The 38th African Summit, which took place on February 15 and 16, 2025, concluded in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa. The summit was held under exceptional circumstances due to developments within the continent, such as conflicts in Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as well as events outside of it. These external events included the ongoing first phase of the prisoner exchange process between Hamas and Israel, and the presence of a new US leadership under President Trump, who had not yet determined his strategic position on the continent. His first term did not carry positive connotations towards it.
It is not surprising that African issues like Sudan, or Arab issues like Palestine, were present in the discussions and in the final communiqué. However, the most important and distinctive point for these countries was the victory of an African/Arab candidate, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Djibouti, as President of the Commission for the first time since the establishment of the organization in 2002. Additionally, an African-Arab deputy, Algerian Malika Haddad, was elected, raising an important question in this regard:
Does this summit mark the beginning of intensive Arab/African cooperation, following the Arab-African summit that was halted at No. 4 in Malabo, the capital of Guinea-Bissau in 2016? The summit’s holding was delayed three times in a row in 2019, 2020, and 2023, for various reasons, including the impact of the Corona virus, as well as differences within each side. These differences included the Arab position on the Al-Aqsa flood and the representation of the Polisario, versus the differences within the African side regarding the position on the Al-Aqsa flood.
Before delving into this question, it may be useful to first define the concept of Arab-African relations and then examine the most prominent issues affecting both sides during this summit. This will help answer the main question about the possibility of improving these relations during the next four years, which is the term of office of the head of the commission and his deputy.
The concept of Arab-African relations and its importance The study of Arab-African relations is the focus of attention for many Arab and African researchers alike. This grouping, which includes 66 countries, including ten countries with joint membership, has the potential to form a strong economic and political bloc that could compete with major powers. This is especially significant given that one part of this bloc owns half of the world’s energy and cash liquidity, while the other part possesses half of the world’s food basket, as well as human resources and natural resources.
However, it is evident that political considerations have governed this relationship, particularly in light of the link between the idea of rapprochement and the African position on the October 1973 war. As a result, these relations were shattered by Egypt’s reconciliation with Israel in 1978/1979, and then the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991 hammered the final nail in the coffin of these relations. Gaddafi later tried to revive them for personal reasons through the Sirte summit in October 2010, but his departure and the Arab Spring prevented this from being realized. Subsequent attempts to revive the summit, such as the Kuwait Summit in 2013 and the Malabo Summit in 2016, which was the first joint summit to be held on African soil, were unsuccessful. The march of the summits was halted for various reasons, including the health crisis caused by the Corona virus and the inter-regional and international political environment, which led to the postponement of the Riyadh summit in November 2023.
African/Arab issues at the 38th African Summit Based on the previous definition, it can be said that this summit focused on three main issues. Two of these issues fall within the African framework: the issues of Sudan and the presidency of the Commission. The third issue falls within the framework of Arab-African relations: the Palestinian issue and the Zionist aggression against the residents of the Gaza Strip since the start of the Al-Aqsa flood on October 7, 2023.
First: The African position on the Al-Aqsa flood
Operation Al-Aqsa Flood temporarily contributed to halting the African rush towards Israel, which was represented in two significant developments:
First, Sudan and Morocco joined the Abraham Peace Accords, despite being part of an Arab front against Israel.
As a result, Israel succeeded in establishing diplomatic relations with 47 African countries out of a total of 54, with 39 of them at the embassy level. In contrast, there are seven countries with which Israel has no relationship at all, five of which are African Arabs: Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Somalia, and Djibouti. Additionally, two countries, Mali and Niger, severed relations and have not re-established them.
African countries that do not have diplomatic relations with Israel:
Country – Justification for the situation Libya – In line with the official Arab position on the need to establish a Palestinian state first Tunisia – In line with the official Arab position on the need to establish a Palestinian state first Algeria – In line with the official Arab position on the need to establish a Palestinian state first Somalia – In line with the official Arab position on the need to establish a Palestinian state first Djibouti – In line with the official Arab position on the need to establish a Palestinian state first Mali – It severed ties with Israel after the 1973 war, but could return under military rule, yet refused to condemn Hamas at the United Nations. Niger – It severed relations with Israel over the events in the West Bank in 2002, but could return under military rule, yet refused to condemn Hamas at the United Nations.
- The researcher compiled this data based on the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ data on the Internet.
Second, the African Union’s decision in July 2021 to grant Israel observer status in the continental organization, which only 15 African countries opposed at the time.
