Africa Amid International Conflict Dynamics Over Strategic Minerals

Currently, there is a high global demand for strategic minerals. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), the market size doubled in recent years, reaching $320 billion in 2022. Demand is expected to more than double by 2030 and quadruple by 2050, with annual revenues projected to reach $400 billion. In response to this surge, investment in the development of these minerals increased by 20% in 2021 and 30% in 2022.

At present, China dominates the strategic minerals market. This dominance poses both geopolitical and security threats to Western nations, as China is already leveraging its influence by imposing export restrictions, cutting supplies, and threatening the supply chains of American, European, and Japanese companies. As a result, Western economies are shifting their focus to African countries—a region where China already holds significant sway—as alternative sources of strategic minerals.

Recognizing their vulnerability, Western countries are now actively seeking to diversify their supply chains to ensure more secure and sustainable access to these critical resources. Africa has thus emerged as a key destination for both Western powers and emerging global players seeking to establish a foothold in the strategic minerals sector. This growing competition signals the emergence of a new global conflict, with Africa poised to become a central battleground.

Therefore, this paper aims to examine Africa’s position amid the dynamics of international competition over strategic minerals. It will analyze the strategies employed by global powers, their interactions, and the broader geopolitical implications of this evolving struggle.

Africa in the Global Minerals Market

“Critical” or “strategic” minerals encompass a range of essential resources for energy, digital transformation, and national security. The significance of these minerals is primarily assessed; first, by their fundamental nature for the industries considered strategic by the state (defense and aerospace, electronics, wind and solar energy generation, automotive manufacturing, etc.), and second, by the risks facing their supply chains, due to shortages in reserves or raw production on a global scale. It is important to note that the assessment of the importance of minerals varies by country and is a result of the economic and geopolitical conditions at a given time. Thus, countries and regional blocs compile their lists of strategic minerals using different criteria.

Africa accounts for approximately 30% of the world’s critical mineral reserves and is a major producer of many minerals classified by Western nations as strategic or critical.

Reserves of Some Strategic Minerals in Africa

Moreover, Africa is the third-largest destination for mining investment globally, despite relatively low exploration budgets and limited new investments. Between 2018 and 2022, the continent received 13.9% of total foreign direct investment (FDI) in the mining sector, amounting to a cumulative $77 billion. This places Africa behind Latin America ($114 billion) and Canada ($80 billion).

Despite this ranking, Africa was among the regions that received the least exploration spending during the same period, attracting only $4.7 million—approximately one-third of what was allocated to Latin America. This suggests that, in recent years, Africa has not been as attractive for exploration activities compared to other regions.

However, with the accelerating global shift toward energy and digital transformation, demand for strategic minerals has surged and is expected to increase by 3.5 times by 2030. Given its vast reserves, Africa is hoping to capitalize on this growing demand to strengthen its position in global value chains. This is particularly relevant as geopolitical tensions surrounding strategic minerals intensify, prompting many countries to adopt new strategies for securing access to these resources, including forging partnerships with resource-rich African nations.

A Crowded Field: From Western Dominance to Multiple Partnerships

African wealth has drawn the interest of industrial powers, with African nations increasingly entering partnership agreements that are often guided by national mineral strategies and vary in their goals, substance, commodities, and key stakeholders.

Regardless of their content, these agreements reflect the contemporary geopolitical landscape. While the UK, Canada, and Australia are champions of the African minerals sector, they face growing competition from new players on the African scene.

Historical Dominance of Western Powers

For decades, African mining activities have been almost exclusively led by Western companies. Former colonial powers had a stranglehold on the exploitation of the earth in their colonies until independence. The wave of independence in African countries marked a relative decline of former colonial powers, which no longer maintain the same influence in the mining sectors of their former colonies, such as France, Belgium, Portugal, Italy, and Germany. To this day, looking at the share of each company in total African mining production, we observe that Western corporations significantly lead, including Anglo American (UK), Glencore (Switzerland), and First Quantum (Canada), which together represented nearly a quarter of production in 2018.

