “New Era” and, most importantly, the redefinition of the party’s new contradiction of “unbalanced and inadequate development.” The chapter emphasizes how these significant ideological changes have impacted real-world economic policy. This is reflected in Xi’s new overarching framework of the “New Development Concept,” which has increasingly replaced “Reform and Opening Up” as the central organizing principle of economic policy. This is also reflected in new state concepts such as “national self-sufficiency,” the “dual circulation economy,” “common prosperity,” “security in development,” and now a set of “new productive forces” to drive growth. The chapter concludes that these changes have required a much more interventionist role for the Chinese Communist Party and state compared to previous eras under Deng, Jiang, and Hu. The measures enacted during Xi’s first full decade in power represent a major shift toward the Marxist left in China’s macroeconomic policy settings.
Chapter eight tracks the parallel process of shifting China’s microeconomic policy settings to the left, as reflected in China’s 14th Five-Year Plan. It explores Xi Jinping’s discourse on the difference between the “real economy” and “building a modern economic system,” on one hand, and the “fictitious economy” based on the real estate sector fueled by finance, on the other. This is followed by an examination of the state’s industrial policy revitalization under Xi. The chapter then analyzes the tightening of policies concerning state-owned enterprises and the new restrictive requirements Xi imposed on the private sector, including employment controls. Finally, the chapter highlights Xi’s redefinition of China’s traditional policy of opening up to the outside world by incorporating the term “a new pattern of opening up” into the ideological language, which includes a set of new arguments related to self-sufficiency, trade, and nationalism. This final section of the chapter also addresses the apparent contradiction between this general trend of the state’s public economic policy settings and the continued liberalization of China’s financial sector.
Chapter nine examines the interplay between the rising Chinese “nationalism” under Xi Jinping and the party’s new “assertiveness” culture in foreign policy. It also identifies the relationship between Marxism-Leninism and nationalism in Xi’s overall ideological vision. This is followed by a brief examination of potential factors shaping a more assertive Chinese foreign policy beyond nationalism, rather than assuming nationalism as the sole driving force behind foreign policy changes. The chapter then analyzes the significance of several “key terms” and “signature phrases” in nationalist rhetoric that have been employed in party speeches.
Chapter ten of the book delves into the official foreign policy discourse under Xi Jinping. It specifically addresses the ideological significance of four key terms: “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” “China’s distinctive traditional culture,” China’s growing “comprehensive national strength,” and China’s role in “changes unseen in the world in a hundred years.”
The tenth chapter also analyzes a second set of terms, developed alongside those in the previous chapter, designed to provide more direct ideological guidance on what this new nationalist confidence means for the future direction of China’s foreign policy. These include: Xi’s formal ending of Deng’s era of “hiding and biding” (taoguang yanghui) and instead moving towards a new era of “striving for achievement” (fenfa youwei); China’s new diplomacy towards neighboring countries (zhoubian guojia waijiao); China’s changing stance towards the U.S. as part of a “new type of great power relations” (xinxing daguo guanxi); and China’s new activism in reforming the world order (guoji zhixu tiaozheng). Taken together, the chapter argues that these represent a new and coherent nationalist narrative of foreign policy assertiveness, where Xi Jinping explicitly empowers his diplomats and the People’s Liberation Army to go out and change the international status quo.
Chapter eleven tests this proposition of increasing foreign policy assertiveness by examining China’s record in the United Nations Security Council. This is done by gathering accounts from several permanent representatives in the UN Security Council and other senior UN officials who have served alongside Chinese officials after 2012. All the ambassadors interviewed for this project reported significant changes in China’s multilateral diplomacy during the period under review. This has been observed in: China’s changing activity in the UN Security Council; China’s post-2013 policy on the Human Rights Council; ambassadors noted a more nuanced set of desired changes in UN peacekeeping operations in defense of the principle of state sovereignty; and a readiness to use new levels of financial generosity towards the UN. Additionally, China has used economic leverage against smaller UN member states to secure Chinese leadership of UN agencies, gain new UN staff positions, or reduce opposition to preferred Chinese political stances. Ambassadors also reported a long-term campaign to change the normative language of UN resolutions towards greater support for Chinese foreign policy concepts and institutions and less accommodation of global Western claims. Collectively, these represent significant changes in China’s policy towards the UN, indicating a new strategy of multilateral assertiveness under Xi Jinping.
Chapter twelve explores how the various individual strands of Xi Jinping’s overall ideological worldview—Leninism, Marxism, and nationalism—are increasingly brought together under the unified framework of “Xi Jinping Thought for the New Era.” The chapter examines how this is clearly presented in the party’s 2021 historical resolution celebrating the centenary of the Chinese Communist Party. It looks at the core ideological confidence of Xi Jinping Thought, which holds that China’s rise is unstoppable, achieved through the application of the “scientific laws” of historical materialism and dialectical materialism. The chapter also explores how this is reinforced by a growing nationalist agenda rooted in the rejuvenation of national power, a new form of cultural nationalism, and an increasingly dualistic view of political and ideological conflict with the U.S. and the West. This emerging worldview under Xi Jinping Thought has been further emphasized through an officially endorsed campaign against growing external threats to the Chinese nation, including concerns over foreign disruptions, sabotage, and encirclement. This, in turn, leads to the emergence of Xi’s comprehensive “national security concept.” The chapter argues that no official narrative about China’s ideological framework during the Deng or Jiang eras compares to the party’s 2021 historical resolution. Indeed, Xi Jinping Thought embraces a Chinese version of the American “manifest destiny”: a strong Leninist party and leader; a people committed to relentless struggle against contradictions at home and abroad; and a nation surrounded by threats from all sides—all bolstered by national pride, national power, and national ambition. The chapter concludes that much of this is new in post-Mao China.