Therefore, it is evident that the Palestinian issue has returned to the forefront of African attention, particularly since the 36th African Summit in 2023, after Israel’s attempt to participate in it. This attempt led to the decision to suspend membership until further notice and the issuance of a strong statement from the summit, focusing on several key points:
The African Union affirmed its full support for the Palestinian people in their legitimate struggle against the Israeli racist colonial occupation. The Union supported the request of the Palestinian President to the Secretary-General of the United Nations to work on an international plan to end the occupation of the territory of the State of Palestine. The African Union supports the direction of the State of Palestine regarding the renewal of its application for full membership in the United Nations, and calls on all countries to accept this membership, and supports accession to international organizations and conventions. As for the recent African summit, Israeli practices were reflected in its atmosphere before and during its convening. The Commission preceded the summit’s work by issuing a statement about it, stipulating the participation of only the observer members of the Union, which amounted to 87 members. The 135 ambassadors accredited to the host country of Ethiopia, including Israel, did not participate. Israel took advantage of this to try to participate in 2023 and 2024 but was expelled.
These developments were also reflected in the summit’s final communiqué, which was influenced by the tragic situation in Gaza, the genocide committed by Israel there, and the attempted forced displacements announced by both Netanyahu and Trump.
Therefore, the most important items of the resolution on Palestine at the summit were as follows:
Full support for the Palestinian people, represented by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), under the leadership of President Mahmoud Abbas, in their legitimate struggle against the racist Israeli colonial occupation to restore their legitimate and inalienable rights, foremost among which are the right to self-determination, independence, the return of refugees, and the establishment of an independent and sovereign State of Palestine, with East Jerusalem as its capital, living in peace side by side with the State of Israel (Preamble). Urge all AU Member States to continue to provide support to the Palestinian cause in order to ensure the implementation of the noble values and principles on which the OAU/AU was founded, the most important of which is support for liberation movements and the right of peoples to self-determination, and to refrain from any action or orientation that would prejudice the constants of solidarity with the Palestinian cause and the rights of the Palestinian people (Preamble). To request the Member States of the African Union to cease all direct and indirect commercial, scientific, and cultural exchanges with Israel in accordance with the resolutions of both the international community and the African Union (item 17). Support ongoing African efforts in support of the Palestinian people (support for South Africa), in particular the submission of its legal investigation to the International Court of Justice to request an advisory opinion on the legal consequences of Israel’s continued violation of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, prolonged occupation, settlement, and annexation of Palestinian territories (Article 19). Urgently and immediately implement the provisional measures ordered by the International Court of Justice on January 26, 2024, regarding the request made by South Africa against Israel in relation to the ongoing conflict in the Gaza Strip, which affirms universal respect for international law and the urgent need for Israel to comply immediately with its obligations under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Article 21). Political, economic, and financial support for the State of Palestine (item 7). Condemn the Israeli colonial policies, which are reflected in the practices of collective punishment against civilians, foremost of which is the genocide committed by the Israeli aggression on the Gaza Strip and the attempts to forcibly displace its population to the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula, as these policies constitute war crimes that require international accountability (Article 3). Several things should be noted here:
Support for the Palestinian people and cause does not mean supporting Hamas, but supporting the Palestinian people represented by the PLO and Abu Mazen, according to the preamble to the resolution. This may make the statement somewhat disconnected from reality, given the lack of a tangible role for the PA in the course of affairs in Gaza since the Al-Aqsa flood. On the other hand, the statement excluded Hamas, despite it being a national liberation movement, which is a violation of African charters, particularly the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, which is based on supporting national liberation movements in the face of occupation and colonialism. Africans’ condemnation of Israel does not mean stopping normalization with it, but Article 17 calls for the cessation of all direct and indirect trade, scientific, and cultural exchanges. However, it does not specify how countries will abide by it, who will follow the implementation process, and how accountability and accountability will take place. This may be one of the tasks entrusted to the new head of the Commission. Article 3 on political, economic, and financial support to Israel does not specify the nature of such support. Despite the issuance of official statements supporting the Palestinian cause and condemning Israeli violations, there are still practical African differences regarding the Al-Aqsa flood operation, as three positions were distinguished at the time:
First: Pro-Palestine countries, led by South Africa, which stressed that the cause of the conflict is the illegal occupation, and demanded a two-state solution, and the opening of safe corridors. They linked Hamas as a resistance movement and the national liberation movement in South Africa against the apartheid regime. The South African Anglican Church even considered Israel an apartheid state.
