Africa: Chronic Challenges and Increasing Risks

Introduction

Africa faces serious challenges that could exacerbate the vulnerability of populations and communities in the near future, threatening resilience and food security. These challenges encompass conflicts, disasters, natural resource degradation, illegal immigration, and more. The severity of these issues is heightened by inappropriate policies, rapid population growth, and climate change. Therefore, it has become urgent to consider a broader conference that presents this vision, facilitates discussion, and leads to proposals aimed at understanding, disaggregating, and analyzing the situation in Africa, ultimately considering ways to mitigate the risks facing the continent.

Illegal Immigration and Africa

Forced Migration: Why Is It Considered a Structural Threat to Africa?

When discussing irregular immigration, or illegal migration, and the related concepts and indicators, Western theoretical approaches view it as a hindrance to building international peace and security. In Africa, the rise of illegal immigration can be considered a structural threat to the continent. It represents a form of soft strategic threat that can reshape the African landscape, even though all international laws and regulations recognize freedom of movement and residence as civil and political rights endorsed by the international community.

Global reports citing high global risks identify illegal immigration as one of the most significant threats, alongside cybercrime, climate change, and issues of security and international competition that have made Africa a fragile region for the clash of regional and international wills. The international risk report released in 2022 noted that the victims of irregular migration exceeded 4,800 in 2021, and the number of refugees could surpass two hundred million by 2050 due solely to environmental displacement.

Conceptual Framework: Roots, Theories, Prejudice, and the Conceptualization Dilemma

Migration is a geographical phenomenon reflecting a demographic dynamic manifesting as the movement of populations from one place to another, wherein individuals or groups move from one country to another without legal permission from the destination country, intending to work or reside temporarily or permanently. The International Labour Organization defines illegal immigration as: “Migration that violates the conditions outlined by international treaties and national laws.” On this basis, illegal immigrants refer to individuals who:

1. Cross borders illegally and covertly from imposed surveillance.
2. Have authorization to work under a contract but violate that contract by engaging in unauthorized work or actions sanctioned by local law.
3. Enter a country’s territory legally on a residence permit but exceed their allowed stay, resulting in illegal status.

Unauthorized migration is also defined as the movement from the homeland to the host country for continuous residence in violation of immigration regulations between states, according to both domestic and international law.

Migration studies have emerged as significant research areas in the 21st century, with notable early pioneers such as Ernst George Ravenstein in his book “Laws of Migration,” who is considered a founding father of modern migration thought, along with William Thomas in his reference book “The Polish Peasant in Europe and America” and Florian Znaniecki. The early research on migration emerged in the latter half of the 20th century, particularly during the last third, a period when migration had burgeoned into an international issue, especially with the rise of illegal migration.

The concept of illegal migration is intertwined with several other concepts, ranging from the illegal perspective to the most extreme form of migration reflected in asylum seeking — a representation of individuals fleeing the horrors of death and murder due to their religion, color, or political or religious affiliations. In light of this perspective, researchers may find it challenging to distinguish between refugees and irregular migrants. In line with global human migration dynamics, the United Nations has designated an “International Day” for migration each year, theoretically advocating for the right to migrate and linking it to major development indicators. In 2020, there were more than 281 million international migrants and over 59 million internally displaced persons by the end of 2021.

Every December 18, the world celebrates the International Migrants Day, a day dedicated to recognizing the significant contributions of migrants, with a special emphasis on the challenges they face. According to the International Organization for Migration, there were 281 million migrants globally in 2020, equating to 3.6% of the world’s population. This marks an increase of more than threefold compared to the figure of 84 million migrants recorded in 1970.

Among these migrants, who are considered among the most marginalized and vulnerable groups worldwide, the United Nations estimates that there are about 146 million males and 135 million females. In recent years, conflicts in various regions, alongside a lack of security and the impacts of climate change, have fueled an increase in “forced migration.”

Illegal Migration in Africa: The Threat Dilemma

The share of migrants in Europe and Asia accounts for 61% of the total number of global migrants, with around 87 million in Europe and 86 million in Asia. North America ranks next to Europe and Asia in hosting migrants, accounting for 20.9% of the total, followed by Africa at about 9%, and then Latin America and the Caribbean and Oceania.

According to the International Organization for Migration, irregular migration in Africa represents a strategy to support livelihoods and reduce poverty in Sub-Saharan African communities. Climate change, natural disasters, and political crises in African nations have driven large numbers of African migrants to cross into other countries for a better life. Increasing political persecution, ethnic cleansing, human rights violations, and political instability in Sub-Saharan countries contribute to African migration towards Europe. Africa is viewed as a continent of migration, displacement, failed states, corruption, resource exploitation, and political repression, leading to increasing migration to Europe in the future.

Moreover, illegal migration is becoming a more deadly threat to Africa’s stability due to the recruitment of African mercenary networks by terrorist groups for armed conflict and arms trafficking. For example, in northern Mali, extremist movements represent a center for recruiting Africans in this area stretching northward to the borders of Algeria. While it’s impossible to definitively assert a direct link between the Wagner Group or Rapid Support Forces and the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad, or the Unity and Jihad Organization and the Ansar Dine Group and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, there are groups of former fighters who were mercenaries in Libya and belong to northern Mali that have engaged in criminal activities, becoming highwaymen or organized gangs crossing borders. Over time, they have become targets for recruitment by warring parties in African countries, forming an organized crime group involved in illegal migration.

Some reports indicate that these groups operate in the African Sahel and in areas like:

1. The Kidal region: located in northeastern Mali in the heart of the Sahara, bordering Niger and Algeria, it serves as the starting point for routes to southwest Libya and northern Niger and Chad.
2. Gao city: which hosts extremist Islamic organizations that continue to attract youth. This medium-sized city lies along the Niger River in northeastern Mali.
3. The northern Mali region, including areas around the historical capital, Timbuktu.

These regions in northern Mali are characterized by a lack of state authority and the presence of extremist movements classified as terrorist, where military operations by the Algerian army and, formerly, French air coverage, alongside troops from various countries, have been monitoring these movements. Additionally, there are artisanal gold mining areas in the north (Tawdeni, Gao, the Ménaka Basin, and the Ménaka Basin in the far northeast), alongside regions in central Mali. As informal mining persists—from local residents working in mineral exploration—mercenary recruitment takes place in these locations, and the Sahel’s soft regions provide avenues for engagement and communication with radical groups. The main routes associated with these activities are:

First: Routes from Chad through several land pathways, primarily traditional routes through border crossings or migrant trails, including areas like Umm Taiman on the border of Sudan’s West Darfur state and a pathway from the Wadi area and Ashi city to the Adre area, then to West Darfur in Sudan. There is a route heading north into the edges of the Chadian desert then to Northern Darfur state in Sudan, with a pathway from southeast Chad across the Central African Republic, and another route from the north through the desert from northern Chad to northern Sudan along the Wadi Hour.

Second: The main route coming from Niger and Mali and other West African countries cuts through southern Libya via the Tibesti Mountains and regions populated by Toubou tribes, serving as a desert passage across the Sahara up to the border with Sudan.

On the other hand, statistics indicate that the rates of displacement and asylum among Africans within Africa are multiples of irregular migration toward European countries. Over time, many African countries have transformed into nations of stability rather than refuge or transit countries, thus creating a contentious issue between international human rights organizations and affected states. This dynamic has led to political tensions between international agencies and several North African states, particularly Tunisia and Libya. Despite this, European fears about what they perceive as an impending African influx that may alter the demographic makeup of Europe are mounting. This anxiety feeds populist currents in Europe from the far right and conservative factions, which have managed to augment their electoral power even in historically humanitarian asylum nations like Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway, to say nothing of the extremist sentiments rejecting the Africanization of Europe, especially in former colonial countries, particularly France.

European apprehensions appear exaggerated; the numbers of African migration within the continent— as previously noted—far exceed those towards Europe and America. For instance, over a million Sudanese have been displaced within Sudan and to neighboring countries, with over 90,000 Sudanese refugees recorded in Chad following the outbreak of conflict, while there are approximately 21,472 African migrants reported in Tunis, and over 13 regions in Algeria engaging in illegal activities despite Algeria’s stringent legal regulations. Some statistics estimate that around 100,000 Africans reside in Morocco, and those who have lived in Libya for decades face the risk of forced displacement and exploitation in conflict, with their numbers exceeding 700,000, many of whom live under special circumstances during Qaddafi’s regime. Simultaneously, the International Organization for Migration reported in a recent report that “3,789 people lost their lives along migration routes in 2022,” indicating that “this number is the highest since 2017,” at which time 4,255 deaths were recorded. Moreover, “more than half of all recorded deaths globally among migrants took place in the Mediterranean and North Africa.” The same report highlighted “203 deaths recorded along the land routes in North Africa—particularly during perilous crossings of the Sahara—while another 825 deaths occurred on migration routes in the Middle East. Libya recorded the highest number of land deaths in North Africa, with 117 fatalities, followed by Algeria with 54, then Morocco (13), Tunisia (10), and Egypt (9) among migrants. Libya remains one of the most targeted countries by migrants, especially Africans, seeking to reach Europe, fleeing the tough living conditions in their countries.

Furthermore, Spanish newspaper “El País” noted that over 14,000 migrants arrived in European countries since early 2023, a figure that means the number of migrants arriving in the same period from 2022 has tripled. Consequently, the Italian Prime Minister has approved some measures to contain this phenomenon, such as increasing penalties for those working with human trafficking networks and maritime smuggling. The newspaper noted that authorities rescued 800 migrants from a fishing boat, and according to the Italian Coast Guard, rescue missions are described as “complex” due to the crowding on board. According to information provided by the Coast Guard, beyond these operations, around 2,000 migrants were rescued from Friday to Sunday, in what they described as “a large number of rescue operations.”

The Center for African Strategic Studies emphasizes the following:

1. Most African migration remains within the continent, representing a consistent pattern over a long period. Approximately 21 million documented Africans reside in another African country, a number likely less than the actual figure since many African countries do not document cases of migration. Urban areas in Nigeria, South Africa, and Egypt are the primary destinations for this migration among Africans, reflecting the relative economic dynamism of these areas.
2. Among the African migrants who left the continent, nearly 11 million live in Europe, around 5 million in the Middle East, and over 3 million in North America.
3. The African continent faces a faster rate of natural disaster events compared to the rest of the world; it confronts numerous natural instability factors ranging from droughts, floods, hurricanes, and epidemics.
4. The World Bank predicts that by 2050 there will be 86 million migrants due to climate change in Africa. About 18 million seasonal migrant workers in Africa may find their jobs in agriculture, mining, and fishing disappearing, increasing the likelihood of permanent migration in search of new job opportunities. Around 30% of citizens in West and Central Africa and Ethiopians reported environmental impacts on their economic conditions.
5. Another study regarding African migration reveals that most migration cases head towards economic hubs in Africa, a pattern anticipated to continue with increasing regional economic integration processes.
6. The rate of irregular migration is rising owing to the exacerbating poverty crisis in Africa and the insecurity prevailing particularly in West Africa and the Sahel region, as well as the collapse of citizens’ purchasing power, aggravated by the global COVID-19 pandemic and its humanitarian consequences, as irregular migration rates from West Africa increased by approximately 30% during 2022.
7. On another side, unemployment rates in Africa are rising alarmingly, reaching over 40% in some countries amid a decline in the annual growth rate in the continent from 4.1% in 2021 to 3.3% in 2022 due to the pandemic, climate change-induced droughts, terrorism, civil wars, and political transformations in most African countries.

Africa is considered the second deadliest region for displaced persons (after the Mediterranean), and irregular migration commonly traverses the southern route of the continent through a complex network of traffickers and traders engaged in perilous smuggling operations while evading detection by authorities, thereby putting migrants’ lives at great risk, as confirmed by the United Nations on its official website on December 13, 2022. The International Organization for Migration’s Missing Migrants Project documented cases of over 5,600 deaths and disappearances of people crossing the Sahara since 2014, with 149 death cases recorded up to December 13, 2022, while 110 deaths among migrants in Chad were recorded between 2014 to mid-2021.

