For centuries, Eastern Europe has shown more interest and admiration for the West than the reverse, writes historian Lien Verpoest in the pages of “Standaard,” in Brussels. She argues that the EU would do well to abandon its hostile attitude now that it is welcoming Eastern European countries.
In the series “Unusual Relations in International History,” let’s discuss today the category of 16th-century dynasties. At that time, Queen Elizabeth I of England and Tsar Ivan the Terrible of Russia maintained a correspondence. Queen Elizabeth primarily sought to strengthen English trade interests in Moscow. On his part, constantly fearing conspiracies and betrayals (this was before he massacred half of his boyars and, in a fit of rage, accidentally killed his son), Ivan made a proposal: in the event of a revolution or mutiny in his empire, he would like to seek refuge in England. In exchange, the queen could find refuge in Moscow if necessary.
Elizabeth replied to the tsar that he was welcome, but politely declined his counter-proposition, deeming it unthinkable for an English monarch to exile himself to Russian lands. With this response, she relegated Russia to its peripheral status on the European continent and dismissed the idea of any equal partnership between the two empires. The tone for East-West relations was set!
A Blind Spot for Western Europe
The interest shown by Russia in Western Europe has never truly been reciprocal. Europe looked East primarily for commercial reasons, not for political, military, or even cultural ones. Nevertheless, Russia’s overtures toward the West were not lacking. Tsar Peter the Great brought numerous experts from Western Europe to modernize Russia, whereas, inversely, Western Europe never considered calling upon Russian expertise. Catherine II of Russia, known as “Catherine the Great,” purchased her artworks from Western Europe and invited Enlightenment thinkers, but they only felt pity for this backward country and were not impressed by its art.
Due to this disinterest, Eastern Europe gradually became a blind spot for Western Europe. Even when the East began to open up to the world in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, the region struggled to fascinate. The elites and privileged classes undertook their Grand Tour heading toward the Middle and Far East, rarely to Russia, and the few travelers who visited often described it negatively. In the 20th century, when the Iron Curtain came down and all contact was buried under thick layers of propaganda, the region became a terra incognita. Even today, it took an invasion for us to pay attention to what was happening in Eastern Europe.
This indifference sharply contrasts with the persistent fascination that Eastern Europe has for the West. Particularly during the Soviet era, many dreamt of visiting the famous cities and museums depicted in books. “‘See Paris and then die’ became the Soviet version of Vedi Napoli e poi muori [‘See Naples and die’],” wrote American historian Eleonory Gilburd about the Soviet Union’s penchant for Western culture. A Russian colleague once told me he knew the streets of London by heart because he had devoured the stories of Sherlock Holmes by Arthur Conan Doyle during the Soviet era.
The 2004 Enlargement Changed the Dynamics
Not only are we blind to this fascination, but we also overlook how the EU’s enlargement in 2004 fundamentally changed our relationship with Eastern Europe. The accession of former communist countries like Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary altered the dynamics. By integrating not only former communist satellite states but also former Soviet republics such as the Baltic States, the East-West relationship became significantly more complex.
This enlargement had significant consequences. First, it increased the critical mass within the EU. The ignorance that surrounded Eastern Europe was suddenly replaced by a group of new member states that shared a common past with the region and possessed a nuanced understanding of it.
Bronislaw Geremek, a former Polish dissident and European Parliament member, predicted in 2006 that this enlargement would significantly alter the relations between the EU and Russia, as the new member states, knowing Russia much better, understood what it was capable of. Disinterest gave way to distrust, rooted in a traumatic past. By joining the European Commission, the European Council, and the European External Action Service, representatives from these Central European countries inevitably echoed these concerns in European policy.
The second consequence of the European expansion into Central Europe is that we encounter invisible borders. When the EU rightly adopted values such as inclusion, tolerance, and solidarity after the Lisbon Treaty in 2009—reflected in policies that included the protection of LGBTQI rights—it faced strong opposition, especially in Central European member states like Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia. A blind spot is not a blank page: in the post-communist EU states, conservative parties enjoy repeating that “their” norms and values are culturally very different from “ours.”
This is also part of European diversity: some political parties active in these countries may be nostalgic for autocratic times or support the traditional values of Eastern Europe, deeming “European values” too progressive.
Selective References to History
How then can we achieve the “unity in diversity” so cherished by the EU? On October 9, during a debate in the European Parliament, we were far from it when Ursula von der Leyen reprimanded Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban for his complete lack of solidarity toward his European partners and toward Ukraine. The Commission President deemed it absurd that some blame Ukraine for being solely responsible for its invasion by the Russians. Do these same people hold Hungarians responsible for their invasion by the Soviets in 1956? she asked.
By relying on history in this way, the Commission President ventured into a slippery territory. Is it really appropriate to engage in a discussion about a history that not everyone shares? One can imagine the indignation this remark will provoke among conservative circles in countries that experienced Soviet occupation: “We do not need lessons from the EU.”
Thus, the path taken does not seem to lead to unity but rather to division. Ursula von der Leyen would have been better off embedding her message, however justified, within a discourse that genuinely concerns the East. It is regrettable that the EU has never shown any attention to this region before 2022. Selective references to history only exacerbate tensions. And we must not let the blind spot turn into a black hole that sucks in everything beyond the European borders. The call from the East will always resonate more strongly among those who feel unheard in the West.
Lien Verpoest
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