Battles of Tinzaouaten: Could They Lead to a Russian-Ukrainian Conflict in Africa?
At the end of July 2024, fierce battles erupted between the Malian army, supported by the Russian Wagner Group, and the Azawadian armed forces in the Tinzaouaten area, located in northern Mali near the Algerian border.
This region holds significant importance for both sides. For the Malian army, the goal is to continue reclaiming areas that had long been under the control of the Azawadian forces. For the Azawadian armed groups, Tinzaouaten is one of their last remaining strongholds, and if the Bamako army were to seize it, it could mean the loss of everything for them.
It’s clear that the Malian army did not reclaim Tinzaouaten, suffering relatively significant losses among its forces and those of Wagner. However, the army did not surrender, as it continued intermittent shelling afterward, suggesting that the likelihood of renewed battles remains very high.
What makes the Tinzaouaten battles particularly noteworthy compared to previous internal conflicts, including those over the recapture of Kidal, a stronghold of the Azawadian groups, are the repercussions that followed. These repercussions extended beyond Mali’s borders, reaching other countries with no geographical or historical connection to this West African nation.
These repercussions are partly a reflection of the broader impact of the Russian-Ukrainian war on Africa, especially in the Sahel region, where Moscow’s influence has significantly increased following the recent wave of military coups, the expulsion of French forces from Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, and the subsequent alliance of these three countries with Russia.
The battles in Tinzaouaten also sparked regional and international alignments either in support of or against Mali, though this has not positively influenced the traditional conflict between the central government in Bamako and the Azawadian groups, both politically and militarily. Calls for dialogue between the two sides and efforts to quell the tension have emerged, but they have had little impact.
In addition to these repercussions, the battles in the Tinzaouaten area, located near the border between Mali and Algeria, have raised concerns about the future of the already tense relations between these two neighboring countries.
Tinzaouaten: The Narrative of Victory and Defeat in a Three-Day War
The battles in Tinzaouaten, a small town in northern Mali near the Algerian border, took place over three days, from July 25 to 27, 2024. In the absence of an independent party to provide an objective account of the war and its outcomes, each side presented its own narrative, either directly or indirectly.
The Permanent Strategic Framework for the Defense of the Azawadian People, a coalition of Azawadian movements fighting the Malian government in the north, announced in its latest tally the killing of “84 Wagner Group members,” “47 Malian soldiers,” and the capture of “seven others.”
The Strategic Framework also reported destroying “six armored vehicles and six troop transport vehicles” while capturing “five armored vehicles, five four-wheel-drive vehicles, including an ambulance, a tanker, and a troop transport truck, all in good condition.” Additionally, its forces confiscated “twenty-eight heavy and group weapons, 137 individual weapons, fifteen RPG missiles, eight grenade launchers, and various ammunition and military communication equipment.” On the other side, it acknowledged the loss of seven of its members, with twelve others wounded.
The Malian army issued two separate statements detailing the outcomes of the battles. The first mentioned “the death of two soldiers and the injury of ten others, along with the killing of twenty Azawadian fighters and the destruction of some military equipment.” The second statement reported “the death of five Azawadian fighters.”
The Wagner Group, on its Telegram channel, only mentioned that “this is not the first unequal battle with global terrorism, nor will it be the last.” It referred to an attack on a convoy of its forces and the Malian army by the Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin group, which resulted in casualties. The group noted that the Azawadian forces exploited a sandstorm, as the adverse weather conditions prevented air support.
While Wagner implicitly acknowledged defeat in these battles, the Malian army presented its reports as evidence of victory, while the Strategic Framework provided a more detailed account of its forces’ success. They also circulated photos and videos on social media platforms, showing dead, injured, and captured Malian and Russian soldiers.
A few days after the battles ended, the Malian army announced airstrikes coordinated with the Burkina Faso armed forces, aimed at “securing people and property in Tinzaouaten and its surroundings against the terrorist alliance responsible for extortion, violations, and illegal trafficking against the Malian population,” according to the official narrative.