Geographically, irregular migrants from the African Sahel and Sahara utilize all available routes and means to reach North Africa and Europe. Field studies on the phenomenon demonstrate that journeys across the desert occur in multiple stages, lasting anywhere from a month to several years. Despite the closure of land borders between Morocco and Algeria since 1994, a significant number of irregular migrants cross daily with the assistance of specialized criminal networks. Consequently, these migrants revive ancient trade routes traversing the Sahara cities at a rate of 60,000 to 80,000 migrants annually, from Gao in Mali, Agadez in Niger, and Abéché in Chad to Tamanrasset in Algeria, and Sirte and Sebha in Libya.

Migration specialists in the region estimate that transit countries or wait rooms have begun to lean towards becoming final destination countries, with the likelihood of permanent settlement increasing for sub-Saharan Africans in North African countries, particularly in Libya (70 to 80%) and Algeria (20 to 30%). For instance, the population of Tamanrasset in Algeria was approximately 3,000 in 1966, but by 1998, this figure soared to about 65,000, among whom approximately 49,000 were residents from Sub-Saharan African nationalities. Over two decades, the region has morphed into a cheap market for trafficking children and women for sexual exploitation and cheap labor, and these children are increasingly recruited into armed conflicts and engage in smuggling across the Sahel. Many studies indicate that child trafficking typically aims for Europe and Gulf countries, commencing from Sub-Saharan regions via Algeria and Mauritania, or through the Morocco-Spain route. Traffickers operate along the Algeria-Mali route, then to Tunisia, with Italy or France as the end destination, with some reports estimating the cost of trafficking a child in these regions between $10,000 to $20,000, and $50,000 for a woman. Annually, between 3,800 to 5,000 women and girls are trafficked from West Africa to Europe, generating profits valued in millions of dollars for traffickers in the area.

Irregular Migration at the Heart of European-African Political Debates: Tensions and Extortion

Political discussions and tensions are escalating, often reaching bargaining degrees between North African states and Europe, particularly between Italy and Tunisia lately, with Tunisia being accused of a hostile approach towards Africans. Tunisian authorities announced that their naval forces thwarted 501 border-crossing attempts and rescued 14,406 migrants, the vast majority of whom were from sub-Saharan African countries, during the first quarter of this year, a fivefold increase compared to the same period in 2022. Sixty-three individuals involved in illegal migration mediation have been arrested. Statistics indicate that the number of African migrants in Tunisia has exceeded 150,000, with only 20,000 in the city of Sfax.

Western nations view the growing threat of crises as a danger that must be confronted, perceiving Africa as a risk to be overshadowed through strategies that do not address problems but rather recycle crises. The 2021 Global Report by Human Rights Watch stated that the European Union’s efforts to combat irregular migration include the following points:

1. Continuing cooperation with the coast guard forces of North African countries, along with training and other support forms to intercept thousands of migrants.
2. The European Union governments agreed to avoid the Irini patrol vessels from monitoring areas in the Mediterranean where they might need to deal with migrant boats calling for rescue.
3. Ongoing European cooperation with North African authorities, particularly Libyan authorities, to halt departure attempts and ensure the repatriation of those intercepted at sea.
4. Cooperation with African countries that are sources of migrants.

A special meeting of the European Council called for an international summit to discuss migration issues with key African countries involved. The summit took place in Valletta, Malta, in November 2015. The heads of European and African states and governments met in an attempt to enhance cooperation and tackle the current challenges and opportunities posed by migration between the two regions. European and African leaders adopted a political declaration expressing their shared concern regarding the sharp increase in flows of refugees, asylum seekers, and irregular migrants from Africa to Europe, and the necessity to manage migration flows from all perspectives. This political declaration was complemented by a joint action plan based on five priority areas:

Firstly, addressing the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement, including investment in development, poverty eradication, and tackling instability and crises.

Secondly, enhancing collaboration in legal migration and mobility, through encouraging regular migration channels from and between European and African countries.

Thirdly, enhancing the protection of refugees and other displaced persons by supporting the long-term integration of refugees and the displaced in host communities, boosting the capacities of first asylum, transit, and destination countries, and enhancing humanitarian assistance efforts in countries most affected by forced displacement.

Fourthly, preventing and combating irregular migration, migrant smuggling, and human trafficking, including the formulation and implementation of appropriate legislative and institutional frameworks, improving intelligence gathering and sharing, combating corruption, providing information about legal migration opportunities and the risks of irregular migration, and improving border management systems at both regional and national levels.

Fifthly, promoting the return of irregular migrants who do not require international protection, either from EU member states or from affiliated countries or from African transit and destination countries, while ensuring their sustainable acceptance and reintegration.

To support the implementation of this joint action plan, a fund for emergency stability and addressing the root causes of irregular migration and displacement in Africa was established. This fund aims to enhance stability and contribute to better migration management. More specifically, it seeks to tackle the root causes of instability and forced displacement and irregular migration through creating equitable opportunities in the economy, security, and development. However, this effort has not received much attention from the European Union, which has rendered it ineffective against irregular migration.

The Western Stance on Migration and Asylum Issues: The Ascendancy of Security Approaches

On one hand, 2015 registered the highest percentage of arrivals of refugees—around 1,015,307 according to UNHCR statistics—approximately 3,771 of whom lost their lives. On another hand, terrorist attacks occurred in Paris on November 13, 2015, posing a significant challenge for European Union nations in addressing this issue and raising many questions about what role they should play amidst this crisis, and whether they should prioritize security or humanitarian considerations and shared human values. Moreover, why do Western nations seek to transform North African countries into gatekeepers against the evils of asylum and migration under the new populist European vision?

In this regard, three important issues regarding the migration and asylum file in the European Union can be highlighted:

1. The First Issue: The perception of migration and asylum issues within Europe transitioned from viewing them predominantly as economic issues to treating them as primarily security and political concerns. This shift has put the European Union and its member states in a predicament between the desire to prevent and restrict asylum applications and respecting the core values upon which the Union was founded, namely human rights.
2. The Second Issue: The handling of migration and asylum is based on individual policies of European states, meaning there is no unified EU policy regarding decision-making to manage this issue. This explains the institutional legal conflicts between first reception countries based on geographical positions (e.g., Spain, Italy, Greece, Cyprus, and Malta) and northern states such as France, the UK, Germany, Austria, etc. The EU plan ideally stems from the principle of shared responsibility among all member states in managing this crisis without imposing the burden on any single country. This principle is frequently championed by countries carrying the heaviest burden of receiving refugees, particularly Germany and Sweden, alongside bordering countries that represent the first point of arrival for refugees to the continent, namely Italy, Greece, and Malta. These states call for all EU countries to share the financial, military, and absorptive burdens. It is worth noting that some countries argued that their financial and economic situations do not allow them to bear their share of those burdens, including Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Austria.
3. The Third Issue: The rising influence of far-right forces, especially since 2014, has enabled these parties to renew discussions surrounding migration and asylum, leaving many migrants worried about their future and livelihoods.

In light of rising far-right parties, Europe is attempting to adopt unilateral measures against irregular migration from Africa. In recent months, particularly Italy’s tone towards North African states, especially Tunisia, has intensified. Recently, an agreement was struck between the Italian and Tunisian governments, which could mark a positive turning point in handling irregular migration across the Mediterranean. Italy has expressed its willingness to increase the number of legal migrants from Tunisia in exchange for calls for greater efforts to combat the phenomenon of irregular migration.

It is noted that irregular migration flows have significantly increased since late 2022 and into the current year. The Ministry of Interior revealed that over 20,000 migrants arrived during November and December of last year compared to about 13,000 during the same period in 2021. During the first ten days of 2023, over 3,800 irregular migrants were recorded arriving in Italy, compared to fewer than 400 in the same timeframe in 2022.

Ramadan Ben Omar, the spokesperson for the Tunisian Forum for Economic and Social Rights, commented, “The agreement discussed by the Italian side is not new; Tunisia has had the right to legally export labor or skilled professionals to Italy since 2011, with a predetermined number between the two countries, thus returning to such agreements might be viewed as the European side’s attempt to push Tunisia towards halting the stream of irregular migration.”

Clearly, there is an Italian attempt to exert pressure on the government of Kais Saied to reduce the number of migrants heading towards Italian shores. Italy provides over 77,000 work contracts annually for foreign migrants, including a percentage allocated specifically to Tunisia, but the reopening of this file appears to merely be a call to limit the number of irregular migrants.

The Tunisian Forum noted a lack of equity in treatment regarding migration to Italy; there should be mutual treatment, whereby, as Italy benefits from trade flows, ship crossings through Tunisia, protecting its coasts, and enjoying free movement to Tunisia, Tunisians should be accorded the same privileges.

Palestinian Refugees in Tunisia

The conditions of refugees in Africa indicate that refugees face a shortfall in protection despite the existence of a legal framework represented by international instruments, starting with the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and the two additional protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 1977, along with the 1951 United Nations Convention, supplemented by the 1967 optional protocol especially. Various Security Council resolutions in this regard have also emerged, in addition to the OAU Convention in 1969 and the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (2009). The weakness of international interest is reflected in:

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees closing its offices in most African nations in 2002, including Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Togo, Gambia, Mali, Niger, and Swaziland, due to its financial incapacity, which prompted a reduction in its budget and almost three-quarters of its operations in Africa. A lack of essential needs for most refugees in Africa affects the commitment of host states, with some African countries threatening that without adequate food aid, they will be compelled to return refugees to their homeland to prevent instability in the refugee areas and camps. Inequality in the assistance provided to refugees in Africa compared to what is available for refugees in other regions. The problem lies also in the misalignment of the definition of a refugee in the 1951 Convention with some groups categorized under mixed flows that necessitate humanitarian protection.

In the search for global and African governance of irregular migration policies, the 2020 World Migration Report issued by the African Union reflects that illegal migration remains an integrated system of structural threats to the African continent regarding its political, economic, security, and environmental causes. Current realities indicate that alleviating the burden of this crisis is possible only through adopting a collective approach between African Union member states—what can be termed as a south-south axis—or a north-south approach linking Africa with European Mediterranean countries.

The African Sahel remains a vulnerable area potentially serving logistical channels for irregular migration networks, ensuring their persistence unless a simultaneous security and development strategy is adopted.

South-South cooperation is crucial, underscoring Algeria’s cancellation of debts owed by 14 African nations, estimated at 3.5 billion dollars, contingent upon investment in development projects in Africa to bolster stability, particularly as Algeria remains wary due to its lengthy borders with the African belt.

The vision of the African Union’s ten-year action plan on migration (2018-2027) includes a continent that recognizes the challenges and opportunities inherent in migration, prepared and capable of addressing these challenges while leveraging opportunities through migration governance strategies.

Effective migration governance reaps the multiple benefits of migration while countering its potential negative effects. Governance of migration can be defined as the institutions and traditions through which authority over migration, mobility, and nationality are exercised in a country, including the government’s capacity to formulate and implement sound policies in these areas. The 2030 Agenda calls for effective migration management to achieve sustainable development goals, urging countries to reduce inequalities both within and among countries by facilitating migration and the movement of persons securely, orderly, and responsibly, including through the implementation of well-planned and managed migration policies. The 2015 Global Migration Governance Framework issued by the International Organization for Migration outlines a holistic vision for migration governance that benefits migrants and society, rooted in principles such as compliance with international standards and laws, safeguarding migrants’ rights, establishing evidence-based policies via comprehensive governmental approaches, and engaging with partners to address migration and related issues. In this framework, the state, while committing to these principles, should aim to achieve the following objectives through migration-related policies, laws, and practices: assisting the social and economic welfare of migrants and society, effectively addressing migration-related crisis aspects, and facilitating safe, orderly, and dignified migration. The priority accorded to these elements depends on the migration dynamics in each country.

African Irregular Migration Between Facts and European Policies

Illegal migration is one of the pivotal issues in the international arena and it presents a complex challenge due to the root problems intertwined with it and its ramifications in evoking conflicts and disputes between European Union states on one side and North African countries on the other, as well as with countries located east and south of the EU’s borders. The reasons triggering migration span from wars and conflicts to rising corruption and oppression, unemployment, and declining job opportunities amidst growing populations. Young people, comprising the largest demographic group in African society, are particularly affected due to the ill-advised policies enacted by African governments alongside their weakened capacity to govern resources, compounded by oppressive and security-centric governance. Moreover, the role played by international powers, often described as exploitative and negative, is due to fierce competition among them for natural resources and increasing strategic positioning within the continent.

