American Alliances (I2U2 – Quad – AUKUS): Are They Tools to Counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative?!

Western control over the international system has opened the door to an increasingly prominent role for what is called Geo-Economics. Geo-economic thinking precedes or merges with geopolitical (Geo-Politics) thinking in the American (and generally Western) mindset. Since its significant rise after World War I, the United States has extensively sought to expand its economic influence across the world’s continents through official and unofficial gateways. It can be said that geo-economics, as an approach to serving American economic ambitions, has shaped today’s world—not just the military aspect.

There is no clearer evidence of this prioritization of geo-economics over geopolitics than the national security strategies that define the United States’ direction. From the Truman administration to the present, no U.S. strategic document has lacked efforts to liberalize trade, stimulate growth, and expand partnerships. However, the Biden administration has intensely focused on expanding partnerships more than any other U.S. administration. In the 2022 U.S. National Security Strategy, the Biden administration viewed the third decade of the 21st century as a decisive one that will shape the fate of the current international order and determine the future international system. Thus, the strategy emphasizes the necessity for the U.S. to strengthen relations with like-minded partners, opening avenues for cooperation in areas such as climate security, energy security, health security, pandemic response, food security, and security coordination in maritime security, counterterrorism, human trafficking, and all factors affecting the global economic system.

Over the past two years, the Biden administration has rapidly pursued this goal, establishing multiple economic frameworks to implement ambitious geo-economic projects, such as:

• The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF).
• The U.S. summit with Pacific Island Countries (PICS) under the Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy.
• The creation of the I2U2 group in 2022, comprising India, the UAE, and Israel, which is expected to quickly transcend the geo-economic perspective.

Undoubtedly, China has succeeded in drawing the U.S. into an arena where Beijing holds strengths. China, which built its global project on the principle of economic cooperation with others, has become an obstacle to Western influence worldwide due to the West’s “donor-recipient” logic versus China’s “mutual benefit” approach.

West Asian countries found in China a strong economic partner. Recently, Beijing has enhanced its diplomatic role in the region, exemplified by its successful mediation of the Saudi-Iranian agreement. China’s growing influence and the failure of traditional U.S. policies have forced Washington to change its strategies in the region. The era when Washington was an unchallenged dominant pole has ended, along with its ability to pressure countries without offering incentives to attract them.

Thus, the U.S. found itself compelled to propose projects in West Asia as alternatives to Chinese projects, aiming to distance regional countries from cooperation with Beijing. Any U.S.-sponsored project will ultimately serve Israel, with countering Iran as one of its objectives. (1)

The U.S. no longer views China merely as a strategic competitor but has shifted to containing it as an adversary seeking to dethrone it from the top of the international hierarchy. The rivalry between the two has evolved from a bilateral struggle to a “conflict of alliances,” as each seeks to solidify partnerships with other nations. In its containment efforts, the U.S. has woven a network of alliances with countries surrounding Beijing, many of which fear living next to a giant like China.

Despite China’s attempts to alleviate these fears, it has failed to reassure its neighbors, due to geopolitical considerations (historical enmities between neighboring states) and U.S. interventions that amplify these fears. These U.S. alliances have taken various names and set different goals, but their core objective remains “containing China” and weakening it. (2)

The U.S. Strategy in Asia

In a speech by U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan at a seminar organized by the Middle East Studies Center on May 4, 2023, he outlined America’s strategy toward West Asia. The primary driver of U.S. foreign policy in the “decisive years ahead,” as President Joe Biden phrased it, is competition with global powers for influence. Sullivan stressed that Washington’s decisions in the coming years will shape U.S. foreign policy for decades.

At the global level, the U.S. considers China its strategic threat. In West Asia, Washington identifies Tehran as the primary threat to its interests. The East’s emergence as a hub for major economic and geopolitical projects pressures the U.S., especially as it attracts many nations. How will America confront this reality in West Asia?

