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After Trump’s Threat… Iran’s Difficult Choice Between Negotiation and War

Iran faces a highly challenging regional and international landscape amid a US-Israeli alliance determined to eradicate its nuclear program from its roots, at a time when it seems to have lost the regional cards it relied on to achieve some balance of power, following Israeli strikes on its arms in the region, particularly Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthi group in Yemen. President Donald Trump’s message, sent to Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, in March 2025, puts Iran in the position of choosing between two extremely difficult options: negotiating a new nuclear deal under American terms, or facing the possibility of war and military action. In this context, the question arises as to how Tehran will deal with this complex situation, especially with the Trump administration’s renewed practice of “maximum pressure” policy.

Trump’s Message… Opportunity or Threat?

On March 6, 2025, Trump confirmed that he had sent a message to Khamenei, urging Iran to reach a new nuclear agreement with the United States. In an interview with Fox Business, Trump said, “I hope Iran will negotiate, and I wrote them a letter saying I hope you will negotiate; because if we have to resort to military intervention, it will be devastating for them.” He added, “I think they want to receive that message… the alternative is that we will do something; because we cannot allow them to possess nuclear weapons.” Trump set a two-month deadline for Tehran to reach the deal he mentioned or face the alternative scenario.

Trump’s message carries a threat, as he pressures Iran to negotiate a new nuclear deal, emphasizing that the alternative is military action, the same point emphasized by the US Special Envoy, Steve Witkov, who described Trump’s message as an attempt to avoid military action. Media outlets quoted him as saying, “Our message to Iran is let’s sit together and see if, through dialogue and diplomacy, we can reach the right solution. If we can, we are ready for that. And if we cannot, the alternative is not a good option.”

But what is the nature of the new deal that the Trump administration seeks to impose under the threat of military action? Here, the US administration goes to the extreme, as CBS News quoted the US National Security Advisor, Mike Waltz, on March 23, 2025, saying that the United States seeks a “complete dismantlement” of Iran’s nuclear program, adding that “Iran must abandon its program in a way that the entire world can see.”

The US administration’s pressure is not limited to solving Iran’s nuclear program problem from its roots, but also includes halting Iran’s support for all the groups it supports in the region, including the Houthi group. On March 17, 2025, Trump warned that Iran would be held responsible for any further attacks by the Houthis on American ships and vessels, and would face dire consequences, and that Tehran must stop supporting the rebels and their attacks on ships in the Red Sea. This came after the United States (with Britain) began, in mid-March 2025, launching strikes on Houthi sites in Yemen as part of a “no-holds-barred” missile campaign, as warned by US Defense Secretary, Pete Hegseth, and the Houthis responded by attacking an American aircraft carrier in the Red Sea.

In light of these US positions that aim to exert maximum pressure, the options of negotiations and war seem more difficult for Tehran, especially if the negotiation scenario is linked to the American preconditions that strip Tehran of all that it considers elements of its strength and symbols of its sovereignty.

Negotiation for a New Deal:

To avoid the military confrontation scenario, especially at this stage of exposure and strategic weakness, it is expected that Iran will return to the negotiation table. Despite Khamenei’s assertion that American threats to his country “will not work, and that Americans and others must know that they will receive a strong slap if they take any action that harms the Iranian nation”; Tehran has not and will not completely close the door to the negotiation scenario in order to avoid the other alternative. This was evident from the statements of Iran’s Foreign Minister, Abbas Araqchi, who said that his country will consider the “opportunities” as well as the “threats” contained in Trump’s message, pointing out that Iran has taken into account the threats and opportunities, and pledged that it will not negotiate under pressure, threats, or increased sanctions. He also emphasized that negotiations must be on an equal footing.

Iranian policy is characterized by a high degree of pragmatism, and Tehran has extensive experience in managing nuclear negotiations with the West in general, and it realizes that the current situation is extremely difficult for it, especially since its Russian ally will not risk losing Trump, who adopts positions in the Ukrainian crisis that somewhat lean towards Moscow. In light of this, it is expected that Tehran will move in the negotiation file with Washington according to the following:

1- Announcing acceptance in principle to enter into negotiations, while rejecting the idea of preconditions or American dictates, as the Iranians call them, and at the same time emphasizing Tehran’s readiness for alternative options, including the military option.

2- Attempting to involve third parties, especially Russia and the Gulf Arab states, to intervene with the Americans to ease the pressure and provide room for possible understandings. Bloomberg reported in a report on March 4, 2025, that Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed to mediate talks between the United States and Iran, following a request from Trump, according to people familiar with the matter. The Kremlin spokesperson, Dmitry Peskov, also said that Russian and American officials discussed the Iranian nuclear program during their meeting in Saudi Arabia last month.