As of January 2022, the population of the EU reached about 446.7 million people, comprising 23.8 million citizens from outside the EU, representing 5.3% of the total population. By 2021, migrants accounted for approximately 8.84 million workers in the EU labor market, equivalent to 4.7% of the total workforce, which numbers around 189.7 million workers. African migration is on an upward trajectory; in the last two decades, the number of migrants from the African continent has increased to over 40 million, reflecting a 30% increase since 2010. This constitutes approximately 14.5% of the total number of global migrants, with Asian migrants amounting to 41% and European migrants at 22.5%. Therefore, it is essential to recognize that the focus on African migrants does not stem from their numerical predominance, but rather from media and political inclinations of Western countries.

According to data released by the United Nations Economic and Social Affairs Department for 2020, the number of migrants rose by about 40% during 30 years from 1990 to 2020, increasing from 17 million to 28.5 million.

East and West Africa are the regions with the highest numbers of migrants; according to UN data, East Africa topped other regions with about 7.68 million migrants, followed by West Africa with about 7.65 million, then Central Africa with about 3.86 million, with North Africa registering approximately 3.17 million migrants.

Structural Factors Within Africa Contributing to the Rise in Illegal Immigration

Urbanization Rates and Mass Displacement

The African continent is witnessing an accelerated urban population growth rate, with the urban to rural population ratio declining from 84% in 1955 to 43.4% by 2019. This figure can be perceived positively as a rise in growth and consumption from a neoliberal perspective, but in reality, it reflects the immense pressure on African cities. This pressure has not developed organically, resulting from job availability and economic growth, but is instead a consequence of rapid and substantial mass displacement due to conflicts between armed groups and state security infrastructures or other parties involved in fighting across Africa’s geographical regions. Armed groups often choose state and rural areas as their centers. For instance, between 1990 and 2008, Africa alone constituted 88% of the total global casualties compared to other continents. The conflict occurring in the eastern region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo has been one of the deadliest.

This growth has also impacted the absorptive capacity of cities, leading to a deterioration in public services and a decline in health and education quality, compounded by rising security threats.

Rising Population Growth Relative to Per Capita GDP

The primary driver of African migration towards Europe is economically motivated; around 80% of African migration is driven by the search for better economic conditions, with only 7.2% of African migrants in EU states classified as refugees. The majority of African populations comprise youth under 25 years old, representing around 60% of Africa’s total population. Economic structures in African nations are characterized by disorganization, rampant unemployment, and corruption. When comparing the economic growth in Africa and Europe to that of demographic growth rates, significant disparities emerge; Africa’s population growth over the 2010-2026 period is approximately 48.6%, while its GDP per capita amounts to about 32.3%, in contrast to the EU, where the demographic growth rate during the same period is around 1%, with per capita GDP at roughly 48.7%. Consequently, many educated young individuals contemplate migration in search of better job prospects or quality of life.

Illegal Migration Routes Inside and Outside Africa

In 2022, approximately 331,000 irregular migrants crossed non-standard European borders, recording a 66% increase from 2021. Meanwhile, around 148,000 crossed by sea in 2021, marking a 29% rise from 2020, whereas roughly 183,000 crossed European land borders, a 110% increase from 2021. The number of irregular migrants arriving in Europe from the central Mediterranean in 2022 rose by about 56% from the previous year, totaling 105,000 migrants, while arrivals from the eastern Mediterranean spiked about 113% compared to last year, with around 44,000 migrants. Migration from the Balkans region surged about 134% compared to 2021, with nearly 144,000 migrants. Conversely, numbers from the western Mediterranean, including the Atlantic route from West Africa to the Canary Islands, dropped approximately 25%, totaling around 30,000 migrants. As for eastern European migration routes, figures decreased by roughly 22%, totaling about 6,300 migrants compared to 2021. Meanwhile, the number of deaths in the Mediterranean increased by around 17% compared to 2021, with 2,406 deaths or disappearances reported in 2022, compared to 2,062 in 2021.

Regarding migration routes and options for migrants from 2010 to 2021, it is evident that African nations are most affected compared to other migration routes. These routes can be classified into four categories:

1. Intra-African Migration: The largest numbers of migrants move within the continent, estimated to be about 53%, primarily distributed across South Sudan, Sudan, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Burkina Faso, Mali, Côte d’Ivoire, Zimbabwe, and Nigeria, with an average of 21 million migrants. Another study confirmed this number represents 51.3% of the total number of African migrants for 2021.
2. Migration to EU Countries: Europe is the second preferred destination for migrants, with about 28% of them, primarily distributed across Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, which serve as gathering points for many migrants coming from Nigeria, South Africa, Congo, and Sudan, averaging around 11 million migrants.
3. Migration to Middle Eastern Countries: Middle Eastern countries account for approximately 13% of migrants, predominantly in Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, and Ethiopia, averaging about 5 million migrants.
4. Migration to North America: North America, particularly the USA and Canada, constitutes a lower percentage of around 6% of total destinations, averaging about 3 million migrants.

These statistics indicate that geographical proximity is a significant factor in determining migrants’ destinations and that African countries shoulder a disproportionate burden compared to stable EU states with job prospects. This perspective is pivotal for understanding the migrant statistics from Africa.

How Does Irregular Migration Impact the European Union?

Demographic and Industrial Impact (Positive Effect)

Irregular migration has contributed positively to counter low demographic growth rates in Europe. In 2011, the EU had a positive population growth rate despite its decline, but it took a downward turn starting in 2012, primarily due to registering more deaths than births. From January 2012 to January 2020, a mere 7.5 million population increase could be attributed to migration. However, in 2022, the death rate continued to exceed the number of live births throughout the EU, deepening the demographic gap, as the number of deaths (5.15 million) surpassed the number of live births (3.86 million). Hence, the growth rate of EU citizens was negative (-1.3 million), but with the net migration of 4.1 million migrants factored in, the EU’s population growth for 2022 stood at 2.8 million. Importantly, migration rates in Europe spiked in 2022 due to the Russian-Ukrainian war and the facilitation of movement for Ukrainians, wherein UNESCO reported that 2.852 million had fled since the onset of war until December 2022.

Moreover, migrants significantly impact industry development, with highly educated workers positively contributing to innovations, yet a notable impact observed in industries with lower skill levels, alongside their pivotal role in foreign direct investments and openness to trade. The overall contribution of skilled migrants is roughly a third of that of native skilled workers.

EU Disintegration and the Rise of Far-Right Parties (Negative Effect)

The negative impacts on the EU center around the idea that irregular migrants drive countries towards exiting the union. The issue of irregular migration served as a primary catalyst for Britain’s exit from the EU. While migrants inhabit 32 countries in the EU, about half reside in just two: Germany and the UK. Germany successfully utilized migration to spur economic growth compared to Britain, where the right-wing used the migration narrative politically to achieve their goal of exiting the union. Leading up to the Brexit referendum, 6 out of 10 in Britain supported reducing immigration by 62%.

The goal of leaving the EU was to grant Britain greater control over its borders and activate specific policies against migration, yet despite these efforts, Britain has yet to completely curtail migration.

A prevailing belief is that immigration threatens the cultural homogeneity of EU states, as 57% perceive a risk to cultural integrity within European countries. Over three-quarters of European residents express concern about irregular migration, with 49% viewing it as a severe issue while 36% deem it merely a significant problem, representing a broad negative trend of 85%. Additionally, significant sectors of communities hosting irregular migrants maintain fears that migrants negatively affect the economy and consume state financial resources to combat the situation, thus leading to economic crises.

The far right has adeptly used immigration as a strategic issue in populist rhetoric, embodying the worst of current ideological tendencies in Europe. Their narratives hinge on three fundamental ideas: (1) racial glorification, (2) xenophobia and anti-migrant sentiments, and (3) a “politics-adverse” populism that rejects institutions. The genuine concerns surrounding the disintegration of the EU stem from the ascent of the far right across many European nations, with nationalist sentiments contributing to European fragmentation. The resurgence of nationalism in some member states has precipitated a breakdown in collaboration and weakened the EU.

The EU has adopted various policies to confront irregular migration. These policies aim to set a comprehensive approach to address both legal and illegal migration. They are reflected in bolstering border controls, ensuring effective returns of irregular migrants, and promoting legal labor migration through offering legitimate pathways for those wishing to migrate to the EU. Nevertheless, rising immigration rates have compelled countries located on the EU’s eastern and southern Mediterranean borders to implement strict security policies, focusing primarily on two areas:

1. Tightening Border Control: Such policies have manifested in drastic measures leading to fatalities. The Greek coast guard has often been accused of deliberately sinking migrant boats, with the most recent case occurring in mid-June 2023, when witnesses recounted thatGreek officers intentionally rolled the boat while binding it to their vessel, resulting in the drowning of over 750 migrants. This incident is not an exception but rather represents a continuing policy approach.
2. Resettling Migrants in Neighboring Countries and forcibly returning them to their countries of origin, with incentives and financial support to help build infrastructures for their accommodation or ensure provision of health and educational services, as successfully executed with Turkey through the EU’s provision of 6 billion euros in installments as an aid package aimed at supporting Turkey in managing refugees internally and preventing their movement towards Europe.

However, the EU faces difficulties arriving at similar agreements with North African states, often resorting to specific stipulations for each country, such as simplifying visa acquisitions or improving trade relations. Simultaneously, the UK seeks to send asylum seekers to Rwanda as a deterrent for migrants trying to reach Britain.

Morocco has refused an EU request to return migrants arriving in Europe from Morocco, especially those reaching the Spanish Canary Islands, though the country has successfully returned about 15,000 migrants annually to their homeland. Additionally, Morocco agreed in 1992 to accept foreign nationals from Spain if repatriated within 24 hours. Still, Morocco’s reluctance to comply with the EU’s anti-migration requests reflects its stance regarding migration and emphasizes each country’s responsibility towards its citizens.

Similarly, Tunisia has renegotiated an agreement with the EU to tighten border controls against trafficking, while the latter allocated 100 million euros to assist Tunisia in combating illegal migration. Nonetheless, serious violations against migrants have surged, with more than 500 migrants, including children, thrown into desolate desert regions near the borders with Libya.

The EU also encourages forming joint task forces with the African Union and United Nations to curb the use of the Western Mediterranean and West African routes for migration. Nevertheless, African governments have shown reluctance to cooperate with European demands.

Such security-oriented policies can be described as short-term measures that deal reactively rather than taking a comprehensive approach aimed at effectively addressing root causes of migration. These security policies might yield deceptive successes that hide moral and political failures. Why might they fail? Simply because migrants are fully aware that this journey may entail facing death before they embark. Additionally, structural factors like corruption, war, and authoritarianism in migrants’ countries of origin have not been positively impacted, remaining the primary drivers behind migration.

The factors creating a repelling environment for Africa’s youth and rendering communities unsafe persist, with European states being a significant cause through their interactions with the continent over the past two centuries. Therefore, should the EU genuinely wish to resolve the migration crisis, it must reconsider its foreign policies towards African states, starting with backing military coups and inciting local actors to engage in conflict, down to stealing or unfairly exploiting natural resources.

3- Irregular Migration in Tunisia: Individual Salvation Amidst International Stakes

The phenomenon of irregular migration, transformed into illegal migration, prompts questioning about how social actors manage this issue. It is vital to note that this phenomenon is dynamic, influenced by factors related to social transformations, geopolitical dynamics, and state relations. It simultaneously represents a project by actors searching for individual salvation from a comprehensive crisis and smuggling networks attempting to provide an enticing offer for this personal escape, whilst states negotiate to mitigate the repercussions of this migration, a matter relevant to both the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean.

The electoral landscape within the European space undoubtedly features irregular migration as a potent issue, compelling discussions around “migrant phobia” that has gripped Europe, particularly under the ascendance of the far-right, which has dominated the political scene in numerous countries, most recently reflected in the Spanish parliamentary elections.

In recent months, Tunisia has seen unprecedented spikes in irregular migration. High-level statements indicate altering demographic dynamics in the country, accompanied by assaults and attempted deportations of sub-Saharan Africans to Libyan and Algerian borders. The situation has necessitated official Italian and European visits to Tunisia, ostensibly exploring these matters while possibly imposing directives in exchange for financial and economic assistance.

Firstly: From Underground Migration to Irregular Migration: What Has Changed?