Sullivan outlined the U.S. strategy for West Asia across five key points:

1. Building Partnerships: Washington seeks to enhance regional cooperation, linking regional states to itself.
2. Ensuring Deterrence: Prioritizing threat deterrence and protecting U.S. interests.
3. Diplomatic De-escalation: Avoiding distractions from the China challenge.
4. Regional Integration: A more interconnected Middle East benefits allies, promotes peace, and reduces long-term U.S. resource commitments.
5. Upholding American Values: Spreading democracy and human rights. (3)

American Alliances to Counter Chinese Influence

1. The I2U2 Alliance

The structures of alliances in key strategic regions have undergone changes, with minilateralism—small-scale multilateral cooperation for specific strategic goals—becoming prominent. Amid the decline of post-WWII U.S.-led security structures and the rise of China and Russia, Washington has built flexible alliances, including:

• I2U2: India, Israel, the U.S., and the UAE.
• Quad: The U.S., Japan, Australia, and India.
• AUKUS: Australia, the UK, and the U.S. (4)

Origins of I2U2:
Formed in October 2021 during Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar’s visit to Israel, I2U2 initially focused on economic ties but quickly expanded. The first virtual summit on July 14, 2022, addressed food security and clean energy. Key outcomes:

1. Economic collaboration in water, energy, transport, space, health, and food security.
2. Support for normalization agreements with Israel.
3. India’s interest in joining the Agriculture Innovation Mission for Climate (AIM for Climate). (6)

Key Projects:

• Food Security: The UAE will invest $2 billion in India for integrated food parks using advanced tech to reduce waste and conserve resources.
• Clean Energy: A 300 MW renewable energy project in Gujarat, India, funded by a $330 million U.S. feasibility study. (7)

Motivations:

• UAE: Enhances its regional role and economic diplomacy.
• India: Strengthens strategic engagement with West Asia.
• Israel: Extends the Abraham Accords, integrating old and new partners. (9)

Trade Relations:
Total trade among members reached nearly 400billionin2021,withIndialeadingat400billionin2021,withIndialeadingat188 billion. The UAE-India partnership is foundational, with $73 billion in bilateral trade. (10)

Strategic Goals:

• Countering China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
• Reducing regional reliance on Chinese cooperation.
• Advancing Israeli normalization.
• Addressing non-traditional security threats collectively. (11)

Is I2U2 a U.S. Tool Against BRI?
While members share common interests, the U.S. aims to distance Israel and the UAE from China. India seeks gains without antagonizing regional players, while the UAE eyes tech transfers. The alliance complements broader U.S. containment efforts in Asia and the Middle East. (12)

2. The Quad Alliance

Origins:
Formed in 2007 to counter China’s Pacific expansion, the Quad (U.S., India, Japan, Australia) collapsed in 2008 under Chinese pressure but revived in 2017 amid China’s aggressive rise.

Mission:
A strategic (not military) forum focusing on:

• Maritime security (countering China’s South China Sea moves).
• Infrastructure investment ($50 billion pledged to counter BRI).
• Climate, cybersecurity, and disaster response. (16)

India’s “Diamond Necklace” Strategy:
A network of military, economic, and security alliances with Indonesia, Japan, Oman, Vietnam, and others to counter BRI’s diplomatic impact. (19)

Recent Agenda:

• A 2022 Tokyo summit pledged an “open Indo-Pacific,” targeting illegal fishing (a veiled reference to China).
• Parallel to AUKUS, the Quad strengthens regional deterrence. (21)

3. The AUKUS Alliance

Overview:
Launched in September 2021, AUKUS (Australia, UK, U.S.) focuses on nuclear submarine tech transfer to Australia—a first since the 1950s—to counter China’s Pacific dominance. (22)

Key Elements:

• Australia cancels $50 billion French submarine deal for U.S. nuclear subs.
• Enhances cyber, AI, and hypersonic weapons cooperation.
• Aims to shift Pacific power balances. (24)

Motivations:

• U.S.: Pivots to Asia, contains China, and reasserts global leadership post-Afghanistan.
• UK: Seeks post-Brexit relevance.
• Australia: Counters Chinese threats with advanced capabilities. (27)