Countries supporting the Al-Aqsa flood:
Country – Justification for the situation South Africa – Rejection of the racist regime and the right of resistance to self-defense Algeria – Rejection of normalization Morocco – Rejection of Israel’s practices Libya – Rejection of normalization Tunisia – Rejection of normalization Somalia – Rejection of normalization Djibouti – Declared its support for the Palestinians Mauritania – It has relations with Israel but blamed it for what is happening recently and refused to grant it observer status in the African Union. Comoros – It has relations with Israel but has refused to grant it observer status in the African Union.
- Compilation of the researcher from different sources.
Second, pro-Israel states include Cameroon, Ghana, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, and Rwanda, mostly for reasons related to the desire to maintain close relations with the United States and Israel simultaneously.
Pro-Israel countries in the Al-Aqsa Flood:
Country – Justification for the situation Cameroon – Paul Biya’s position. The Cameroonian government still refuses to recognize the existence of a Palestinian state. Kenya – Support at the beginning. The United States made Kenya’s support for Israel’s political and commercial interests one of the terms of the trade deal with Nairobi, which is a Western-backed ally with continued support from Washington. A balanced position after that due to popular pressure on President Ruto. Ghana – It is looking with the West for funding for various projects related to the economy and infrastructure, in addition to the Accra Counter-Terrorism Initiative that extends from the Sahel to the Gulf of Guinea coast countries, such as Benin, Ivory Coast, and Togo. Rwanda – One of the countries that have supported Israel in recent years. Together with the Democratic Republic of Congo, it played a role in 2021 to facilitate the process of recognizing Israel and granting it observer status within the African Union. Democratic Republic of the Congo – Strong relations with Tel Aviv.
- Compilation of the researcher from different sources.
Third: Neutral countries, including Nigeria, Senegal, and Chad, which demand a cessation of hostilities and dialogue to reach a two-state solution.
Neutral countries in the Al-Aqsa flood: Stop violence on both sides and two-state solution
Country – Justification for the situation Uganda – In 2021, Uganda exported fish fillets, coffee plants, and perfumes to Israel. Ugandan police forces purchased mobile phone hacking technology from an Israeli company in 2022, and the Ugandan government signed a memorandum of understanding with the Israeli Ministry of Defense on defense. Nigeria – Nigeria ranks second only to South Africa in terms of trade with Israel in sub-Saharan Africa, with trade volumes ranging between 200millionand200millionand250 million annually. Chad – Since the beginning of the Al-Aqsa flood, it has merely condemned the loss of innocent civilian lives, called for a ceasefire, and sought a lasting solution to the Palestinian question. Note: Déby Jr., who came to power in Chad after his father’s death, pledged military and Western support and has stated that his country will open an embassy in Tel Aviv to strengthen bilateral ties with Israel. Senegal – Chairman of the Committee on Palestinian Rights at the United Nations. I voted against condemning Hamas at the UN.
- Compilation of the researcher from different sources.
Second: The Sudan issue is an African issue
Given the seriousness of the developments in Sudan, their regional complexities, and their negative effects on the region, this file was discussed as an African issue and not as an Arab issue, along with the Democratic Republic of the Congo at the last summit. A special session of the Peace and Security Council at the presidential level was dedicated to discussing this matter. The sensitivity of the situation and the existence of regional division seem to have made it difficult to issue a final statement from the meetings. However, two days later, the commissioner of the African Peace and Security Council, Bankole Adeoli, held a special session to clarify some points about the conflict in Sudan and elsewhere. Regarding Sudan, the position was as follows:
Calling on the parties in Sudan, the army and the Rapid Support, to stop the will of bloodshed in preparation for the resumption of the political process. Consider the recent roadmap put forward by the transitional government in Sudan affiliated with the military, while stressing the importance of its inclusiveness, which implies the need for the participation of the Rapid Support Forces. Linking the issue of Sudan’s return to membership in the African Union to taking clear steps towards a democratic and constitutional political transition. This is because Sudan’s membership was suspended following Al-Burhan’s actions on October 25, 2021, when he dissolved the Sovereign Council and the Council of Ministers, Hamdok’s government, and imposed a state of emergency in the country. The Union considered this a coup, while Al-Burhan rejected the African characterization and called his decisions corrective measures imposed by the circumstances of the stage. The AU roadmap includes an unconditional ceasefire, facilitating humanitarian access, protecting civilians, and launching an inclusive political process that paves the way for the formation of a civilian government. However, Burhan insists that Sudan will not respond to any African initiative unless it is a member of the African organization.