Leveraging its relationships within the Commonwealth and its long-standing presence in the African mining sector, the UK has established partnerships with nations like South Africa, Nigeria, and Zambia to ensure access to critical minerals. Given the EU’s heavy reliance on China for these minerals undermines its broader energy transition, it has directed its efforts towards African countries through the “Global Gateway” initiative, signing strategic partnerships with Namibia (2022), the Democratic Republic of Congo, Zambia (2023), and Rwanda (2024) to develop sustainable value chains.

Driven by economic security and national defense concerns, the United States has signed a memorandum of understanding with African nations to support the development of a value chain in the electric vehicle battery sector with the Democratic Republic of Congo and Zambia, whereas the memorandum signed in 2023 regarding the development of the Lobito Corridor and the Zambia-Lobito railway, which it signed with Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the EU, and Zambia, is not directly related to mineral sourcing or processing but rather to transport. Additionally, there are multiple multilateral initiatives such as the Mineral Security Partnership and the Energy Resource Governance Initiative.

Thus, the status of Western actors in the African minerals market remains somewhat dynamic despite the entry of many competitors.

Emergence of New Players

The mining boom between 2003 and 2008 not only solidified the presence of traditional industrial powers on African soil but also witnessed the emergence of so-called “rising” actors. Africa could establish relationships with Moscow, Beijing, Brasilia, and New Delhi in the context of decolonization and the birth of the Non-Alignment Movement during the Cold War. However, these ties weakened at least in the 1980s. Afterward, the continuous acceleration of economic growth rates led to a strong resurgence of these players on the scene. Since 2005, mining companies from emerging countries have become serious competitors to Western firms.

To mitigate the risks of supply chain disruptions, China has sought to expand and strengthen its extensive network of diplomatic relationships to enhance cooperation in the minerals sector, particularly with African nations, with 19 mineral partnerships covering regions throughout the continent. Many of these partnerships were established in the mid-2000s, with some in 2010, alongside newer agreements. China has also concluded what can be termed “infrastructure-for-resources” agreements as part of the Belt and Road Initiative. These agreements require China to provide major infrastructure projects in exchange for mining concessions in Africa. Additionally, the Chinese government has encouraged outward investment by state-owned and private companies since the inception of its “Going Global” policy in 2000.

Russia has similarly signed bilateral agreements with many African nations—with most being undisclosed—some dating back to 1999 (South Africa), while others were signed recently, such as those with Angola in 2009 and 2019, Namibia in 2016, and Zimbabwe in 2019 and 2020. India, for its part, has formed partnerships with nine African countries, the majority of which are Commonwealth nations, one of which dates back to 1997 with South Africa, while most were signed after 2010 with Zambia, Zimbabwe, Mali, and others.

Similarly, South Korea, Japan, Indonesia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE have signed several mineral partnership agreements with African nations. Overall, the number of players has increased, including African entities themselves.

Proactive African Powers

It is important to note that while the focus is on external actors, African countries are not passively participating in these partnerships. South Africa has long been an exception on the continent; it is the most important actor in African mineral production and has a large number of highly active companies that can be comparable in size to the largest investors on African soil. It has developed world-class companies—including AngloGold Ashanti, Anglo American Platinum, Impala Platinum, and Gold Fields—which are among the top 50 mining companies globally. Thanks to these large and small companies, South Africa is a significant player not only within its borders but also on a continental and global scale. Morocco is also working on developing an ambitious African strategy through actors such as Managem or the OCP Group. Managem is the leading company in the Moroccan mining sector, having acquired a stake in the Canadian mineral exploration company SEMAFO in 1997. Currently, the company operates 15 mines producing copper, zinc, lead, gold, silver, cobalt, and fluorite in eight African countries and has shown significant dynamism by acquiring assets from the Canadian company Iamgold in Senegal, Mali, and Guinea in December 2022. Other African nations have struggled to develop companies of this scale; however, the mining boom has given rise to a series of national African actors. Broadly speaking, there is a desire in many countries to reactivate long-established national companies—like Gécamines or SOMIKO in the Democratic Republic of Congo—or to create new companies such as “Mauritania Minerals,” established in 2020.