Chapter thirteen focuses on the role of the 20th Party Congress in October 2022 in reinforcing Xi’s political and ideological strategy after his first decade in power. This chapter addresses fundamental questions concerning ideological foundations, political control, further subordination of the economy to national security dictates, and an increasingly nationalist foreign policy. It argues that Xi delivered the most ideological congress report since the end of the Cultural Revolution, with a record number of references to the centrality of Marxism. It notes that Xi’s “winner-takes-all” approach to Politburo appointments, along with his enshrining of his “core leadership” status in the party constitution, has transformed the Leninist Chinese Communist Party into Xi’s Chinese Communist Party. Regarding the economy, the chapter examines the relative marginalization of the party’s broad economic development agenda as it becomes increasingly immersed in national security priorities, as part of Xi’s new concept of “security in development.”
In foreign policy, the nationalist message Xi sent to the party during the 20th Congress was that China’s long-held assumption of continuing to enjoy a benign strategic environment had ended. References to the “period of strategic opportunity,” which had been cited in successive congresses since 2002, were omitted. The chapter concludes that Xi is preparing for an increasingly bipolar international order.
Chapter fourteen addresses the political and policy impact of the complex developments that unfolded after Xi Jinping’s sudden abandonment of the “zero-COVID” strategy in December 2022 and the collapse of China’s economic growth between 2021 and 2023. It explores whether these challenging developments have prompted any ideological reassessment of Xi’s Marxist-nationalist agenda. The chapter examines China’s interests in tactically softening its messaging to re-engage the private sector at home and abroad, stabilizing geopolitical tensions with the U.S., and rebuilding economic growth. However, the chapter concludes that none of these measures reflect a fundamental strategic change in direction on Xi’s part. They appear primarily tactical in nature. Xi’s core ideological mission concerning party power and economic control remains intact.
Chapter fifteen specifically addresses whether changes in Chinese foreign policy direction emerging from the 2023 summit between President Biden and Xi Jinping are likely to be tactical or strategic. It examines the ongoing role of Marxist nationalism in shaping foreign policy toward an increasingly bilateral direction over time. The chapter concludes that the party’s December 2023 Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference shows that Xi’s long-term direction toward the U.S. and reforming the international system in a manner more aligned with Chinese interests is likely to continue unabated.
The final chapter of the book explores the direction Xi Jinping’s ideological agenda might take between 2023 and 2032, and the implications of this agenda in constructing a “new Marxism for the 21st century”—not only for China, but for the world. It analyzes Xi’s new directives on integrating classical Chinese culture into the language and concepts of modern Marxism “rooted in China,” which he referred to as the “second integration.” The chapter examines how Xi adapts the core and compatible elements of classical Chinese traditions to Marxism in an attempt to safeguard the latter against the inevitable challenges of modernity. It speculates whether this could lead to a “third integration” in the future, by incorporating aspects of global cultures into the Marxist linguistic and conceptual framework.
Both of these efforts are designed to preserve Marxism as a robust ideological worldview for the distant future, rather than succumbing to the rise and fall of individual civilizations, states, and doctrinal systems. The chapter concludes by describing the costs China has borne as a result of the sustained ideological project embraced by Xi Jinping—both at the economic level and in terms of its international standing. It argues that despite domestic concerns over these costs, Xi is likely to remain in power for the long term due to the immense power wielded by the new surveillance state. The chapter also considers the possibility that the party, after Xi, might eventually correct itself towards a more pragmatic and sustainable political balance. Meanwhile, navigating the era of Xi Jinping through effective deterrence and diplomacy will remain the most significant and complex foreign policy and security challenge for the United States and its allies since the end of the Cold War.
The book’s overall conclusion is that as long as Xi Jinping’s ideological worldview remains constant and his individual political power unchallenged, the general trend of changes in domestic and foreign policy observed during the first decade of his rule will likely continue into his second decade. This means that under Xi Jinping, it is highly unlikely that we will witness any substantial shifts in the overall direction of Chinese policy. When policy changes do occur, they are likely to be tactical rather than strategic—short-term adjustments to navigate unexpected obstacles that lie in Beijing’s path, rather than a deeper ideological reassessment of the course itself.
In fact, Xi Jinping’s 2023 formulation regarding the need for the party to think in terms of the “extreme scenario” (jixian siwei), along with his longstanding directive for the party to engage in “struggle” for the future of the party and country, indicates that Xi Jinping foresees multiple obstacles ahead. However, these formulations do not suggest any change in Xi Jinping’s fundamental ideological line: reasserting the power of the party within China, curbing the growing power of the private sector, and projecting China’s national strength in its region and the wider world, to create an international order more aligned with the Chinese Communist Party’s interests, values, and worldview.
In short, at least under Xi Jinping’s rule, the ideological die seems to have been cast.