Irregular migration is now celebrated as a sign of social success, held in familial esteem after previously being stigmatized as a social mobility failure. The term “harqa” in the Tunisian vernacular, meaning “burning everything left behind” as a metaphor for embarking on a different life, persists among youth. The failure to adopt other labels like “illegal” or “irregular migration” has not diminished its symbolic resonance as a bitter experience.

This significant transformation in perception reflects that what was once deemed a risk has become a mark of success, where risk is valorized as an adventure revealing an individual’s capability to surmount obstacles to social advancement. Self-esteem derived from moving away from failure carries risks of drowning or deportation, yet youth still ardently re-attempt the journey.

When the phenomenon first emerged in the early 1990s, attention focused on the imposition of “Schengen” visas on prospective migrants and motivations driving young people to gamble with their lives to reach northern Mediterranean shores. Those motivations were primarily economic and remain pertinent amid increasingly slim prospects. Nevertheless, the outlook regarding migration matters has shifted: alongside driving conditions and diminished opportunities for young people, a new element has surfaced regarding how young individuals construct their migration journeys outside legal frameworks, effectively entering what is termed the risk community.

The migration shift from systems-based to network-based migration has become increasingly evident in the last decades. Each migration type carries its own rationale and characteristics dictated by dispersed state institutions in the face of more agile network relationships. Systematic migration occurs under state negotiations measured by profit and loss and geopolitical interactions, leading to a pronounced call for selective migration that EU member states advocate, characterized by brain drain and skilled labor migration that benefits economies and addresses demographic shortfalls. Germany’s acceptance of more than a million Syrian refugees exemplifies this, positively reintegrating them into economic systems while expecting Italy to move in this direction as well.

Network-driven migration grants individuals greater flexibility in overcoming bureaucratic challenges imposed by states and offers appealing solutions to individual failures. It provides encouragement and reassures them that success is attainable, requiring only the courage to finance travel.

In this context, macro-sociological motivations recede while micro-narratives driving youth build their migration projects emerge. Questions transform from broader economic circumstances to self-exploration, testing individual capabilities to defy laws and norms, questioning the logic behind choosing irregular migration. Individuals face judgments not for their choice to migrate but for their success in doing so with the least damage. Hence, it is unsurprising that youth attempt multiple crossings until successful. To ensure successful navigation, families engage in such endeavors through material and moral support, seeking legitimacy in their actions. The Tunisian family has become part of this challenge. Chronicling their experiences and sharing them on social media normalizes the phenomenon, declaring triumph over imposed migration laws.

Secondly: Irregular Migration and the Individualization of Social Issues

Understanding the irregular migration phenomenon necessitates acknowledging the social transformations impacting individual relationships with society, including the collapse of nurturing institutions, social bonds, self-centric dynamics, and the continuous pursuit of recognition and positive positioning. This perpetual search for self-worth compels young people to embark on risky yet costly migration ventures.

The concepts of the individual, individualism, and the individualization of social problems, coupled with the risk society notion, have risen, aiding the understanding of emerging phenomena, notably irregular migration. The individual now serves as the lens through which society is viewed and comprehended. In the past, society guided our understanding of individuals, dictating their movements and options. This is no longer the case. The individual assumes responsibility for their fate and mobility within an ever-expanding horizon. The limits of their identities are linked to their capacity to seize opportunities and leverage them effectively, holding themselves accountable for their choices.

Current conditions expose individuals to hurdles in their professional trajectories: situated within urban spaces, their ability to distinguish themselves and assert their existence, achieve successes in various domains, express identity, and face potential challenges. All these narratives foster a continuous self-innovation journey rooted in a unique daily experience, seeking meaningful personal trajectories within a sphere populated by individuals. Hence, social problems are now perceived from the individual perspective, emphasizing their personal focuses.

Irregular migration encapsulates all these dimensions, representing expressions of developmental policy failures and shortcomings in integration narratives long espoused by socialization institutions. Individuals are searching for solace, though the costs are immense.

Thirdly: Irregular Migration: Shifts in the Phenomenon

Irregular migration is a dynamic phenomenon, morphing not just in form but in substance. Initially characterized by fear and lack of experience, it was secretive and predominantly male. However, as years progressed, it’s become increasingly feminized, with small numbers of female migrants from across Africa and Tunisia participating. In recent times, minors and families have also entered the scene.

Irregular migration networks continue to adapt, innovating new crossing methods. A burgeoning route from Tataouine— a southern Tunisian town—through Serbia to France has emerged, representing a hybrid air-and-land route both longer and costlier but with fewer maritime risks. Nonetheless, this route offers no guarantees. Serious studies report that about 12,000 youths have left Tataouine this year, indicative of a stark vacuum in the city and in its cafés, as local soccer teams now draw crowds of fewer than 500 spectators, contrasting sharply with the previously-filled stadiums. Tataouine has a long-established migratory culture, with thousands of families residing in France, creating a dense familial network where young migrants find immediate integration.

Moreover, irregular migration networks are increasingly attuned to essential socioeconomic contexts that enhance their operational capabilities. Notably, minors are often exempt from deportation, a reflection of European legislation. Minors receive social and educational care aimed at rehabilitating and reintegrating them, which families organize to receive ongoing support.

The irregular migration adventure has undergone a significant normalizing process, viewed as less daunting today. There is extensive individualization around the process, where experiences are shared amongst peers facing similar challenges, with little hesitation to engage in this risky venture.

Fourthly: Specific Numbers Regarding Irregular Migration Trends in Tunisia

In Tunisia, a civil society exists that diligently works on migration issues, integrating them within human rights concerns and defending migrants regardless of their origin. The Tunisian Forum for Economic and Social Rights provides timely indicators concerning the migratory situation accurately. Data suggests that the largest migratory wave occurred in the early months of Tunisia’s 2011 revolution, with approximately 25,000 individuals reaching Italy’s island of Lampedusa, exploiting the inability of Tunisian security to cope with the massive influx amid politically turbulent conditions.

The forum’s data indicates that the number of Tunisian irregular migrants reached 880 in 2015, 1,200 in 2016, and 2,700 in 2017. In 2018, 4,849 migrants succeeded in reaching Italian territory; the numbers dropped in 2019 to 2,592 and surged to 11,212 in 2020, then reached 14,342 in 2021. This number peaked at 18,148 in 2022, dwindling to 4,318 by June 30, 2023.

Since 2020, there has been a noticeable surge in the number of Tunisian migrants who have entered Italian territory compared to previous years, largely due to the stark realities facing citizens amidst a governmental inability to provide a community project. This situation is compounded by increasing crises such as food shortages, alongside soaring living costs and shortages in access to water and electricity. These crises have become more pronounced than before.

There is a growing consensus that this overarching crisis persists, and this is reflected in the migratory intentions which have become a predominant narrative within Tunisian society across various socioeconomic and educational strata. Everyone conceives of leaving the country either as a dream or reality.

Minors have noticeably entered irregular migration in significant numbers recently, pointing to the complex, multifaceted nature of the phenomenon; families are now pivotal actors in migration projects, reflecting a worsening dynamic compounded by a lack of development alternatives. The forum recorded the arrival of 595 minors with or without family accompaniment in 2019, increasing to 1,607 in 2020, 2,492 in 2021, and 3,399 in 2022. By June 30 of this year, 1,044 minors had crossed the same threshold.

This phenomenon has also seen an influx of women; 307 were reported in 2020, 523 in 2021, and 850 in 2022. The migratory project has evidently transitioned into a familial endeavor.

Reports indicate that 581 Tunisians died or went missing during irregular maritime crossings in 2022, with the figure rising to 608 as of June 30 this year, though the numbers soar significantly for other nationalities, especially among sub-Saharan Africans.

Data from the forum indicate that approximately 38,372 individuals from various nationalities were prevented from crossing from Tunisian shores in 2022, while 32,792 were stopped from attempting crossings as of June 30, 2023.

Fifthly: Irregular Migration and Overlapping International Stakes

Tunisia’s approach to irregular migration has noticeably shifted, as Italy and the European Union engage in negotiations to establish a framework that shields European interests from the fallout of the influx of Tunisian and non-Tunisian migrants.

Before examining the geopolitical stakes surrounding irregular migration, it is essential to highlight the Tunisian government’s stance, with the president asserting that the presence of sub-Saharan Africans on Tunisian soil illegally constitutes a conspiracy aimed at altering the demographic composition of Tunisian society. He called for strict enforcement of laws to curb this illegal influx. This rhetoric triggered significant confrontations between enraged Tunisians and African migrants, underscoring tensions, with many subjected to violent attacks since early July 2023 in Sfax, prompting some to abandon the city and plight towards the Libyan and Algerian borders, while hundreds remain stranded at these borders in dismal humanitarian conditions amid harsh weather.

In tandem, the issue of irregular migration is now unfolding on the negotiation table between Tunisia and the EU, with Italy leading the process owing to its direct impact from this influx under the right-wing government of Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, who pledged to eliminate the phenomenon of irregular migration.

Recently, a memorandum of understanding was signed between Tunisia and the EU for an economic partnership, albeit also aimed at mitigating irregular migration. The speed with which this agreement was reached indicates the EU’s desire to score political points in domestic contexts, particularly following governmental instability in countries like the Netherlands over migration policy disagreements. In the meantime, this memorandum reinforces previously included issues, with irregular migration remaining a contentious topic without a clear resolution on combat mechanisms under negotiations.

Recently, there has been a noticeable increase in the European side’s engagement toward Africa, especially regarding migration. Concurrently, various African communities have formed networks to secure their rights within new international partnerships aimed at preventing irregular migration. Yet, despite this recent surge of attention toward migration, primarily due to the geopolitical implications of Africa’s migrant crisis, the dangers posed to African migrants primarily stem from external exploitation.

In conclusion, irregular migration remains a critical, multifaceted challenge deriving from systemic failures, their correlation with growing economic disparities, and the persistent influence of colonial legacies that continue to affect African nations in grappling with migration issues. To mitigate these challenges effectively, nations must pursue sustainable solutions that adapt and address the root causes driving these complex migration trends, based on deeper introspection and systemic change.

Africa and Climate Risks

Climate Change and Its Implications: The Drought Wave in the Horn of Africa as a Case Study

Like a recurring Greek tragedy, the specter of drought alarms once again in the Horn of Africa, threatening millions with a slow death due to acute food insecurity while leading to the death of millions of livestock.

Information from the region reveals catastrophic living conditions as the Horn of Africa remains one of the most affected areas by climate changes, exemplified by the current drought wave, which is exacerbated by several arid and semi-arid regions.

This paper delineates how severe climate changes have precipitated the current drought wave in the Horn of Africa, illustrating how these changes intertwine with human factors to exacerbate the disaster, projecting consequences both within and beyond the region.

1- Drought as a Manifestation of Climate Change in the Horn of Africa

This impoverished region bears the brunt of the global warming crisis it did not contribute to. A report from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) links the current drought waves with the La Niña phenomenon, which worsens due to climate change caused by human activities, according to the World Meteorological Organization.

This disastrous drought unveils glaring obstacles for many residents of the affected areas, who wholly depend on fragile lifestyles such as pastoralism and rain-fed agriculture.

Although the region has a history of coping with climatic fluctuations, climate change has intensified drought events, with the area experiencing a drought nearly every year since 2008. The European Union’s Commissioner for Crisis Management, Janez Lenarčič, described this drought wave as “historic.”

In this context, changes in rainfall patterns prove critical in creating the catastrophic drought landscape; the spokesperson for the UN Refugee Agency stated that the Horn of Africa is entering its sixth consecutive poor rainy season, with no immediate end in sight to what has become one of the longest and harshest drought periods ever recorded. According to last year’s UN estimates, drought threatens agricultural yields, with expectations that grain harvests in some areas will be 70% below the average.

Declining precipitation rates correspondingly lead to significant reductions in water bodies, resulting in the deaths of millions of livestock vital for pastoralists’ livelihoods, thereby leaving them vulnerable with no resources to combat severe drought.

Another devastating reflection of climate change sees this drought, while the region still grapples with the aftermath of desert locust waves that impacted it in previous years. An international report has linked the outbreak of desert locust to cyclones in the Indian Ocean, brought on by climatic changes. A swarm of locusts can consume food in a single day equivalent to what 35,000 people consume, severely affecting agricultural production.