While the Azawadian Strategic Framework claimed that these airstrikes targeted a traditional gold mining site and that the victims were foreign nationals, the strikes sent a clear message that the battles at the end of July were just one episode in a series with regional and international military and diplomatic dimensions.
Regional and International Repercussions of the Tinzaouaten Battles
The Tinzaouaten battles had a range of regional and international repercussions, including diplomatic severances and alignments with one side or the other.
Following these battles, Mali announced on August 4, 2024, that it was severing diplomatic relations with Ukraine “with immediate effect.” A statement read on national television by government spokesperson Colonel Abdoulaye Maïga accused Ukraine’s military intelligence spokesman Andriy Yusov of admitting his country’s involvement in a “cowardly, treacherous, and barbaric attack by armed terrorist groups that resulted in the deaths of Malian defense and security forces in Tinzaouaten and caused material damage.”
Niger quickly aligned itself with its ally, announcing on Tuesday, August 6, that it was severing relations with Ukraine. A statement read on Niger’s national television by Colonel Amadou Abdourahmane declared that the Nigerien government, “in full solidarity with the government and people of Mali, has decided in its full sovereignty to sever diplomatic relations with Ukraine with immediate effect.”
Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement rejecting “in the strongest terms the accusations by Mali’s transitional government of supporting international terrorism,” calling the decision to sever relations “short-sighted and hasty.”
In response, Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry criticized Niger’s accusations as “baseless and incapable of withstanding any scrutiny,” adding that Niger’s authorities had decided to sever relations without investigating the incident in Mali or providing any evidence related to the decision.
Russia also weighed in, with Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova accusing Ukraine of “opening a second front” in Africa, attributing this to “Volodymyr Zelensky’s inability to defeat Russia on the battlefield,” leading him to turn to Africa to “support terrorist groups in countries on the continent allied with Moscow.”
The repercussions of the Tinzaouaten battles widened, leading Mali to expel Sweden’s ambassador, Kristina Kuhnel, in protest of an announcement by Sweden’s Minister for International Development Cooperation and Trade, Johan Forssell, that his country had decided to phase out aid to Mali following its severance of relations with Ukraine.
Meanwhile, Senegal’s Foreign Ministry summoned Ukraine’s ambassador to the country, Yuriy Pyvovarov, in protest of a video published on the embassy’s Facebook page in which he expressed support for the Azawadian armed forces.
The Senegalese Foreign Ministry issued a statement affirming that Senegal “rejects terrorism in all its forms and cannot agree with statements that support it, especially those aimed at destabilizing a friendly state like Mali.”
This position was reiterated by Senegalese Prime Minister Ousmane Sonko during a visit to Mali, where he held discussions with his Malian counterpart, Choguel Kokalla Maïga, and the transitional president, Assimi Goïta.
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) also adopted a similar stance, condemning the attacks “against Malian defense and security forces in Tinzaouaten.”
In response, the Azawadian Strategic Framework criticized the positions of Senegal and ECOWAS, asserting that they “were members of the international mediation under the Algeria Accord,” and that this was sufficient reason for them to remain neutral.
Kyiv and Moscow: Competing for Influence and Interests in Africa
The battles in Tinzaouaten have once again highlighted the Russian-Ukrainian competition for influence in Africa. Mali’s decision to cut ties with Ukraine coincided with Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba’s fourth African tour, which took him to Malawi, Zambia, and Mauritius.
Since the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian war on February 24, 2022, Kuleba has visited twelve African countries, while Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has visited fourteen, reflecting fierce competition for influence and interests.
Ukraine has also opened a number of embassies in various African countries in recent months, while Russia now has more than forty embassies on the continent.
Africa heavily relies on Russia and Ukraine for a significant portion of its grain needs, with some African countries depending on these two countries for more than 80% of their grain imports.