Reactions:

• France condemned the deal as a “stab in the back.”
• China likened AUKUS to an “Asian NATO.” (26)

Final Observations

The U.S. faces challenges in maintaining alliances amid economic ties with China, European skepticism, and the need for cost-sharing. AUKUS and Quad reflect a new era of strategic competition, with China responding through partnerships in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia. (28-29)

List of Cited Sources

1. Analysis of U.S. Strategic Shifts in West Asia – Discusses U.S. efforts to counter Chinese influence through economic alliances like I2U2.
2. Containment of China via Alliances – Examines U.S. strategies to weaken China’s global influence through partnerships with regional actors.
3. U.S. National Security Strategy (2022) – Official document outlining Biden’s focus on alliances, climate security, and Indo-Pacific priorities.
4. Overview of U.S.-Led Alliances (I2U2, Quad, AUKUS) – Comparative study of minilateral frameworks targeting China.
5. Origins of I2U2 (2021–2022) – Details the group’s formation as an economic forum and expansion into strategic cooperation.
6. White House Statement on I2U2 Summit (July 2022) – Official release on food/energy projects and support for Israeli normalization.
7. UAE-India Food Parks & Renewable Energy Projects – Reports on I2U2’s $2 billion investment and Gujarat’s 300 MW solar/wind initiative.
8. UAE’s Role in I2U2 – Highlights Abu Dhabi’s economic diplomacy and regional leadership aspirations.
9. India’s Strategic Gains in I2U2 – Analyzes trade ties with the U.S., UAE, and Israel, including defense and tech partnerships.
10. IMF Trade Data (2021) – Statistics on commerce between I2U2 members (~$400 billion total).
11. Geopolitical Aims of I2U2 – Argues the alliance counters BRI, isolates Russia, and integrates Israel regionally.
12. Divergent Goals Within I2U2 – Explores how members leverage the group for distinct interests (e.g., UAE’s tech transfers, India’s hedging).
13. U.S. Counter-BRI Initiatives (Blue Dot Network, IPEF) – Critiques Western infrastructure alternatives to China’s Belt and Road.
14. Quad’s Origins (2004 Tsunami Response) – Traces the group’s evolution from disaster relief to security dialogue.
15. Quad as “Asian NATO” – Debates its military vs. economic focus and China’s backlash.
16. Quad Revival (2017–2021) – Covers renewed cooperation under Biden, including maritime surveillance and $50B infrastructure pledges.
17. Quad’s 2022 Tokyo Summit – Focus on illegal fishing, climate, and “open Indo-Pacific” rhetoric.
18. China’s Counter-Alliance Moves (Pakistan, Afghanistan, Central Asia) – Details Beijing’s regional partnerships to offset U.S. pressure.
19. India’s “Diamond Necklace” Strategy – Examines New Delhi’s network of partnerships to rival BRI.
20. Quad-AUKUS Synergy – Analyzes overlapping roles in deterring China, including Australia’s nuclear subs.
21. Quad’s 2022 Fisheries Program – Targets IUU fishing (implicitly criticizing Chinese vessels).
22. AUKUS Announcement (September 2021) – Covers nuclear submarine deal and tech-sharing terms.
23. French Backlash Over AUKUS – Macron’s “betrayal” rhetoric and diplomatic fallout.
24. AUKUS as a Pacific Deterrent – Assesses its impact on regional power balances vis-à-vis China.
25. China’s Naval Expansion – Context for AUKUS as a response to PLA Navy modernization.
26. Global Reactions to AUKUS – Support from allies (e.g., NZ, Canada) vs. Chinese condemnation.
27. Motivations of AUKUS Members – U.S. pivot to Asia, UK’s post-Brexit role, Australia’s security fears.
28. U.S. Challenges in Alliance Management – Tensions with Europe, cost-sharing, and hedging by partners.
29. Future of U.S.-Led Alliances – Proposals to link frameworks (e.g., Quad + AUKUS) and address BRI’s appeal.