Suddenly, without prior warning, heavy gunfire was heard around the presidential palace in the Chadian capital, N’Djamena, on the evening of January 8, 2025, instilling fear among residents; they were unaccustomed to such incidents, despite the country having previously experienced military coups and ongoing fierce battles against armed groups and rebel factions.
Residents of N’Djamena waited anxiously for details about what was happening in their capital until Foreign Minister and government spokesperson, Abdurrahman Kallam Allah, appeared in a short video posted on his Facebook page hours after the attack, stating that the situation was under control and there was no cause for concern.
The same official later appeared in an interview with national television, providing more details, and held a press conference the following day where he clarified some aspects of the sudden attack, which targeted the “Toumaye” palace while President Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno was present.
Despite a return to calm in the streets of N’Djamena hours after the attack and reassurances from various officials in Mahamat Déby’s regime, questions remained regarding the identities of the attackers, the messages they intended to convey, and whether they had connections or coordination with other armed factions within or outside the country.
The attack occurred amid various internal and regional contexts, making several scenarios plausible regarding the nature of those responsible and their potential affiliations. However, Chadian authorities have limited themselves to announcing an investigation into the incident.
Additionally, the accounts of what happened that Wednesday evening were not without inconsistencies, adding to the attack’s ambiguity and making the possibility of its recurrence, perhaps in a more precise and organized manner, highly likely unless the authorities take more resolute measures against the unknown threat.
N’Djamena has a history of bloody incidents; on several occasions, Boko Haram has carried out attacks in the capital resulting in numerous deaths and injuries. The police have killed dozens of protesters opposed to the current president’s rule, and in a separate incident, the army killed one of the prominent opponents of the president’s regime after besieging his party’s headquarters in the heart of the capital.
However, the attack on the presidential palace stands out from previous incidents, indicating a vulnerability in securing what is supposed to be the most fortified location in the country.
Who Wants the Head of the Occupant of the Toumaye Palace?
In a statement on January 9, 2025, following his meeting with accredited diplomats in Chad, and a day after the attack on the presidential palace, Chadian Foreign Minister Abdurrahman Kallam Allah affirmed that the attack “had no link to any known terrorist organization,” claiming that the assailants “carried talismans they believed would protect them,” and that they were “under the influence of alcohol” when they engaged with the palace guards.
The minister, who became a prominent official source regarding the attack in local and regional media, indicated that the attackers spoke Arabic and “belonged to the same ethnic group,” without specifying which group or revealing additional details.
On the same day the foreign minister issued his statement, the prosecutor in N’Djamena, Omar Mohamed Kdily, also released a statement announcing the opening of an investigation into the attack, describing the assailants as “having ill intentions,” and adding that they “pretended their vehicle had broken down and took the opportunity to attack the guards,” emphasizing that their actions constituted “murder, deliberate assault, an attempt to undermine the constitutional order, assault on state institutions and security, conspiracy against the state, and involvement in a rebellious movement.”
While the Chadian government tends to believe that the attack, which resulted in the death of 18 assailants and one of the presidential guards, was carried out by ordinary individuals from various neighborhoods of N’Djamena, armed primarily with knives and light weapons, the president, Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno, viewed the attack as a direct assault on him, praising the “vigilance and courage” of the presidential security that confronted the attackers.
Days before the attack, Déby had commented in a year-end speech that Chad would be “attacked,” and he had considered the “security, economic, diplomatic, and media ramifications” of his decision to cancel a military and security cooperation agreement with France, indicating he did not rule out the possibility of Chadian citizens being exploited to destabilize the country.
This statement raises several possibilities; either President Déby anticipated that N’Djamena’s decision to cancel the military cooperation with Paris would not go unanswered security-wise, or he was aware of preparations by other entities within the country and wanted to send a veiled message with that remark in his speech.
It is also possible that the president, who was promoted weeks earlier to the rank of Marshal for reasons including his “significant role in establishing security, stability, and countering terrorism,” wanted to emulate leaders in the region who have warned that regional and international entities seek to destabilize their countries.
Potential Parties Behind the Attack
With no investigation results yet announced by the Chadian authorities—though they are unlikely to be publicized—a number of speculations arise regarding who might be behind the attack, which jeopardized the life and rule of President Mahamat Déby, more than three years after his father, Idriss Déby Itno, was killed in a battle against rebels, as per the official Chadian account.
Despite the N’Djamena government’s exclusion of the attack being “terrorist”—implying a denial of Boko Haram’s involvement—it remains possible that this group was implicated, given that their assaults on the Chadian army have never ceased, and they have previously claimed responsibility for several attacks in the capital. Thus, the possibility of them reaching the presidential palace is conceivable.