2- Human Factors Compound the Crisis

In addition to the natural effects of climate change, several human factors significantly contribute to the catastrophic consequences of the drought crisis, with attention drawn to traditional lifestyle patterns in the Horn of Africa, governance approaches, and sustained conflicts that characterize the region.

A. The Spread of Dryland Pastoralist Economies

Agriculture and pastoralism are the primary sectors in the economies of the Horn of Africa, with the World Bank estimating the number of pastoralists at between 12 to 22 million, constituting a significant population in the arid and semi-arid lands covering approximately 60% of the Horn’s territory.

One study estimates pastoralists require between five to eight years to fully recover from periodic drought impacts; however, drought waves now recur within cycles of two to three years, pushing pastoralists to adopt risk-laden strategies involving migration to alternate areas, resulting in clashes with local communities, or resorting to selling livestock, creating an oversupply that sharply reduces prices while also losing essential means of living.

Moreover, the agricultural sector in the region is underdeveloped and lacks resilience; many farmers cannot adopt modern methods and technologies conducive to adaptation to climatic changes and to mitigate associated risks, leading to declines in vital crops like maize, millet, and sorghum, posing severe threats to food security in the Horn of Africa.

B. Mismanagement by States

According to the 2023 Fragile States Index issued by the Fund for Peace, the Horn of Africa includes some of the world’s most fragile nations such as Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, and South Sudan.

These countries grapple with limited or unequal access to natural resources, social tensions based on ethnic or religious grounds, poverty, and economic inequality, while the weakened state capacity to ensure security, coupled with political and administrative corruption, has led to ineffective governance, undemocratic practices, limited trust, and the absence of state legitimacy amidst rebellion.

All the preceding factors have incapacitated these states from devising appropriate strategies and plans to adapt to climate changes and provide citizens with the necessary tools to mitigate their consequences.

C. Persistent Conflicts

The Horn of Africa has been a region enduring significant levels of conflict in recent decades, leading to catastrophic outcomes on political stability, social order, and economic development.

Somalia grapples with the consequences of central authority collapse since 1991, marked predominantly by internal conflicts, while the Somali youth movement continues to grow, threatening the tenuous central authority in Mogadishu.

The ramifications of the 1998-2000 Ethiopian-Eritrean War have persisted for two decades, relegating Eritrea to a closed, dictatorial regime with a fragile economy, while South Sudan has endured a violent civil war from 2013 to 2020 that still threatens to reignite.

Despite significant stabilization in Ethiopia under the Tigray People’s Liberation Front leadership, ethnic conflicts broke out under Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, culminating in a fierce war with Tigray from 2020 to 2022 that undermined much of the developmental gains achieved over the preceding two decades.

3- Impacts of the Drought Crisis

Though the humanitarian aspect of this crisis is paramount, the anticipated effects extend into socio-economic, security, and political repercussions, particularly when analyzing two critical factors: firstly, this severe drought is emblematic of climatic changes that may initiate a pattern of recurring droughts, suggesting their persistence in the future; and secondly, many states in the region suffer from severe fragility negatively affecting their ability to engage effectively with harsh climate change impacts.

Broadly speaking, when discussing this wave’s impacts, we can address current and anticipated outcomes with reverberations beyond the borders of the Horn of Africa.

A. Current Consequences

Firstly: Food Security Deterioration and Increased Displacement Rates

UN estimates suggest that over 43 million people require assistance across Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia in 2023, including over 32 million facing high levels of acute food insecurity, alongside more than 8 million children and pregnant or lactating women confronting severe malnutrition, as drought has resulted in the deaths of over 13 million livestock.

The decline in precipitation rates has significantly reduced the levels of freshwater bodies, leading to the demise of millions of livestock crucial for pastoralists’ livelihoods, thereby leaving them defenseless against severe drought conditions.

Secondly: Displacement Waves

A multitude of interconnected crises, particularly those affecting climate change impacts, is propelling vast numbers of residents in various countries to move, creating substantial displacement waves; millions are compelled to flee their homes in search of essential resources and services elsewhere.

According to UNICEF, the number of internally displaced persons in Ethiopia and Somalia was approximately 4.5 million and 3 million, respectively, by late June 2022. Access to clean water restrictions exacerbates issues concerning hygiene and sanitation, resulting in increased diarrhea cases and the proliferation of illnesses like cholera, hepatitis, typhoid, and polio.

B. Anticipated Consequences

Firstly: Social Unrest

As millions flee their areas to escape hunger, urban migration emerges as an option, elevating unemployment rates, pressuring services, and expanding poverty belts, creating a fertile ground for crime while also foreshadowing socio-economic disturbances in nations grappling with various fractures.

Additionally, the way national governments ineffectively respond to crises induced by climate change could incite violent civic unrest destabilizing already fragile states, amplifying this risk due to deep-seated grievances over prolonged failures of governments to achieve developmental and political stability objectives, potentially igniting public outrage if inappropriate responses to climate change impacts affect citizens’ basic needs. Increased bread prices in Sudan, for instance, sparked a public revolt in December 2018, where this price hike acted as a catalyst for expressing widespread discontent towards the broader policies of the regime.

Secondly: Resource Conflicts

Indicators suggest sharp changes occurring in pastoralist lifestyles will likely force populations to encroach upon agricultural zones, leading to conflict over scarce natural resources.

Years of continued drought due to declining precipitation directly influence water levels in rivers while exacerbating the existing water scarcity. This could lead to heightened tensions over water resources. For instance, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam exemplifies a potential conflict sparked by climate changes as disputing parties debate management approaches amid extended droughts, which seem likely to become a recurrent pattern in the future.

Signs of such contention have emerged amid numerous conflicts over water sources observed since 2020, potentially escalating into more severe and violent confrontations. A similar situation unfolded in Darfur, where disputes between pastoralists affected by desertification and agricultural communities triggered a crisis that resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands, with tragic outcomes still visible nearly two decades since its onset.

Thirdly: Increased Threat from Armed Groups

A serious expected outcome of these crises is their contribution to creating a conducive environment for recruiting combatants by armed groups. For instance, a study conducted by the German “Climate Diplomacy” initiative indicated that the devastating drought affecting Lake Chad in West Africa catalyzed militant activities by non-state actors like Boko Haram.

In the Horn of Africa, several armed groups with ethnic, tribal, and religious backgrounds coalesce in Somalia, South Sudan, and Ethiopia. Over recent years, Somalia has witnessed an expansive growth of the extremist group Al-Shabaab, which has turned into a significant threat to the entire region.

Fourthly: Vulnerability to External Forces

Conversely, these drought waves may expose local states to external pressures, particularly given their significant reliance on imported wheat, which provides leverage to countries like Russia against nations like Ethiopia, which sources 44% of its wheat imports from Moscow, according to the World Food Program.

Amidst the ongoing international struggle for influence in the Horn of Africa, these crises will provide concerned nations the opportunity to heighten their presence in the region through what is referred to as “humanitarian crisis diplomacy.” For instance, extensive Turkish humanitarian aid during Somalia’s famine in 2011 marked a significant expansion of Ankara’s influence in the country, which has now become pivotal for Turkey’s posture in the Horn of Africa.

C. Extended Impacts Beyond the Region

Firstly: Migration Waves

The catastrophic conditions are compelling many to cross into neighboring nations, pressuring already struggling states while potentially sparking conflicts between local populations and displaced groups.

Secondly: Rise in Racist Sentiments

Previous drought events have led to heightened irregular migration activities from affected areas towards the Middle East or beyond, a trend likely to repeat now amid the potent combination of drought and warfare threatening to collapse major regional countries like Sudan and Ethiopia, exacerbated by a significant youth demographic eager for change and capable of undertaking hazardous travel.

Such circumstances are expected to incite the rise of nationalist and xenophobic currents in Europe and other areas, particularly alongside vast migration flows resulting from the Syrian crisis.

Thirdly: Increased External Competition for the Region

The Horn of Africa, affected by various factors, is at the center of a geostrategic struggle for influence involving numerous international and regional powers, exposing nations in the region to external forces. As mentioned earlier, this exposure will escalate competition.

Lieutenant General Kirk Smith, deputy commander of US Africa Command, clearly articulated this risk, stating: “We clearly know that environmental change is a driver of instability, and we recognize that other entities, whether we label them competitors or adversaries, will capitalize on that.”

The waves of severe drought presently afflicting the Horn of Africa epitomize the catastrophic outcomes of climate change manifestation as observed in multiple regions globally, with implications that intensify amid the deep-seated challenges faced by countries in the Horn, impeding their capacity to address the pressing challenges posed by severe climate changes.

This analysis has spotlighted some of the tragic consequences affecting millions of Horn of African residents while anticipating repercussions extending beyond the region’s bounds, whether to neighboring countries or further afield.

Given the seriousness of this phenomenon, Horn nations require multidimensional support—not just to address current needs but also to establish capacities for devising and implementing sustainable future adaptation strategies. Alongside fostering peace efforts, they should reduce conflict drivers at both local and regional levels.

It is also vital to enhance early warning systems, share information, and support regional and sub-regional institutions like the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Furthermore, supporting civil society organizations, researchers, activists, and African community leaders is crucial to conducting research and formulating policy proposals that tackle the climate crisis influencing their livelihoods and stability. Such organizations are best positioned to innovate suitable solutions to their community challenges.

The Russian-Ukrainian War and Food Security in Africa: Implications and Opportunities

Africa currently grapples with an import crisis due to the Russian-Ukrainian war that erupted approximately one year and five months ago, leading to severe negative ramifications across the continent in diverse sectors, particularly concerning food security. This conflict has notably caused food scarcity and skyrocketing prices, the highest seen since the 2008 global financial crisis. Despite Africa’s vast and abundant resources that could enable food surplus capable of nourishing parts of the world beyond the continent, the war has exacerbated food insecurity.

This paper will explore the primary impacts and ramifications of this conflict while considering sustainable solutions and alternatives that can help Africa, both in overcoming this food crisis and future global crises with negative consequences for the region.

Impacts of the Russian-Ukrainian War on Food Security in Africa

Approximately one and a half years have passed since Russia commenced its military operation in Ukraine in February of last year. This conflict has arrived at a very inopportune moment for Africa, which had just begun to stabilize following economic and social wounds inflicted by the COVID-19 pandemic. The Russian-Ukrainian war has complicated Africa’s already fragile economy, which significantly relies on grain imports, alongside contributing to soaring gas and oil prices, indicating that the nightmare of economic deterioration will continue to haunt Africa for the foreseeable future.

Russia and Ukraine play pivotal roles in worldwide agriculture, being the two leading exporting nations of agricultural products to global markets. “Russia is the largest wheat exporter globally, accounting for 18% of the global exports as projected for 2023/24, while Ukraine ranks sixth among wheat-exporting countries at 10% of global exports.” Together, both nations comprise almost 80% of the global corn, barley, canola seeds, and sunflower oil exports since 2018. Additionally, Russia is also one of the largest exporters of nitrogen, potassium, and phosphorus fertilizers.

“African nations procure about 90% or more of their wheat consumption.” The largest importers are North African countries, notably Egypt, sourcing over 60% of its wheat consumption, with Algeria at 75%, Tunisia at 62%, and Morocco at 38%. Places like Cameroon, Djibouti, Burundi, Togo, Senegal, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Tanzania, Rwanda, Togo, Libya, Mauritania, and Namibia import between 50% to 70% of their wheat needs. Madagascar and Egypt source 70% to 80% of their wheat from international markets, while Somalia imports over 90%, and Eritrea suffers profoundly, importing all of its grain from Russia and Ukraine. Interestingly, Eritrea is among the five nations that cast votes against the UN censure of President Vladimir Putin’s decision to annex four Ukrainian provinces. According to iPES Food 2022 and the FAO 2022 report, approximately 84% of wheat in East Africa is imported primarily from Ukraine and Russia.

This staggering reliance on imported grains underscores the alarming state of food insecurity across the African continent; approximately 283 million people already faced hunger prior to the onset of the Ukraine war, further exacerbated by the current conflict. Clearly, the Ukrainian crisis is significantly disrupting global agricultural food markets and threatening to worsen famine in Africa, owing to several African nations relying on food imports, hampering the development of agricultural sectors and effective food policies at national levels.