This was confirmed by Al-Burhan again after the statements of the peace and security official. He rejected the map of both the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to stop the war in Sudan and expressed his anger at the participation of former Prime Minister Abdullah Hamdok in the work of the summit. He announced his rejection of what he called “attempts to impose a government from abroad,” stressing: “As long as we exist and the Sudanese people exist, we will not be ruled by any of those who roam abroad.”
In January 2024, Al-Burhan suspended his country’s membership in IGAD after allowing the participation of the commander of the Rapid Support Forces, Hemedti, in an extraordinary summit held in Uganda. He linked his country’s return to the organization to its apology for that and rejected the IGAD roadmap plan since the outbreak of the war more than two years ago when it announced the existence of a constitutional vacuum in Sudan, which requires the deployment of forces from the East African region.
Third: African Arabs at the head of the Commission
According to the principle of regional rotation adopted by the Union in 2018 and entered into force in 2021, this system was applied to the positions of President of the Commission (East Africa) and Vice-President (North Africa). The competition for the post of President was limited to three candidates: the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Djibouti, Mahmoud Ali Youssef, who rejected normalization and giving Israel observer status, former Kenyan Prime Minister Raila Odinga, who supported normalization and granting Israel observer status in the Union if he wins, and the Minister of Finance of Madagascar, Richard Wandrea, who also favored normalization.
Youssef’s campaign received broad support from African member states of the Arab League, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and the Francophone Bloc. After seven rounds of voting, he was able to secure the position in his favor with 33 votes (the two-thirds majority needed to win), while Madagascar’s pro-Israel candidate exited the first sessions.
The results of the vote indicate two things:
First, Africans are not racists, and they view the North as part of the continent, not according to the previous racist view that the North is an Arab Muslim in the face of Christian South Africa. This view was promoted by the Kenyan media before the elections, which argued that in no way should an Arab Muslim reach the highest leadership position in the African organization. They also tried to promote Yusuf’s withdrawal from the elections before they began, which did not happen. Second, rejecting the Zionist and American hegemony over the continent, represented by the character of Raila Odinga and his and his country’s close relations with Israel and the United States. It seems that the flagrant Israeli violations in Gaza, the unlimited American support for it, as well as the rejection of American hegemony by many African countries, were among the reasons for directing the vote towards Mahmoud Yousef. Despite the continued presence of a pro-Israel team within the Union, it seems that their voices have been somewhat dimmed due to Israel’s inhumane practices in Gaza. As for the position of vice-president of the commission, it was also limited to North Africa, where the competition was between four candidates from Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, and Libya. The Algerian candidate, Algeria’s ambassador to Ethiopia, Salma Malika Haddadi, was able to settle the matter in her favor. Algeria is known for its rejection of normalization and granting Israel observer status in the Union.
Challenges of Arab-African Relations: A Future Outlook
The Commission is the principal executive organ of the African Union and is responsible for implementing the policies and decisions adopted by the Assembly of the Union (Heads of State and Government) and the Executive Council (Ministers of Member States). It also acts as the General Secretariat of the African Union and plays essential roles in support of the objectives of the Union. The most prominent tasks include implementing decisions, coordinating activities and developing policies, promoting African integration, promoting African interests, managing administrative and financial affairs, promoting human rights and democracy, and managing crises and conflicts.
African heads of state have realized the importance of the position of head of the Commission because it reflects not only the interests of the continent but also the foreign policy of the country he represents, in violation of the Charter of the Union. However, this is what is happening on the ground or at least during the past period. There are many examples, including the adoption in 2016 by the former Chairperson of the African Commission, Dlamini Zuma, of the right of the Saharan people to self-determination, which may lead to secession. She stressed at the African Union Summit in Ethiopia in January 2016 that African countries owe the Sahrawi people to work to organize a referendum on self-determination because that was a promise. This was confirmed at the time by the President of the Summit, Robert Mugabe, President of Zimbabwe, who said in his editorial: “We still have the question of Western Sahara, which is a debt that we have to pay to its people, and the question remains: when will we pay this debt? When will we decide on the independence of the Saharawi people?”
This adoption occurred despite the fact that 28 EU countries – half of the member states – signed a request to suspend the Sahrawi Republic’s membership in order to facilitate Morocco’s return to the Union.
This stance was repeated again with the outgoing Commission chairman, Moussa Faki, adopting the idea of Israel becoming an observer in the EU in 2021, and candidate Odinga adopting the same position as well.