Thus, the desire to regain control over the national mining sector has become strong, whether reflected in the creation of new companies or in the reform of existing mining contracts.

Are Africa’s Minerals Shaping Up as Another International Conflict?

Widespread political instability in Africa complicates the geopolitical conflict over strategic minerals, as the United States, China, Russia, the European Union, and others compete in an increasingly unstable arena.

The takeover of mineral wealth abroad has long been a fundamental goal of U.S. foreign policy; this explains President Trump’s desire to strike a minerals deal with Ukraine and his interest in acquiring Greenland and Canada.

The U.S. has also come to recognize the strategic nature of minerals produced in Africa and has announced its intention to increase its presence in this sector. Some Africans have attempted to leverage this angle; the Democratic Republic of Congo has offered access to its mineral resources in exchange for help achieving security and stability. Algeria has also expressed its willingness to partner with Washington regarding its globally sought-after mineral resources.

Due to competition with China, the search for these strategic minerals has been a necessity for the United States for nearly a decade.

Previously, officials in the State Department during the former administration formed a coalition with a group of countries to discuss creating or enhancing critical mineral supply chains outside of China. They also established a forum for mineral-rich countries to connect with potential clients and foreign companies regarding the development of mines and processing plants.

China has made significant efforts over the years to develop its global dominance in extracting and processing critical minerals, while the U.S. has been forced to import substantial amounts for both commercial and military use; the U.S. is 100% reliant on imports for 14 minerals on the critical minerals list, and over 75% reliant on imports for 10 other minerals. China is the leading producer of 29 critical minerals and has repeatedly shown its willingness to use these minerals as a weapon, including imposing export restrictions and bans on a range of raw minerals.

Despite former President Joe Biden’s efforts to invest in and deepen mineral partnerships—such as the memorandums of understanding signed in 2022 with Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo for cooperation in building supply chains for electric vehicle batteries and the commencement of a nickel battery refining plant in Tanzania, supported by the U.S., the first of its kind on the continent—U.S. presence in Africa in this field remains weak.

The “Going Global” policy, alongside a remarkable surge in Chinese demand in the early 21st century, has led to a doubling of its investments, particularly in Africa, which attracted nearly a third (30.2%) of Chinese mining investments between 2018 and 2022. China is particularly entrenched in cobalt production in the Democratic Republic of Congo and platinum in South Africa, and is increasing its investments in Guinean bauxite.

China remains the largest player in the African mining sector; it has invested billions over the past few years as part of the Belt and Road Initiative. In 2022 alone, China imported $10 billion worth of “rare earth minerals” from the continent. In addition to its dominance, China is the largest refiner in the world for many strategic minerals; Chinese refineries provide 68% of the world’s nickel, 40% of copper, 59% of lithium, and 73% of cobalt.

For years, the “Western” world has begun to realize this delicate situation and decided to be proactive. Yet, while the EU, the UK, and the U.S. work to diversify supply chains for rare earth minerals and other strategic raw materials, they are finding that it is no easy task. The dangers of China’s dominance have been demonstrated, particularly for rare earth minerals; it currently dominates the market, producing around 60% and processing and refining about 80% of them, being a key player in the global supply chain. Therefore, the fear is that supply constraints, or even shutdowns, could severely harm economies, industries, and decarbonization plans. The escalating geopolitical tensions and the trade war between the U.S. and China only add to these fears, as China has repeatedly threatened to cut or halt its exports to the United States.

Conversely, in its efforts to form an alliance against the West, Russia offers supplier countries its expertise in mining along with a range of other services, including security services, particularly through its military company “Wagner Group,” leveraging military support against jihadist insurgencies to expand its political influence and secure access to resources. The goals of these engagements are to secure natural resources (primarily gold and critical minerals), as well as to outmaneuver Chinese and American efforts to establish its own influence there. The group has ground forces in Libya, Mozambique, Mali, the Central African Republic, and Sudan (with rumors of its spread to the Democratic Republic of Congo). It has mining concessions in Sudan and the Central African Republic and very strong influence in Mali and Burkina Faso, both of which countries have gold mines exploited by Russian companies for more than a decade.