Many African countries, like various regions worldwide, heavily depend on wheat from Russia and Ukraine. The war and the suite of economic sanctions against Russia have disrupted supply chains, causing extensive challenges across many countries. Food security holds paramount importance for Africans, with the scarcity induced by the war posing substantial challenges for nations already grappling with drought due to climate change, conflicts, and the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic. Numerous African countries possess economies reliant on agriculture; as the war in Ukraine impacts the supply of fertilizers from Russia, Ghana—a significant importer—obtains 50% of its fertilizers from Russia.

The war has also disrupted global food markets, leading to surging prices along with food shortages. Alongside the interruption of fertilizer supplies, an essential input in agricultural production, fertilizer prices have risen sharply, making it progressively challenging and costly for African farmers to produce food, potentially exacerbating food insecurity. Undoubtedly, the Russian-Ukraine conflict presents long-lasting challenges for food security on the continent, from the inability to import staple crops to the significant long-term consequences of fertilizer restrictions and essential agricultural materials. In this regard, the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) stated that 20 African countries import 90% of their grains from Russia and Ukraine, highlighting the alarming depletion of strategic food stocks in many nations across the continent, posing serious concerns for next year’s agricultural season in 2023/24, particularly as farmers cannot afford the costs of fertilizers, which have more than doubled. Without proper incentives for fertilizer utilization, very low outputs may be witnessed in the upcoming season.

We must recognize that Africa already encounters severe crises, as there are “281 million people in Africa lacking sufficient food,” with about three-quarters of the population unable to afford nutritious food, compounding other challenges such as climate shifts, acute drought in East Africa, and the worst locust plague in 70 years that has decimated harvests. Not to forget the crisis of COVID-19 and its repercussions that led to an 18% decline in agricultural productivity.

African nations relying on food imports bear the brunt of rising prices in global markets; however, exporting countries are likely to cut food exports to secure adequate domestic provisions during times of crisis, further intensifying shortages and leading to elevated prices in international markets, to the detriment of poorer, less developed countries. As price shocks become increasingly exacerbated by financial market speculations, combating food price speculation is central to addressing hunger crises in Africa.

Although poverty rates in Africa have declined since 2000, large portions of Africa’s population remain beneath the poverty line, with poverty being a key driver of hunger. Given the mutual reinforcement between poverty and food insecurity, efforts to combat poverty form the first pillar in addressing hunger, just as political instability and conflicts heavily impact food security across the continent. Nevertheless, many agricultural economists and experts indicate that the root of food crises in Africa is not the war in Ukraine but rather the fragility of the continent’s food systems.

The distinct ramifications of the Russian-Ukrainian War on food security in Africa are summarized as follows:

1. Rising Food Prices: The conflict results in a sharp increase in the costs of wheat, corn, and sunflower oil, complicating the ability for Africans to purchase food, forcing millions into poverty.
2. Food Shortages: The war has impeded food supplies, leading to decreased availability of key staples like wheat, corn, and sunflower oil in certain countries, having an especially adverse impact on nations heavily reliant on imports from Russia and Ukraine.
3. Increasing Hunger Levels: The surge in food prices and shortages has augmented hunger, with the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimating that war-induced hunger among Africans could see an increase by as many as 11 million people.

The full impact of the Russian-Ukrainian war on food security in Africa is still unfolding. Clearly, the war has dramatically adverse effects on food security across the region.

What Solutions Could Pull Africa Out of Its Food Crisis?

Reducing dependence on food imports necessitates that African nations strive for self-sufficiency in food production. It is essential to rethink agricultural policies across the continent, as Africa currently spends approximately $55 billion annually on food imports, a figure projected to double by 2030. From this perspective, food policies must strengthen the production base and develop rural infrastructure. This requires effective public policies that facilitate and prioritize access to funding for agricultural projects, support smallholder farmers, and provide training on new production techniques that enhance yields and improve rural infrastructure.

Increasing agricultural production is a pivotal solution to combat hunger. This can be achieved by promoting the heightened use of fertilizers alongside environmentally directed agriculture. For instance, in 2020, the average fertilizer usage per hectare of cultivated land in Sub-Saharan Africa was around 17 kg, compared to the global average of 135 kg. Furthermore, Africa remains heavily reliant on fertilizer imports, highlighting an urgent need to support the fertilizer value chain by improving access for smallholder farmers and expanding research and local production of organic fertilizers across the continent.

The Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), supported by the African Union since 2003 under the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), specifically aims to enhance food supplies and reduce hunger in Africa. It provides a political framework and strategic interventions that can be increasingly leveraged at the regional level. Similarly, developing the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) with a focus on food and agricultural products will not only promote the consumption of locally produced goods but also influence the fertilizer supply chain. It is also paramount to encourage the strengthening of national and regional strategic food reserves, as already practiced by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

Moreover, several strategies could alleviate the burden on struggling African economies, thus securing liquidity that contributes to food availability. For example, reallocating $100 billion from International Monetary Fund special drawing rights to support African nations, alongside restructuring African public debt, could provide financial room for these countries to address the crisis. Moreover, the political will of African governments to refocus on agriculture—through increased public spending to build a resilient, self-sufficient food system—will be critical for establishing complete food sovereignty, increasing arable land, and enhancing market access to boost cross-border trade, while expediting the implementation of the AfCFTA agreement.

Resolving this crisis revolves around addressing the fundamental vulnerabilities of the systems in place. Short-term solutions are proposed for how to facilitate grain flows and mitigate further shocks to food security by increasing production in both high and low-yielding areas. This can be achieved by applying market incentives on both the supply and demand sides, considering medium-term replacement processes, and working to improve resilience at local, regional, and global levels for wheat and grain supply, while supporting pathways to self-sufficiency alongside open trade within the continent.

We must recognize the necessity of developing resilient agricultural and food systems, as the cycle of shocks and food crises will not cease without progress in this realm. We need to be prepared to confront these shocks, and this is an area that development partners can support. The private sector needs to play a strategic role, and African governments must demonstrate leadership and responsibility to avoid such crises. Solutions also encompass looking for alternatives to wheat; for example, maize and millet can serve as viable substitutes. Additionally, offering short-term incentives to the private sector could bolster agricultural market activities, while encouraging governments to provide grants for obtaining fertilizers and other essential materials.

On another front, it is essential to enhance data availability, as the need for robust data systems has become pressing. This is a focal point that requires attention, as Africa has seen unprecedented increases in data availability and forecasting capabilities through African experts in relevant institutions. Thus, there is a need to establish a specialized body that integrates data with research-focused organizations and on-the-ground entities to bridge the gap between them, fostering understanding of what needs to be done effectively and adopting a more efficient regional approach. It is vital to emphasize the fundamental importance of partnerships and cooperation in this aspect. Additionally, developing regional programs to enhance analytical frameworks and data systems for political leadership using reliable data for informed decision-making is crucial. This project should be executed in collaboration with African organizations such as the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), which comprises 21 member states, and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) with 15 members. The collected data could help ensure the transition of food from surplus to deficit areas, underscoring the significance of strong data systems that bolster growth and guide better food supply policies. Furthermore, it is crucial for development partners to disseminate available agricultural innovations and establish active connections between research institutions and humanitarian and developmental aid organizations, while continuously monitoring reports from Agricultural Market Information Systems (AMIS) and the International Food Policy Research Institute to enhance resilience in such crises.

Additionally, it would be prudent to adopt some strategies to mitigate the impact of war on food security in Africa through:

1. Regular Meetings: Convening periodic meetings of African agriculture ministers to assess the impact of conflicts on food security and to brainstorm solutions, while allowing agricultural researchers to present recommendations and proposals to identify best practices for implementation.
2. Food Aid: There will be a pressing need for food assistance to help those facing hunger as a result of conflict. The international community must intensify efforts to provide food aid to Africa. While I am not in favor of relying solely on international intervention, current circumstances necessitate leveraging international support.

African Conflicts: Ongoing Concerns and Containment Opportunities

Interstate Borders and Conflicts in Africa: Roots and Phenomena

Border conflicts in Africa represent a significant challenge faced by African states, particularly in resource-rich areas. Disputes often arise over territorial claims between nations or control of natural resources such as oil, water, and arable land. Currently, there are around 100 unresolved border disputes among African countries, encompassing most nations on the continent, including 16 landlocked countries, with a total length of disputed borders estimated at approximately 170,000 kilometers. This includes 109 land areas and 73 maritime areas. Alarmingly, only 35% of Africa’s borders have been officially demarcated, which means roughly 110,000 kilometers of borders remain undetermined and unmarked between African nations as of 2020. These statistics highlight the political tensions prevalent within the African continent. The established borders, recognized at the 1964 meeting of African state and government leaders under the Organization of African Unity, were based on boundaries drawn by colonial powers and the treaties they signed among each other, coinciding with independence movements across numerous African nations. Consequently, African states have struggled to resolve border demarcation issues over the past six decades.

Roots of the Problem: Colonialism and Boundary Demarcation in Africa

Colonialism is one of the principal root causes of most border disputes, as European powers deliberately demarcated borders and signed treaties from a competitive standpoint, with little involvement of local leaders or stakeholders, except in occasional exceptions. Some geographic areas were even named after explorers and imposed by colonial powers. The imposed borders often disregarded the distribution of tribes and populations in the continent, leading to conflicts between communities and the colonizing states, fueled by colonial responses of massacres and genocide. As Africa gained independence, these disputes deepened, taking on a nationalist character.

The origins of these conflicts trace back to the late 18th century when major colonial powers sought to delineate their spheres of influence, culminating in the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885, which legitimized the division of Africa. The conference was convened by German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck ostensibly to promote free trade in West Africa; however, it quickly transformed into a delineation of spheres of influence among colonial powers that partitioned Africa according to their economic interests and military strategies.

The partitioning of Africa and its borders was executed without regard for geography, history, demographics, or the complex ethnic and religious makeup of the continent. The driving force behind this division was competition for resources and strategic locations. A testament to this profound ignorance of African geography and society is encapsulated in a statement made by British Prime Minister Lord Salisbury in 1890, who remarked, “We were conceding mountains, rivers, and lakes to one another, untroubled by the minor inconvenience of never having known where the mountains, rivers, and lakes actually were.” This assertion not only indicates ignorance but also reflects a derogatory and racist view of African populations, perceived by Europeans as “slaves” to be exploited for economic gain, both within and outside the continent.

As knowledge of geography and demography expanded, colonial powers manipulated this acquired knowledge to create crises for their benefit. They preferentially interacted with certain African leaders and tribal chiefs to seize land and resources and drew borders through intimidation or persuasion. Colonial powers designed regional maps with no notification to local African leaders and signed treaties among themselves to circumvent competition over resources, ignoring the local African contexts. This contributed to the transformation of competition for the exploitation and theft of African resources into an organized partnership between major powers, with African communities and states as victims.

Borders of Violence: Ethnic Map and “National” Borders

In a survey conducted in 17 African countries between 2002 and 2003, around 42% of respondents indicated that border disputes were the primary cause of conflicts in Africa. From 1997 to 2021, over 171,000 lives were lost due to violent incidents in North and West Africa, particularly along the borders of Libya, Chad, and Cameroon and extending to the western coast of Africa—regions whose states struggle to secure long boundaries. The ongoing conflict in eastern Congo has resulted in nearly six million deaths since 1996 and is characterized by the presence of numerous ethnic armed groups supported by neighboring countries and major powers. In Darfur, about 300,000 people have died, and 2.5 million have been displaced since the conflict erupted in 2003. The Darfur region exemplifies the disconnect between territorial boundaries and the actual settlement distribution of tribes and populations, which often transcends the drawn Sudanese-Chadian borders. A common element in these conflicts is the mismatch between imposed borders and social dynamics.

In 1959, American anthropologist George Peter Murdock mapped Africa, illustrating ethnic and linguistic divisions that overlapped with the national borders drawn by colonial powers. His study identified approximately 843 distinct areas. Notably, this mapping excluded around eight desert regions perceived at the time of colonization as uninhabited, comprising small groups and islands, including the Comoros and Madeira, still under Portuguese occupation. Murdock’s ethnic analysis delineates seven to eight primary language groups and identifies 357 ethnic groups among the 843 defined regions that exist across national borders, accounting for 42.3% of the total ethnicities studied. However, if focused on substantial divisions, this figure drops to 27.7%, with 229 groups presenting significant differences.