In 2020, Africa imported $4 billion worth of agricultural products from Russia and $3 billion from Ukraine, with wheat and corn making up about 90% of these imports.
Beyond the economic and trade aspects, Africa holds strategic importance due to its vast mineral resources and its significance in international voting blocs. Africa represents 28% of the United Nations’ membership, and the African Union has become a member of the G20.
This has motivated the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian competition for African support, as both countries seek to win African votes in the UN on issues related to their conflict, which appears to have no end in sight.
In an effort to avoid African alignment with either Russia or Ukraine, the African Union has sought to mediate between the two sides by organizing three-way talks with Turkey.
While these mediation efforts have yet to yield tangible results, Russia’s influence appears to be increasing following a series of coups in West and Central Africa, notably in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, where the central authorities have allied with Moscow, often following the expulsion of French forces from these countries.
The implications of the Russian-Ukrainian war are becoming more evident in Africa, especially in the Sahel region, where the Russian Wagner Group has replaced French forces in protecting government regimes in Mali and other countries. This has made Russia’s confrontation with Kyiv in Africa increasingly direct and open.
The battles in Tinzaouaten have exposed how the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, which began in Eastern Europe, has expanded to become a global issue with repercussions extending to Africa. If the diplomatic escalation continues, it could spark a larger confrontation between Moscow and Kyiv, this time in Africa.
Russia’s War and the Sahel War: A Contrast of Damage and Gains
African nations have been affected to varying degrees by the Russian-Ukrainian war. Some countries on the continent have borne a significant share of these impacts, primarily because they were already grappling with other challenges related to security and climate change. The war between these two nations, which are major food suppliers to Africa, has exacerbated the suffering.
In June 2022, Chad declared a state of food emergency due to the worsening food situation caused by the Russian-Ukrainian war. The United Nations also warned of a potential “famine cyclone.”
Regional and international organizations have warned of severe food insecurity in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. The suffering of millions of people in these landlocked countries has been intensified by several factors, including climate shocks and the consequences of the Moscow-Kyiv conflict. The situation in these countries has been further complicated by sanctions imposed in response to recent military coups.
The disruption of supply chains due to the war has affected food security in African countries, many of which rely heavily on agriculture. Twenty African nations depend on Russia and Ukraine for 90% of their wheat needs.
Like many other nations, the Sahel countries have suffered due to the Russian-Ukrainian war, experiencing food shortages and rising prices of essential goods. Grains, a staple in the African diet, have become increasingly scarce, highlighting the continent’s inability to meet its food needs despite its vast arable lands.
The consequences of the war extend beyond food shortages. Tens of thousands of African students studying in Russia and Ukraine have been affected, with many forced to leave, particularly those in areas directly impacted by the conflict or at risk of being affected.
Reflecting the severity of Africa’s predicament in this war, the continent’s food security crisis has become a point of competition between Russia and Ukraine. Both countries have announced plans to provide food aid to several African nations, including those in the Sahel.
While the war has had numerous negative effects on the Sahel countries, Russia and Ukraine have both found ways to benefit from the political and security instability in the region. Following a series of military coups in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, Russia has strengthened its presence in these countries, positioning itself as an alternative to France, the traditional partner of these nations. Russia has succeeded in winning this bet.
Russia has also increased its military presence in these countries, capitalizing on the ongoing decade-long war against armed groups. This has taken two main forms: Mali’s contracting of the Russian Wagner Group and the deployment of Russian forces in Niger and Burkina Faso under the guise of the African Corps. The primary goal is to secure Russian interests and counter Western influence in these countries.
In addition to deploying troops, Russia has provided military aid to these countries, which has been used to bolster their arsenals in the fight against armed groups, especially in the tri-border area between Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso.
Russia has expanded its cooperation with these countries beyond arms deals to include other areas of economic and trade cooperation.
Ukraine, on the other hand, has shown interest in entering the Sahel through military means, as evidenced by the recent battles in Tinzaouatene. The Malian authorities and their allies have suggested that the weapons and training used by the Azawadian armed forces were provided by an external party, later identified as Ukraine.