The second possibility regarding those behind the attack could be that it was a French message, particularly considering the context in which it occurred—amid escalating verbal tensions between Chad and France. Following a speech by French President Emmanuel Macron in 2025 to his ambassadors about the country’s foreign policy, in which he stated that some African presidents “forgot” to thank France, asserting that without French forces, their countries would have no “sovereignty,” which displeased several countries, including Chad, which issued a formal response through its foreign ministry.
Moreover, in addition to these two external parties, there are two internal ones that could be behind the attack: one being the opposition leader, Succès Masra, who has opposed Mahamat Déby’s regime and later became an ally through Congolese mediation after living in exile for some time, competing against him in presidential elections, only to later oppose him again, calling for a boycott of the recent legislative elections.
Masra is also linked to the bloody protests that occurred in N’Djamena in 2022 against extending the transitional period, which resulted in hundreds of deaths and injuries due to police repression. It is not unreasonable to think that some of his supporters might have targeted the presidential palace now, despite him not publicly calling for civil disobedience in his current exile.
Another internal party that might be behind the attack emerges from the statement by the Chadian government spokesperson, suggesting that the attackers belong to the same ethnic group, indicating a possible revenge motive from some associates or supporters of the opposition leader, Yahya Dillo, who was killed in a Chadian army attack on his party’s headquarters, the “Socialist Party without Borders,” in late February 2024, in N’Djamena.
In contrast, it seems highly unlikely that the attack was carried out by two other parties: one being internal—the army, indicating it was not a coup attempt—and the other being external—the rebel groups. Had the attack involved either of these parties, it would likely have been stronger, potentially resulting in a higher casualty count among the presidential guard.
Context Surrounding the Attack on the Marshal’s Palace
The attack on the “Toumaye” palace occurred within various internal contexts, leading to the possibility of the aforementioned parties being behind it. We will focus on three notable internal contexts:
Operation “Houskhanat”
In late October 2024, a Chadian military base in the Lake Chad region near the Nigerian border faced a violent attack by Boko Haram, resulting in the deaths of forty soldiers. In response, the Chadian presidency announced President Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno’s visit to the attack site to launch a military operation named “Houskhanat,” aimed at pursuing Boko Haram militants.
This attack sparked widespread debate; it continued the series of strong offensives by this armed group against the Chadian army in recent years and highlighted the failure of a previous operation launched by the late Idriss Déby Itno over four years ago in the same region known as “Puma’s Wrath,” in response to Boko Haram’s killing of nearly a hundred Chadian soldiers.
This puts considerable pressure on Déby the younger; “Houskhanat” is not expected to differ from “Puma’s Wrath,” even though this latest attack reportedly angered the president, and he hinted at Chad’s withdrawal from the multinational joint force formed over a decade ago to eliminate Boko Haram, declaring that “this force, established to unify efforts and intelligence, is stagnant.”
The Chadian army reported casualties of more than a hundred Boko Haram militants and the recovery of some military equipment during Operation “Houskhanat,” with reports indicating the deaths and injuries of forty-seven Chadian soldiers. Similar to “Puma’s Wrath,” which subsequently led to the promotion of Déby the elder to the rank of “Marshal,” Déby the younger was also promoted to the same military rank following “Houskhanat.”
Non-consensual Legislative Elections
As part of President Mahamat Déby’s regime’s efforts to end all transitional phases before 2025, Chad held legislative elections on December 29, 2024—the first in more than a decade—alongside elections for regional and local representatives. Despite President Mahamat Déby labeling these elections as “historic,” his regime failed to convince active opposition forces to participate, as was the case with the “Transformers” party, whose leader, Succès Masra, criticized the lack of international observers and the absence of a political climate offering “transparency guarantees.”
As anticipated, the ruling party in Chad since Idriss Déby’s era, the “National Rescue Movement,” secured a majority of seats in these elections, obtaining 124 out of 188 parliamentary seats. Opposition protests erupted against the results, signaling the country might be heading toward a new political crisis, especially after the regime had managed to attract various opposition figures shortly before the presidential elections.
French Military Withdrawal
In a surprising move for France, Chad issued a statement from its foreign ministry on November 29, 2024, just hours after the French foreign minister left the capital, N’Djamena, during an official visit, announcing the cancellation of a defense cooperation agreement that had been in place for decades. To reaffirm its decision to impose full sovereignty after over six and a half decades post-independence from France, Chadian authorities set January 31, 2025, as the deadline for the complete withdrawal of French forces from its territory.
French forces quickly moved to abide by the termination of the military agreement, beginning to withdraw from military bases and hand them over to the Chadian army. The Chadian and French sides announced their agreement on a withdrawal mechanism. This stance positioned Chad officially alongside countries opposing the French military presence in the Sahel and West Africa, particularly Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, with Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire expected to join this movement as French troops are scheduled to withdraw at their request in 2025.
Internal and External Reactions to the Attack
The attack on the Chadian presidential palace elicited mixed internal reactions, with some supporting President Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno, while others were critical and skeptical, alongside external reactions ranging from support for the president to indifference towards the incident. Domestically, thirteen political parties under the National Framework for Political Parties Coordination expressed “steadfast support for President Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno,” reiterating their unity “as one person behind the Marshal, his government, and the security forces.”