Like China, albeit for significantly different reasons, Russia is a regional partner that the U.S. finds hard to compete with, as Washington has not provided the same kind of support that Moscow offers to African capitals.

Alongside China and Russia, many other nations view Africa as a stage for extending their influence. These countries have investment strategies that extend beyond the mining sector alone, aimed not only at exploiting wealth but also at spreading their influence throughout the continent. Thus, investment in strategic minerals and geopolitical influence in African countries have become increasingly intertwined.

Amid this dynamic, the EU is trying to increase its presence; European companies operate 46 mines, and several medium and small companies in France, Finland, Cyprus, the Netherlands, Sweden, Germany, Belgium, Ireland, Romania, and Portugal have mining assets in Africa, especially in chromium, copper, and diamonds. Moreover, the “Global Gateway” project will help facilitate the exploitation of significant reserves of rare earth minerals held by several countries like Algeria, Burundi, Gabon, Tanzania, and others. The U.S., the EU, and Japan have formulated offensive strategies aimed at securing their supplies and reducing dependence on China by organizing a meeting in September 2022 with major African mining nations (the Democratic Republic of Congo, Zambia, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania, etc.) to explore ways and means to penetrate these markets and obtain their strategic resources.

Therefore, while many African governments desire greater Western participation, they have not been hurried to abandon China and Russia; they seem eager to increase competition so that African countries can secure better deals from all participating players.

This rapid scramble for critical minerals in Africa places the continent at the heart of a new geostrategic dynamic, the full implications of which are still difficult to grasp. However, it cannot be denied that amid this period of conflict and realignment of alliances, African mineral resources are attracting increasingly more attention. The question remains: how will global powers approach in the future: will it be a profitable cooperation approach with the continent’s countries, or just new greed for its resources, or merely a wager for global conflict and a battleground where African nations will end up being the losers?

Intertwined Opportunities and Challenges

Africa’s positioning amid these dynamics presents countless intertwined opportunities and challenges:

First: Opportunities: By leveraging geopolitical conflicts, such as the U.S. restrictions on China, Africa could fill the gaps in mineral supply chains. Economic growth will stimulate demand for African critical minerals, increasing export revenues and attracting foreign investments and job opportunities, while allowing for balanced negotiations, such as revising mineral partnerships to increase revenues and enforce clauses relating to expanding local contributions to the global value chain, gradually transitioning from raw exports to manufacturing through the development of refining and primary manufacturing facilities, with support from international financing institutions. Expanding partnerships (China, the EU, BRICS) will reduce dependence on Western players, allowing Africa to achieve more economic gains and gain greater global influence.

Second: Challenges: Represented by global disparities: Africa holds 30% of global critical mineral reserves but receives only 10% of global revenues generated from them. Moreover, the region’s economies’ reliance on raw exports without added industrial value limits economic benefits, particularly amid global competition, inadequate infrastructure, and China’s dominance over production. Security and stability threats: Rising mineral prices in Africa have previously led to increased violence and armed conflicts, with rebel groups and militias funding their activities through mining, causing the expansion and spread of conflicts to other regions, with long-term impacts on social and economic stability. Environmental impacts: Africans will be compelled to strike a difficult balance between enhancing their economy through the exploitation of critical minerals and managing the significant environmental risks resulting from their extraction.

Conclusion

The struggle to access strategic minerals embodies a microcosm of contemporary geopolitical and geo-economic tensions. While Western players maintain their influence through expertise and investment, emerging nations are redrawing the map of partnerships. Amid this, the greatest challenge facing African nations is to transform the “resource curse” into a structural opportunity that positions Africa as a central player in the global economy, relying on its ability to smartly position itself and transform international greed for its resources into a source of geopolitical and geo-economic leverage and a catalyst for sustainable economic development, through effective cooperation, negotiation, and investment in research and development, as well as strengthening governance, regulation, and local skills.