It is true that such requests of the President of the Commission cannot be decided by a direct decision of the Commission, but he may be able to direct both the Executive Council and the Conference of Heads of State on them, as he is primarily responsible for the agenda presented to both. This may lead to the belief that Arab issues such as Palestine, as well as Arab-African cooperation and the rejection of external interference in the affairs of the continent, are at the forefront of the African agenda during the next four years of Youssef’s first term. However, this matter may also face several obstacles, especially from the camp supporting Israel and the West, which will play on the card that the head of the Commission is trying to paint an Arab-Muslim racist character on the black continent.
Hence, it may be necessary to unify Arab visions and overcome Arab-Arab differences, which are reflected in cooperation with the African continent. Here, the traditional dispute between Algeria and Morocco as two African-Arab countries on the issue of the Sahara and the Polisario issue and the extent of its recognition emerges. This dispute contributed not only to the non-holding of the last Arab-African summit in Riyadh in 2023 but also to the weakening of these summits once held, as happened in the fourth summit hosted by Equatorial Guinea in 2016. It failed due to the presence of a flag of the Sahrawi Republic despite the absence of its representatives, and the withdrawal of 8 Arab countries, including the six Gulf states, except Kuwait, as well as Yemen, Jordan, and Morocco.
Indeed, it is noted that these Arab disparities have gone beyond that to the corridors of infrastructure within the African Union, where the competition between Morocco and Algeria for membership of the Peace and Security Council this year postponed the decision, although the other four regions chose their candidates.
The Polisario issue, which is seen as an African-Arab issue, is still a stumbling block to the summits of Arab-African cooperation in light of the presence of two divided Arab axes on it. The first includes Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, Jordan, Yemen, Somalia, and Kuwait and is supportive of Morocco’s position on not recognizing the Polisario state, which is also not recognized by the United Nations and the Arab League. This is in contrast to the other party led by Algeria, which recognizes it as a member state of the African Union and, before it, the Organization of African Unity. In other words, the representation of the Polisario is settled in Africa, as it is a member of the African Union, while it is not decided by the Arab Union, which may hinder the holding of African summits.
In this context, the countries rejecting the Polisario submit a proposal that cooperation between the League of Arab States and the African Union should be limited to the member states of the United Nations, in compliance with the principle of the territorial sovereignty of states and what was stated in the declaration of April 20, 2016, issued by the first Moroccan-Gulf summit in Riyadh, which affirmed the same meaning. The other party rejects this proposal.
Therefore, the question remains: How long will both the Arab/African sides remain unable or unwilling to achieve common interests and obstruct the dream of the possibility of merging the two entities, Arab and African, within the framework of what is known as the Afro-Arab or African framework? This was called for by the late African Muslim scholar, Ali Mazrouei, who believes that rapprochement between the two sides is a reality due to the presence of non-African Arab countries such as Yemen that are closer to the continent than African countries such as Mauritius. On the other hand, he believes that the Arab Gulf countries are closer to Africa than it is to non-Arab Asian countries.
The Gaza war made the countries supporting Israel temporarily forget their differences and stand united with them, in exchange for an Arab-Arab difference, which was reflected in rapprochement with Africa, in exchange for a practical African difference on Palestine. Thus, the Arab-African divergence has become the master of the situation so far.
In conclusion, it can be said that there are a set of requirements to activate joint Arab-African action during the coming period and to take advantage of the opportunity of an African/Arab figure at the top of the administrative pyramid of the African Union. The most notable requirements are as follows:
Political conviction provides the necessity and inevitability of joint Arab-African action in deed rather than words, in light of the process of dismantling the Arab regime on the one hand and the economic invasion of Africa by emerging economic countries such as China and Turkey, as well as Israel, on the other hand. Achieving unity within each party after internal disagreements, not to mention inter-regional crises, almost ravaged them. Perhaps one of the most important issues that must be resolved is the position on the Sahara issue at the Arab level. The need for leading countries for this joint action and pushing in this context, especially after the absence of Gaddafi and the preoccupation of Egypt, as well as most North African countries, with their internal issues. Activating the institutional mechanisms of each of them (the university and the union) and adhering to what is issued by these two institutions in deed, not in words, and avoiding individualism, especially if they contradict the positions of these institutions. Not only that, but the Arab political systems, in particular, are required not to think superficially in their relationship with Africa and the need to involve elites, research centers, or even peoples in the formulation of this relationship, especially after it became clear that many decisions are based on whims and psychology and not on objective considerations. This makes this relationship always in the wind. Improving the mental image of both, avoiding negative aspects and irresponsible behavior, especially in the media, particularly in the sports field, and trying to distinguish within African sports championships between North and Southern Africa. The need to activate the Arab-African Cooperation Committee, which is the joint committee that can play an active role in the Palestinian cause. The need to hold the fifth Arab-African summit at the earliest opportunity and to search for issues of cooperation first and to distance controversial issues aside or deliberately ignore them until such as the issue of the Renaissance Dam and others.