Superimposing the national borders imposed by colonial powers onto Murdock’s ethnic map reveals 13 ethnic groups residing in areas that cross four nations’ boundaries, 61 groups in zones that span three nations, and 148 groups in regions that overlap with two countries. This evidence hints that the “national” borders drawn by colonial powers fail to reflect or accommodate the social and tribal fabric of African societies, serving as a fundamental factor in generating conflicts and crises, regardless of whether these are driven by ethnic, religious, nationalistic, or economic motives.

Patterns of Border Conflicts in Africa

Border disputes in Africa can be categorized into three primary types. The first pattern occurs between African states as entities locked in contention against one another, exemplified by the border dispute between Malawi and Tanzania over Lake Nyasa. The boundary is based on the Heligoland Treaty signed in July 1890 between Germany and Britain. The second and third patterns occur in hybrid conflicts in which the clash involves a nation versus a tribe or armed group, or among different tribes and armed factions regardless of ethnic or religious affiliations. In these complex and intertwined conflicts, each party—whether state, ethnic group, or militia—plays a role, making this the most prevalent conflict type in Africa. The extent of international involvement varies from one conflict to another based on the strategic significance of geographic locations and the abundance of natural resources.

An example of the hybrid model seen in the conflicts in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, particularly in the North Kivu and Ituri provinces, is pivotal. These provinces are among the five in this densely populated region, rich in natural resources like gold, coltan, diamonds, and other precious minerals, with fertile land. The roots of these conflicts date back to the 1990s, and numerous militia groups, often identified as “Mayi-Mayi,” are active there. Some of these groups have been exploited by Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, and others to assert influence and control over natural resources. The most militarily capable and operationally significant groups include the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF-NALU), a rebel faction formed in the 1990s to resist the Ugandan government, and the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), comprising former members of the Rwandan army and Hutu refugees opposing the current government. The Cooperative for the Development of Congo (CODECO) represents another significant armed ethnic group, albeit the Congolese government forces’ (FARDC) mismanagement of resources and conflicts with local populations remains a pressing issue.

In these complex conflicts, many nations and major corporations fuel fighting and engage in proxy wars to procure precious minerals at low prices for their economic interests. This highlights the intricate nature of the conflict, exemplifying a hybrid that merges aspects of the second and third patterns, where non-state actors, governments, and various tribes intersect with differing motivations. Many other examples abound, such as the border conflict in western Somalia with Kenya and Ethiopia, where tribes form armed militias to defend themselves against external threats or protect their property and interests.

External interventions in local conflicts abound, with one significant example being Israel’s involvement in the Sudanese war, supporting rebellious movements in South Sudan politically and militarily to destabilize the central government in Khartoum and facilitate the division of Sudan into two countries. This was discussed by former Mossad chief David Ben-Ozivil in his recently published book, where he recounted establishing the first rebel army in South Sudan to disrupt Sudanese unity.

The Crisis of Sovereignty, Borders, and the National State

The border crisis and the resulting conflicts are underpinned by issues of sovereignty and territorial disputes among competing or conflicting parties, whether they are states, tribes, or armed groups. Tribes historically managed their internal affairs and resources within their territories, exercising authority over the land they inhabited. These traditional governance structures created participatory or competitive relationships regarding trade and resources, with exchanges of benefits occurring between tribes situated along trade routes and those occupying fertile lands. While negative interactions and conflicts were also present, the colonial imposition of “national” borders generated a new reality, leading to sharper and more pronounced conflict maps.

Maps

National or state-centric governance monopolized authority over law enforcement, trade management, and resource administration, often with backing from colonial powers and corporations. This has bred disputes among various stakeholders over the legitimacy of the state’s central authority over functions once managed communally. The demarcation of “national” borders created centralized authorities that stripped sovereignty from previously decentralized communities, while the internal borders drawn by colonial powers restricted community movement and significantly shaped the dynamics and relations between the state and society.

Colonial powers forged new forms of nationalism tied to borders in an effort to create a different reality and engendered beliefs among ruling elites that tribal and ethnic identities hindered advancement and development. Consequently, some of these elites attacked tribal systems, emphasizing the imperative to dismantle traditional customs and practices.

Colonial forces established functional central governments, supplied and armed them to safeguard their political and economic interests. Consequently, Africa has been one of the regions most plagued by military coups, internal strife, and authoritarianism. According to data compiled by Paul and Tinn, at least one coup has occurred in 45 of the 54 African countries since the year 1950, with most successful coups taking place during the Cold War between 1946 and 1991. Africa has recorded the highest number of coup attempts compared to other continents, amounting to 214, with 106 being successful.

European colonial powers employed “divide and conquer,” “direct rule,” and “assimilation” policies to maintain their interests, contributing to the erosion of social norms and identities within numerous African communities. They actively promoted one ethnic group’s culture over others using coercive means, leading to a sense of threat to the identity, culture, history, and religion of many tribes and ethnic groups within Africa. This prompted a reactionary embrace of violence in efforts to preserve culture, identity, sovereignty, and religion. Furthermore, both Britain and France forcibly enforced their languages, suppressing local cultures and dialects, indoctrinating societies and elites that this was the path to progress. Colonial forces sought to instill a belief in the inferiority of African cultures compared to Western cultures, normalizing it and enforcing it.

From the perspective of the Western state model, the African experience necessitates advancement in technology, production methods, and a turn towards a neo-liberal state. In reality, this perspective seeks to co-opt African nations into the machinery of the Western economy, conforming them to global market demands, with little intent to foster genuine development or meet the needs of African citizens.

International Rivalries Among Major Powers Following Hybrid Security and Military Policies

The withdrawal of colonial occupation forces and the closure of military bases in many African nations did not signal the end of tragedy and crisis but ushered in a new phase of suffering marked by the competition of major powers—both colonial and non-colonial—over natural resources, despite African nations attaining independence. Former colonial powers adopted new policies aimed at preserving their interests and influence by exporting weapons, deploying paramilitary and private security companies, and supporting both rebel groups and mercenaries. These actions were neither random nor spontaneous but constituted an organized policy to hinder the progress of rising powers, particularly China and Russia.

This shift stemmed from declining financial and military capabilities as a result of the World Wars and was not intended as a withdrawal from their colonial policies. An ongoing climate of chaos and violence allows for ongoing interference in shaping the policies of African nations, steering them to realize the interests of external powers. Thus, while the reduction in military bases does not equate to a return to rational governance or acknowledgment of past mistakes, it can be viewed as an adaptation to the new global context and a repositioning prompted by the increasing financial and political costs of maintaining military bases.

A review of the scale of arms exports from major powers reveals this as a continuity of their previous colonial policies. Russia, France, Germany, the United States, and China dominate the list of arms exporters to Africa. Between 2000 and 2018, Russia accounted for 34% of all arms exports to Africa, followed by the U.S. with 19%, Germany with 17%, France with 9%, and China with 7.5%.

Despite the repercussions of these policies evident in rising illegal immigration and the disintegration of the European Union, these powers have not adjusted their stance nor pursued developmental policies to root out the issues caused by these past actions.

Conclusion

Political and economic competition within African regions has generated significant tensions among neighboring countries, fueling support for rebel movements fighting over access to natural resources. Population growth exerts pressure on states and systems to meet needs, especially in resource-scarce areas such as water and arable land. This complexity can lead to confusion over border delineation and rightful resource usage. The issues highlighted throughout this paper outline structural factors contributing to crises and problems faced by African nations, including illegal migration, child recruitment, human trafficking, drug and arms trade, the spread of corruption and poverty, authoritarianism, and a lack of justice. These problems are manifestations resulting from the colonial competitions that began with the partitioning of the continent into spheres of influence, enabling the distribution and theft of resources. The policies established by colonial powers perpetuate violence and force among competing parties as the only viable means to an end.

African nations need to break free from the cycle of conflict towards joint development projects that transcend disputes by investing resources and redistributing them among populations to achieve sustainable development. Such endeavors require a strong communal will that transcends major power interests. A primary step involves establishing governance systems that lean towards community engagement while considering traditional and communal norms in distributing central and service authorities. Furthermore, African nations should critique the modern state models imposed by colonial powers by developing locally participatory governance frameworks that reflect the societal fabric and integrate ethnic and religious minorities into the governance system and political representation processes. This undoubtedly requires time and persistent effort to yield tangible results in practice.

Overcoming the national borders delineated by colonial powers will involve embracing diverse ethnic groups and fostering joint economic projects among nations with disputed borders or facing challenges due to the presence of multiple ethnic groups in those areas. The process of integrating ethnic groups must occur within a collaborative framework that respects their historical rights, identities, and cultures.

Regional integration among states will facilitate movement, mobility, and trade across borders without engendering tensions and conflicts. One example is the unified currency project that the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) aims to issue by 2027, which includes 15 member states. Although the currency project has faced multiple delays since the early 20th century, the steps taken by member states on various political and security issues are contributing towards regional integration and making significant strides toward the success of a unified currency project. The difficulty in distributing the financial reserves required for the new currency, lack of unified tariffs, significant disparities among member countries in growth, poverty, inflation rates, debt levels, and foreign reserves, alongside political instability and the ongoing threat of military coups in several nations, pose substantial challenges.

References

 Global Risks Report 2022, Word Economic Forum, 11 January 2022 (accessed July 25, 2023): https://www.weforum.org/reports/global-risks-report-2022/in-full

International Migrants Day | United Nations

Statistics on migration to Europe, European Commission, Jan 2022, https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/promoting-our-european-way-life/statistics-migration-europe_en#refugees-in-europe

African Migration Trends to Watch in 2023, the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Jan 2023, https://africacenter.org/spotlight/african-migration-trends-to-watch-in-2023/

Africa and Europe Facts and Figures on African Migrations, Africa Europe Foundation Debate, Feb 2022, https://mo.ibrahim.foundation/sites/default/files/2022-02/aef_summit_african-migrations.pdf

International Migrant Stock 2020 (Total destination, Total origin, Age and sex), United Nations, 2020, https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/content/international-migrant-stock

Africa Urban Population، Africa Demographics، World o mater, https://www.worldometers.info/demographics/demographics-of-africa/

Hawkins, Virgil. Stealth conflicts: How the world’s worst violence is ignored. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2008.

Gianna-Carina Grün, How the EU spent billions to halt migration from Africa, DW, Dec 2022, https://www.dw.com/en/how-the-eu-spent-billions-to-halt-migration-from-africa/a-61362906

El Habti, H. “Why Africa’s youth hold the key to its development potential.” In World Economic Forum. As accessed on, vol. 16. 2023. https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2022/09/why-africa-youth-key-development-potential/

Africa and Europe Facts and Figures on African Migrations, Africa Europe Foundation, Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2022, https://mo.ibrahim.foundation/sites/default/files/2022-02/aef_summit_african-migrations.pdf

Irregular EU border crossings by nationality in 2022، Statistics on migration to Europe, European Commission, Jan 2022, https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/promoting-our-european-way-life/statistics-migration-europe_en#irregular-border-crossings

African Migration Trends to Watch in 2022, the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Dec 2021, https://africacenter.org/spotlight/african-migration-trends-to-watch-in-2022/

Population and population change statistics, Eurostat, Data extracted 6 July 2023, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Population_and_population_change_statistics#EU_population_shows_a_strong_increase_in_2022

Ukraine Refugee Situation, UNHCR, Border crossings from Ukraine since 24 Feb 2022 to Dec 2022, https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine

– Fassio, Claudio, Fabio Montobbio, and Alessandra Venturini. “Skilled migration and innovation in European industries.” Research Policy 48, no. 3 (2019): 706-718.

Connor, Phillip, and Jeffrey S. Passel. “5 facts about unauthorized immigration in Europe.” (2019). https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2019/11/14/5-facts-about-unauthorized-immigration-in-europe/

Mona Lotten, From The Outside In (G20 views of the UK before and after the EU referendum), British Council 2017/G258, ISBN 978-0-86355-861-0, https://www.britishcouncil.org/sites/default/files/from_the_outside_in.pdf

Project Europe (Immigration), Századvég Publishing House, Aug 2016, https://szazadveg.hu/en/2016/08/09/immigration~n1401

18)- Ciris, Kazim. “The effects of European Union illegal immigration policies on the candidate countries: the case of Turkey.” PhD diss., Rutgers University-Graduate School-Newark, 2016.