Conversely, the opposition party, the Union of Democrats for Development and Progress, led by Max Kamkoy, described the attack as indicative of the “fragility of the existing authority,” calling for “an independent investigation by the government to disclose the truth about what happened on January 8.”
On the external front, while France maintained official silence regarding the attack on the Chadian presidential palace, Russia issued a statement from its foreign ministry condemning it as “terrorist,” asserting that it was “targeted against the legitimate leadership of the Republic of Chad.” Similarly, China, which saw the palace attack occur mere hours after the conclusion of a visit by its foreign minister, Wang Yi, expressed solidarity with Chad, emphasizing, through local media accounts from the Chinese ambassador in N’Djamena, the importance of fostering a peaceful environment for development and stressing that this attack “should not disrupt the tranquility of the Chadian nation.”
Regionally, the transitional president of Burkina Faso, Captain Ibrahim Traoré, sent his government’s spokesperson as a special envoy carrying a message to Chadian President Mahamat Idriss Déby shortly after the attack, reflecting rapprochement between the two countries. Reports from local media also suggest that the Chadian president might have dispatched a secret special envoy to Malian transitional president, General Assimi Goïta, who heads the Sahel coalition, indicating a potential formal alignment of Chad with the anti-France coalition close to Russia. In regional responses to the attack on the Chadian presidential palace, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights welcomed the “swift return to calm,” expressing solidarity with the “Government of Chad and its people in facing this attack,” while calling for “a prompt, fair, and comprehensive investigation to clarify these events and determine responsibility.”
Conclusion
The mysterious attack on the Chadian presidential palace raises numerous questions that remain unanswered unless the circumstances surrounding it are revealed, as well as concerns about the future and the deep-rooted security issues in the country; if the president is not safe in his palace, nothing else is secure.
The security challenge in Chad differs from that faced by other countries in the region confronting similar threats, as its sources are multiple rather than a single entity. On one side, President Mahamat Idriss Déby’s regime faces armed rebel groups, many of which it has failed to contain through local and international dialogues, rendering him a perpetual target for them, making it plausible that he could face the same fate as his father.
On the other side lies the threat posed by Boko Haram, which, despite being primarily focused in the Lake Chad region, has executed attacks previously in N’Djamena. It’s evident that the threat from this group exceeds the capabilities of the Chadian national army and even the regional joint force specifically formed to combat it, as Boko Haram still successfully conducts operations across the territories of those countries forming that military coalition.
Combined with these challenges inherited by Déby the younger from his father is another profound issue concerning the struggle for power not just within the Zaghawa tribe, to which late President Idriss Déby belonged, but also within the Déby family itself, thus perpetuating the threat to the current president’s rule. In the latter days of Déby the elder’s rule, while preparing to secure a sixth presidential term, Chadian security forces targeted his opposition nephew, Yahya Dillo, the head of the “Socialist Party without Borders,” who narrowly escaped death, while his mother and one of his sons were killed.
However, the same individual was killed in late February 2024 in an attack by Chadian security forces on his party’s headquarters, where he was expected to be a competitor against his cousin, President Mahamat Idriss Déby, in the presidential elections held in May of the same year. In the same operation that resulted in Dillo’s death and injuries to other opposition leaders, General Saleh Déby, the uncle of President Mahamat Idriss Déby, was arrested. These intertwined challenges concerning external security and internal political familial struggles make Mahamat Déby’s regime a constant target and suggest the attack on the presidential palace may not have been an isolated event, but rather a link in a series of forthcoming incidents.
References
Chad – Après l’attaque du palais présidentiel: Le procureur ouvre une enquête, publié le 09 Janvier 2025, vu le 13 Janvier 2025, https://urls.fr/3m1VUq
Tchad: Déby dénonce l’attaque sanglante contre son palis, des vidéos dévoilées, publié le 09 Janvier 2025, vu le 13 Janvier 2025, https://urls.fr/-HVtaw
Tchad: la date de retrait des forces françaises fixée au 31 janvier 2025 «non négociable» (PM), publié le 08 Janvier 2025, vu le 18 Janvier 2025, https://urls.fr/-VkSIL
Au Tchad, les politiques entre soutien et questionnement après l’attaque du palais présidentiel, publié le 11 Janvier 2025, vu le 18 Janvier 2025, https://urls.fr/w6vEYo
Déclaration de la Chine sur l’attaque contre la présidence du Tchad, publié le 12 Janvier 2025, vu le 18 Janvier 2025, https://urls.fr/fdouo6
Communiqué de presse sur l’attaque du palais présidentiel, à N’Djamena, en République du Tchad, publié le 13 Janvier 2025, vu le 18 Janvier 2025, https://urls.fr/CfG2w2