Ukraine’s actions seem aimed at playing a role similar to its involvement in Sudan, where it fought alongside the Sudanese Armed Forces against the Rapid Support Forces, which were backed by Russia, according to the Wall Street Journal.
Conclusion
The battles in Tinzaouatene have not been confined to the narrow geographical area in northern Mali where they occurred. Instead, they have extended far beyond, casting shadows of diplomatic crises and official alignments across several countries and organizations.
The issue has even reached the halls of the United Nations. Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso sent a joint letter to the UN Security Council through the foreign ministries of the three countries, all of which are part of the “Sahel Alliance.”
These three nations expressed their condemnation of Ukraine’s alleged support for armed groups in the Sahel region, calling on the Security Council, chaired by Sierra Leone in August, to take notice and put an end to it.
This move reflects the determination of Russia’s allied states to extend their anti-Ukraine positions as far as possible to serve Moscow’s interests in its war with Kyiv.
The Tinzaouaten battles have exposed a dangerous new front in the Russian-Ukrainian war in Africa, one that may not be easily contained by Mali and Niger’s severing of diplomatic ties with Ukraine. As conflicts between the Malian army and the Azawadian armed forces continue, Russia may increasingly appear in the background with its weapons and personnel, and Ukraine with its arms, training, and possibly its soldiers as well.
This conflict may not remain confined to Mali, but could potentially spread to other countries in the region, such as Niger, Burkina Faso, and possibly Chad, which have all aligned themselves with Russia.
There are growing concerns that the circle of allies and enemies could widen, drawing other international parties into the fray, either directly or indirectly. The West, for instance, might back Ukraine, particularly France, whose forces have been expelled from Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, and the United States, whose forces were ousted from Niger. Meanwhile, other parties, like Iran, which is allied with Russia’s allies in the Sahel, might side with Russia.
The expansion of the conflict in Mali from an internal war rooted in a decades-old traditional struggle between groups seeking the secession of the Azawad region from the central Malian state, into a multi-faceted war involving regional and international actors, could pose a significant threat that might affect other countries in the region. Mali shares borders with seven countries, all of which have been affected, to varying degrees, by the country’s security turmoil.
Burkina Faso and Niger, for example, have been infiltrated by armed groups from northern Mali for nearly a decade. Algeria’s relations with Bamako have been tense for some time, despite being the mediator of the 2015 peace and reconciliation agreement between the Malian authorities and the Azawadian movements, an agreement that has since been annulled by the current transitional authorities.
The proximity of the Tinzaouatene battles to Algeria’s border suggests a high likelihood of Algeria being affected by the conflict’s escalation, much like Mauritania, where some areas near the Malian border have recently been repeatedly targeted by the army and its Russian allies.
As for Côte d’Ivoire, Mali’s southern neighbor, recent regional and international media reports have indicated that the United States has been allowed to establish a military base on its territory following its withdrawal from Niger. This suggests that Côte d’Ivoire could become involved in the conflict if it expands, with multiple allies and enemies involved.
Guinea Conakry and Senegal also face these concerns. Both countries are traditionally aligned with France and have not turned their backs on it during the recent changes in the region.
References
Mali / Burkina : Une coordination des forces armées frappe des cibles ¨terroristes¨ à Tinzaoutene, publié le 31 juillet 2024, vu le 13 Août 2024, https://shorturl.at/eqWzO
Le Mali rompt ses relations diplomatiques avec l’Ukraine, publié le 05 août 2024, vu le 14 août 2024, https://shorturl.at/UENnM
Après le Mali, le Niger rompt ses relations avec l’Ukraine, publié le 07 août 2024, vu le 14 août 2024, https://shorturl.at/y4IB2
Confit Russie – Ukraine : quelles conséquences sur les économies africaines ? publié avril 2022, vu le 14 août 2024, https://shorturl.at/XBqkK