19)- Cesáreo Rodríguez-Aguilera, The Rise of The Far Right in Europe, IEMed, (Mediterranean Yearbook 2014), https://www.iemed.org/publication/the-rise-of-the-far-right-in-europe/

Wellings, Ben. “Nationalism and European disintegration.” Nations and Nationalism (2022). https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/nana.12884

Webber, Douglas. European disintegration?: the politics of crisis in the European Union. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2018. https://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/60897

Articles 79 and 80 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), Fact Sheets on the European Union, European Parliament, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/152/immigration-policy

Countering irregular migration: better EU border management, European Parliament, april 2023, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/society/20170627STO78419/countering-irregular-migration-better-eu-border-management

Ashitha Nagesh, Video shows Greek coast guard ‘deliberately sinking lifeboat full of refugees’, Metro, Nov 2015, https://metro.co.uk/2015/11/22/video-shows-greek-coast-guard-deliberately-sinking-lifeboat-full-of-refugees-5518390/

Terry, Kyilah. “The EU-Turkey deal, five years on: A frayed and controversial but enduring blueprint.” Migration Policy Institute 8 (2021). https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/eu-turkey-deal-five-years-on

Limb, Matthew. “UK-Rwanda migration plan fails to safeguard refugees’ medical care, say campaigners.” (2022). https://www.bmj.com/content/377/bmj.o1087.short

Morocco rebuffs EU request to re-admit third-country migrants, Reuters, Dec 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/morocco-eu-migration-int/morocco-rebuffs-eu-request-to-re-admit-third-country-migrants-idUSKBN28P252

– Tunisia and EU finalise deal on migration, Aljazeera, Jul 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/16/tunisia-and-eu-finalise-deal-on-migration

– Bouazza Ben Bouazza, Under pressure, Tunisia takes back hundreds of migrants trapped in a border zone with Libya, AP news, July 2023, https://apnews.com/article/tunisia-libya-migrants-border-tensions-391e7e7c5200b9a7e4331aff1a7c0d5b

– Joint press release of the United Nations, the African Union and the European Union, European Commission, Nov 2017, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/STATEMENT_17_5029

 WFP, Regional Drought Response Plan for the Horn of Africa: 2023, 23 January 2023, (Accessed: 8 June 2023), https://cutt.us/iQoVy   

 UN, Worsening drought in Horn of Africa puts up to 20 million at risk: WFP, 19 April 2022, (Accessed: 8 June 20232), https://cutt.us/B35nq

3- OCHA, Horn of Africa Drought: Humanitarian Key Messages, 9 February 2022, p. 1.

 Fund For peace, Fragile States Index (2023), 2023, p.7.

 Krampe, Florian, Van De Goor, Luc, Barnhoorn, Anniek, Smith, Elizabeth, & Smith, Dan, Water Security and Governance in The Horn of Africa, SIPRI, Policy Paper 54, March 2020, p.3

 OCHA, Horn of Africa: Humanitarian Update – With the Emergency Far from Over, Immediate Action Is Required to Save Lives and Prevent the Next Catastrophe (May 2023), 19 May 2023, (Accessed: 8 June 2023), https://cutt.us/22G1F

 OCHA, Donors pledge close to $1.4 billion for Horn of Africa drought response.

 UNHCR, East and Horn of Africa, and the Great Lakes Region, January – June 2022,

 D. Gavin, Michelle, Climate Change and Regional Instability in the Horn of Africa, Council on Foreign Relations, Center for Preventive Action, November 2022, p.p. 7-8.

Schipani, Andres & Pilling, David, Horn of Africa ravaged by worst drought in four decades, Financial Times, 3 May 2022, (Accessed: 8 June 2023), https://cutt.us/WGDH7  

 OCHA, Donors pledge close to $1.4 billion for Horn of Africa drought response, 26 April 2022, (Accessed: 8 June 2023), https://cutt.us/kqX0G

Aljazeera, Drought crisis puts Horn of Africa ‘on the brink of catastrophe’, 15 Febraury 2022, (Accessed: 8 June 2023), https://cutt.us/SFmI3

 OCHA, Donors pledge close to $1.4 billion for Horn of Africa drought response.

World Bank, World Bank Boosts Support for Pastoralists in Horn of Africa, 18 March 2014, (Accessed: 24 June 2023), https://cutt.us/EmTYp

 Strouboulis, Anastasia, Tesfaye, Beza, Edwards, Abigail, & Yayboke, Erol, Rethinking Humanitarian Assistance Climate and Crisis in the Horn of Africa, Center for strategic international studies, USAid, 2023, p.11.

 Russian invasion in Ukraine could threaten global food security and starve hundreds of millions globally, 6 September 2022 (access 30 Aug 2023),

 How the Ukraine Invasion Impacts Food Security in Africa, 26 May 2022, (access 30 Aug. 2023),

Hunger in Africa: statistics and facts, 12 May 2022, (access 30 Aug. 2023),

https://www.developmentaid.org/news-stream/post/142904/hunger-in-africa-statistics-and-facts

 Hunger in Africa: statistics and facts, 12 May 2022, (access 30 Aug. 2023),

https://www.developmentaid.org/news-stream/post/142904/hunger-in-africa…

 Sone, Patience Munge. “Interstate border disputes in Africa: Their resolution and implications for human rights and peace.” African security review 26, no. 3 (2017): 325-339.

 Amupanda, Alyssa Petrus. “BORDER DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISMS AMONG SOUTHERN AFRICA COUTRIES: CASE STUDY OF NAMIBIA, ANGOLA AND SOUTH AFRICA.” African Journal of Emerging Issues 3, no. 7 (2021): 1-13. https://ajoeijournals.org/sys/index.php/ajoei/article/view/212/251

 Brunet-Jailly, Emmanuel. “Cross-border cooperation: a global overview.” Alternatives 47, no. 1 (2022): 3-17. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8905113/

 Perkmann, Markus, and Ngai-Ling Sum. “Globalization, regionalization and cross-border regions: scales, discourses and governance.” In Globalization, regionalization and cross-border regions, pp. 3-21. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2002. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9780230596092_1

 African Union Commission. “African Union Strategy for a Better Integrated Border Governance.” (2020). https://archives.au.int/handle/123456789/8851

 Pippie Hugues, Interstate border disputes in Africa and their resolution. The case of Ethiopia/Eritrea and Sudan/South Sudan, (Master Thesis), Munich, 2018, https://www.grin.com/document/1033455

Introduction Thompsell, Angela. “The colonial names of African states.” ThoughCo 2 (2019): 2019.

 Gashaw, Tasew. “Colonial Borders in Africa: Improper Design and its Impact on African Borderland Communities.” Africa Up Close 17 (2017).

 Robinson, Amanda Lea. “Colonial rule and its political legacies in Africa.” In Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics. 2019. https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.1346

 Kumar, Yash. “Can a principled Negotiations Framework explain the Participants’ Strategies and Outcomes in the 1884-1885 Berlin Conference?.” UNSWLJ Student Series 16-02 (2016).

Ikome, Francis Nguendi. “Africa’s international borders as potential sources of conflict and future threats to peace and security.” Institute for Security Studies Papers 2012, no. 233 (2012): 16.

Wadsworth, Phil. Cambridge International AS Level International History 1871-1945 Coursebook. Cambridge University Press, 2013. P17.

Introduction Herbst, Jeffrey. “The creation and matintenance of national boundaries in Africa.” International Organization 43, no. 4 (1989): 673-692.

Depetris-Chauvin, Emilio, and Ömer Özak. “Borderline disorder:(de facto) historical ethnic borders and contemporary conflict in africa.” Available at SSRN 3541025 (2020).

 Borders and Conflicts in North and West Africa, OECD, Feb 2022, https://www.oecd.org/development/borders-and-conflicts-in-north-and-west-africa-6da6d21e-en.htm

Introduction Parens, Raphael. “Conflict in Eastern Congo: A spark away from a regional conflagration.” (2022). https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/09/conflict-in-eastern-congo-a-spark-away-from-a-regional-conflagration/

 Millions face starvation and disease as aid agencies are expelled from Darfur, Amnest, Mar 2009, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2009/03/millions-face-starvation-and-disease-aid-agencies-are-expelled-darfur-20090305/

 Murdock, George Peter, Tribal Map of Africa, McGraw-Hill Book Company, American Geographical Society Library, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Libraries, 1959, https://collections.lib.uwm.edu/digital/collection/agdm/id/22910/rec/1

 Michalopoulos, Stelios, and Elias Papaioannou. “The long-run effects of the scramble for Africa.” American Economic Review 106, no. 7 (2016): 1802-1848.

 Hyde, Tim. “Are Colonial Era Borders Drawn by Europeans holding Africa Back?.” American Economic Association, July 31 (2016).

 Kuditchar, Nene-Lomotey. “The AfCFTA in the Context of Africa-EU Relations: A Regulation Analysis of Some Stylized Facts.” Contexto Internacional 44 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1590/S0102-8529.20224403e20210016

Mayall, James. “The Malawi—Tanzania Boundary Dispute.” The Journal of Modern African Studies 11, no. 4 (1973): 611-628. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-modern-african-studies/article/abs/malawitanzania-boundary-dispute/E752189685196A67E9C83E04A1B555B9

Pyeatt, Duane Niler. “Heligoland and the making of the Anglo-German colonial agreement in 1890.” PhD diss., Texas Tech University, 1988.

 Democratic Republic of the Congo: Justice and freedoms under siege in North-Kivu and Ituri, Amnesty, May 2022, Index Number: AFR 62/5495/2022, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr62/5495/2022/en/?utm_source=annual_report&utm_medium=epub&utm_campaign=2021

(25) Musamba, Josaphat, Christoph Vogel, and Koen Vlassenroot. “It takes (more than) two to tango.” https://www.gicnetwork.be/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/10_GIC_It-Takes-More-Than-Two-to-Tango_WEB-2.pdf

(26) Falbeb-Brown, Vanda. “The problem with militias in Somalia: almost everyone wants them despite their dangers.” (2020). https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-problem-with-militias-in-somalia-almost-everyone-wants-them-despite-their-dangers/

Provisions of the Ben-Uziel, David. “A Mossad Agent in Southern Sudan, 1969–1971: An Operation Log.” (2017).

Paragraph 1 Robinson, Amanda Lea. “Colonial rule and its political legacies in Africa.” In Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics. 2019. https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.1346

 Jason W.Clay, Nation, Tribe and Ethnic Group in Africa, 9-3 Nation, Tribe and Ethnic Groups in Africa, Cultural Survival, Feb 2010, https://www.culturalsurvival.org/publications/cultural-survival-quarterly/nation-tribe-and-ethnic-group-africa

Paragraph 1 Duzor, Megan, and Brian Williamson. “By the numbers: Coups in Africa.” Retrieved April 12 (2022): 2022.

(31) Herbst, Jeffrey. “The creation and matintenance of national boundaries in Africa.” International Organization 43, no. 4 (1989): 673-692.

(32) Afua Hirsch, Africa’s colonisation of the English language continues apace, The Guardian, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/jan/29/africa-coloniasation-english-language-oxford-dictionary-nigerian

(33) Chelati Dirar, Uoldelul. “Colonialism and the construction of national identities: The case of Eritrea.” Journal of Eastern African Studies 1, no. 2 (2007): 256-276.

(34) – Paragraph 1 Bellucci, Beluce. “The state in Africa.” (2010). https://portalantigo.ipea.gov.br/agencia/images/stories/PDFs/rtm/121129_rtm_ingles03_cap3.pdf

Shadi Ibrahim, The Arms Map in Africa: Between the Politics of Neocolonialism and the Competition of Major Powers, Al Jazeera Center for Studies, September 12, 2021 (accessed September 7, 2023), https://studies.aljazeera.net/ar/article/5133#a4

 Hendrix, Cullen S. “Arms and Influence? Chinese Arms Transfers to Africa in Context.” Realtime Economic Issues Watch (2020).

Prasad, Eswar, and Vera Songwe. Regional integration in West Africa: is there a role for a single currency?. Brookings Institution Press, 2021.

Ordu, Aloysius Uche, Ali Zafar, and Jan Muench. “Is West Africa ready for a single currency?.” (2021).