References
1- This term in the political literature means the relations between the 12 Arab-Asian countries that are members of the League of Arab States, and the 54 countries of the African continent, both Arab and African. Therefore, the 10 Arab countries located in Africa, namely the North African countries starting with Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania and then the eastern countries, namely Sudan, Djibouti, and Somalia, are seen as African countries when talking about relations with the rest of the African countries. Therefore, it is also wrong to divide the African continent into North African Arab countries and sub-Saharan African countries, because this is a colonial division that discriminates and stirs up strife between the two sides, and therefore any relations between the member states of the African Union fall within the framework of African relations, even if one of its parties is any of the ten countries mentioned earlier. This is the case within the framework of international organizations such as the United Nations, which divides the continent geographically and not culturally into five regions, including North Africa, which includes 6 Arab countries, and East Africa, which includes 4 Arab countries.
On the concept of Arab-African relations, see: Odeh, Abdel Malik: A Future Strategic Outlook for Arab-African Relations in Zarnuqa, Salah (ed.): Arabs and Africa in the Post-Cold War Phase (Cairo: Center for Studies and Research of Developing Countries, Faculty of Economics, Cairo University, Development Issues Series, No. 18, 2002), p. 133.
2- For more details, see: Israeli Foreign Ministry website (accessed February 19, 2025), https://n9.cl/u7wgj
3- Declaration of the African Summit 18-19 February 2023 on the Situation in Palestine and the Middle East, Thirty-sixth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union in Addis Ababa Assembly/AU/Decl.2(XXXVI)
4- The African Union issues a statement on Israel’s participation in its summit this month, Al Jazeera Net, February 4, 2025 (accessed February 19, 2025), https://2u.pw/uakPW7da
5- Draft Declaration on the Situation in Palestine and the Middle East, 16 February 2025, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia – Thirty-eighth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union, Assembly/AU/Draft/Decl.6(XXXVIII)
6. On these positions, see:
Shafei, Badr Hassan, The story of the postponed summit between Arabs and Africa, Al Jazeera Net, November 22, 2023 (accessed February 19, 2025), https://2u.pw/ZWbpXOhn
7- Press Briefing by AU Commissioner Political Affairs Peace and Security. (visited,19 Feb,2025) https://2u.pw/CNkC2q3I
8- Al-Nour, Ahmed Al-Nour, Steps separating Sudan from returning to the African House, Al-Jazeera Net, October 16, 2024 (accessed February 19, 2025), https://2u.pw/r6xqIUDz
9- Ahmed Younis, a fiery attack to demonstrate the “interference” of the African Union and IGAD in the affairs of Sudan. Declared his rejection of any government from abroad and the return of Hamdok, Asharq Al-Awsat London, February 17, 2025 (accessed: February 19, 2025),
10- Al-Nour Ahmed Al-Nour, previous reference.
11. For more details on these amendments and the electoral system, see: 2025 African Union Commission Elections,
African Union Commission Elections 2025, African Union Website,. (visited,19 Feb,2025) https://2u.pw/xeA1XbFN
12- African leaders affirm: Western Sahara’s lack of independence is a shame on the continent, Al-Massae, January 31, 2016 (accessed February 19, 2025), https://2u.pw/7wtL8xkp
13- Morocco thanks the countries that adhered to the rules of the Arab-African partnership at the Malabo summit, Mauritanian National Harmony News Agency, November 26, 2026 (accessed February 19, 2025), https://2u.pw/1jFixbgT
14. On some of these measures, see:
Shafei, Badr Hassan, Malabo Summit and the Future of Arab-African Relations, Al Jazeera Center for Studies, December 4, 2016 (accessed February 19, 2025), https://2u.pw/qdMc3Ofh
15- African Presence in Arab Countries’ Strategies: Reality, Challenges and Prospects, Mashhad 2024, July 23, 2015 (accessed February 19, 2025), https://2u.pw/TSjDzAJd