3- Adopting a long-term approach in negotiations, and Iran is indeed experienced in this matter, as entering into negotiations does not mean that immediate understandings will be reached, but rather it may take years, as happened in the first deal. This approach is consistent with what is known as Tehran’s “strategic patience” policy; which means buying time and waiting for changes in Washington, but things may be different with the Trump administration, which is not expected to accept a policy of procrastination and extended negotiations. There have already been leaked reports in newspapers showing that European countries (France, Germany, and Britain) have given Iran a deadline until next June to reach a deal, otherwise it will face international sanctions, and possibly American and Israeli military strikes.

Military Action Scenario:

Many indicators suggest that the US military action scenario against Iran is not unlikely, but rather may be possible in light of the following:

1- The unprecedented strategic exposure that Iran appears to be experiencing after the Israeli strikes on it and its allies in the region, which are seen as an opportunity for the United States and Israel to eradicate the Iranian threat from its roots. According to many military analyses, the Israeli air strike in October 2024 inflicted significant damage on Iran’s air defense systems; which may render them ineffective in the event of large-scale American and Israeli military strikes, as well as weakening Iran’s ballistic missile industry. In addition, the superior military technological capabilities of the United States and Israel, which were evident during the wars in Lebanon and Gaza, give them a clear military advantage against Tehran; which may encourage the hawks in the American and Israeli administrations to push towards military action in order to exploit the current moment to uproot the Iranian threat from its roots, and achieve the goal of completely dismantling Iran’s nuclear program, as mentioned by the US National Security Advisor.

Naturally, Iran’s state of strategic exposure and weakness is enhanced by the success of the Israeli war in weakening the strength and influence of Iran’s allies and arms in Lebanon (Hezbollah), as well as the fall of its main ally represented by Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, while the Houthi group is subjected to strong American, Israeli, and British strikes that put it to the test. The current strong US military campaign against the Houthis, and Trump’s decisive threats to eliminate the Houthi threat, and even his threat to Iran itself that it will be held responsible for any further Houthi attacks on American ships and vessels; is a clear deterrent message of Washington’s readiness to use military force.

2- The dominance of anti-Iran hawks in the decision-making process within the current US administration, in addition to Trump’s own positions supporting Israel and opposing Tehran. Since his return to the White House on January 20, 2025, Trump has continued to follow a policy of “maximum pressure” on Tehran, imposing sanctions on its oil exports with the aim of reducing them to zero; and then forcing the Iranian leadership to negotiate a new nuclear deal. The United States has imposed four rounds of sanctions on Iranian oil sales since the beginning of Trump’s second term.

3- The escalation of Iran’s economic crisis, as Iran has been going through a complex economic crisis for years, and its severity will increase with the US “maximum pressure” policy. Iran’s annual inflation rate reached around 35% in February 2025, while the value of the local currency continued to decline, reaching a record level recently. More than a third of the Iranian people suffer from poverty, which translates to around 32 million Iranians living in difficult living conditions.

4- The increasing frequency of international reports indicating that Iran has approached or exceeded the nuclear threshold, as the International Atomic Energy Agency expressed concern about this matter, and indicated in a confidential report dated February 8, 2025, that Iran’s stockpile of uranium enriched to 60% has significantly increased, reaching 274.8 kilograms compared to around 182.3 kilograms in November last year, representing a 51% increase in just three months.

With all these factors, the possibility of resorting to the military action option may not be ruled out, especially if Tehran ultimately rejects Trump’s invitation to negotiate. However, the military action scenario itself is subject to discussions; meaning, will the US military action be comprehensive and effective enough to eliminate the nuclear program? Or will it be partial with the aim of pressuring Tehran and proving seriousness? In the case of choosing limited or partial military action, it is unexpected that Iran will respond in a way that leads to escalation, and the scenario of responding to the Israeli strike may be repeated or in a less intense manner.

In the case of a strong military response scenario, the repercussions may be significant. When asked about the extent of his country’s capabilities to destroy Iran’s nuclear program sites, US Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, said that he is “confident enough to say that if President Trump decides that we need to take action to prevent Iran from possessing nuclear capability, we have the ability to do so, and go beyond that and possibly even threaten the regime itself.” Therefore, the risk will be in the case of this last scenario, which Tehran will try to avoid.

In conclusion, the options before Iran seem extremely difficult, and practically there is only the negotiation option in the face of a US-Israeli alliance that wants to end the Iranian nuclear threat, but the situation will remain open to all possible scenarios.

Mohamed SAKHRI

I’m Mohamed Sakhri, the founder of World Policy Hub. I hold a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science and International Relations and a Master’s in International Security Studies. My academic journey has given me a strong foundation in political theory, global affairs, and strategic studies, allowing me to analyze the complex challenges that confront nations and political institutions today.

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