(1) J. Boafo, J. Obodai, E. Stemn, and P. N. Nkrumah, “The race for critical minerals in Africa: A blessing or another resource curse?,” Resources Policy, vol. 93, Jun. 2024. (accessed Apr. 01, 2025). https://tinyurl.com/4ne9whak 

 (2) Ibid.

 (3) Ibidem. 

(4) ‘Julien Gourdon, Hugo Lapeyronie ‘Le potentiel minier de l’Afrique: Panorama, enjeux et défis’ , Editions Agence française de développment, 19, 2024. (accessed Apr. 01, 2025). https://tinyurl.com/mvw3w7cd

 (5) P. Beuter et al., “Mapping Africa’s Green Mineral Partnerships,” APRI, Jan. 20, 2025. (accessed Apr. 01, 2025). https://tinyurl.com/bdd8mez3

(6) S. Logan, “Can Europe Compete with China in the Race for Africa’s Critical Minerals? – chinaobservers,” chinaobservers, Jan. 07, 2025. (accessed Apr. 01, 2025). https://tinyurl.com/6rmzezpz  

 (7) “Mapping Africa’s Green Mineral Partnerships,” Ibid.

(8) ‘Le potentiel minier de l’Afrique’Ibid.

(9) “Mapping Africa’s Green Mineral Partnerships,” Ibid.

(10) Ibidem. 

(11) Ibidem. 

(12) ‘Le potentiel minier de l’Afrique’Ibid.

(13) Ibidem. 

(14) V. Latour, “RDC-USA : un accord minier en échange d’un appui militaire ?,” Le Point, Mar. 20, 2025. (accessed Mar. 31, 2025). https://tinyurl.com/mvetder4

(15) B. Vincent, “Algeria’s ambassador to the US on new bilateral military plans: ‘The sky is the limit,’” DefenseScoop, Mar. 07, 2025 (accessed Mar. 31, 2025). https://tinyurl.com/28pavucp

(16) E. Wong, “How Trump and Biden’s Focus on Minerals Became Core to U.S. Foreign Policy,” The New York Times, Feb. 26, 2025. (accessed Mar. 31, 2025).  https://tinyurl.com/yc6bacw7

(17) “Africa and the Global Race for Critical Minerals,” Bradley.com, Aug. 31, 2023.  (accessed Apr. 01, 2025). https://tinyurl.com/2ratmt5v

(18) “How Trump and Biden’s Focus” Ibid.

(19) “Africa and the Global Race for Critical Minerals,” Ibid.

(20) ‘Le potentiel minier de l’Afrique’Ibid.

(21) “Africa and the Global Race for Critical Minerals,” Ibid.

(22) Arslan Chikhaoui, “LA GEOPOLITIQUE DES TERRES RARES: ENJEUX ET JEUX D’INFLUENCE EN MEDITERAFRIQUE” Nesa-center.org, 2024. (accessed Apr. 01, 2025).https://tinyurl.com/ms5ymyyx

(23) “Africa and the Global Race for Critical Minerals,” Ibid.

(24) ‘Le potentiel minier de l’Afrique’Ibid.

(25) Ibidem. 

(26) M. Diop, “Guerre des grandes puissances pour le contrôle des métaux critiques: une opportunité pour l’Afrique, mais…,” Le 360 Afrique, Jul. 03, 2023. (accessed Apr. 01, 2025). https://tinyurl.com/3kp635t8  

(27) A. Lemma, “Critical minerals, critical moment: Africa’s role in the AI revolution,” ODI: Think change, Feb. 10, 2025.  (accessed Apr. 01, 2025). https://tinyurl.com/47d8nsa3

(28) N. Berman, “Comment le ‘boom des minerais’ augmente la violence en Afrique,” The Conversation, Apr. 24, 2019.  (accessed Apr. 01, 2025). https://tinyurl.com/yvku59jy