Most political analysts agree that October 7, 2023, represents a turning point in the trajectory of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but they differ on diagnosing the dimensions of the change brought about by the Al-Aqsa Flood operation. This disagreement arises because political analyses are made while warfare is still ongoing and even escalating, with its outcomes yet to be determined. This situation complicates the provision of an objective assessment of a year of war.
Naturally, there are several confirmed changes that have occurred and can be pointed out. For example, this war is the longest in history compared to all previous wars in the region, excluding the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon, which lasted for three years. Furthermore, this war, as one of the hybrid wars combining traditional and unconventional means, demonstrates that the application of modern technology for military purposes has no limits. The number of Palestinian casualties in about twelve months of conflict is the highest ever compared to all previous rounds of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
These are some established facts known to all. However, on another level, there are other evolving changes that have yet to crystallize or, say, are still incomplete, making it premature to analyze them objectively. This includes attempts to redraw a new map for the Middle East.
It is true that Israel is attempting to re-engineer geographical borders, whether within historic Palestine or between itself and Lebanon and Syria by utilizing settlement and displacement mechanisms and establishing buffer zones, as well as expanding those already in place. It is also true that former U.S. President Donald Trump and current candidate for the 2024 elections gave Israel the green light to expand, stating that its size is no longer sufficient; this indicates his understanding of Israel’s need to expand at the expense of its neighbors. However, the aforementioned plan has not yet been completed and continues to face severe resistance.
It is well understood that whether or not the face of the Middle East changes, and the extent to which this change can go, depends on the direction of the military battles and the potential to create new realities on the ground. In this analytical context, this article distinguishes between what has indeed changed and what has not after the passage of more than a year since the Al-Aqsa Flood.
Breaking the Rules of the Game:
Starting with what has changed, it encompasses the overturning of the rules that governed previous rounds of the Arab-Israeli conflict, which provided some control. This has been aptly described by some as crossing red lines. Hamas did not content itself with a rocket response to Israel’s siege on Gaza, the maltreatment of prisoners, and violations of the sanctity of Al-Aqsa Mosque; rather, the Al-Qassam Brigades penetrated deep into Israeli territory, attacked settlements, and held at least 250 hostages.
Hamas’s operation was qualitatively unprecedented in its boldness, meticulous planning, and the immediate results it achieved. While it was expected that the Israeli response would be extremely violent and different from anything before due to the severity of the attack, it surpassed all conceivable scenarios in ferocity. This may have led some to exaggerate by asserting that Israel had lured Hamas into the attack of October 7 to easily eliminate the Palestinian cause.
The pattern of escalation and counter-escalation characterized the battles over the course of twelve months. This was supported by two main factors: the first was Israel setting impossible goals to stop the war, primarily the total eradication of Hamas. It is well-known that eliminating Hamas’s leadership and cadres does not equate to eradicating Hamas’s ideology or, of course, resolving the Palestinian issue. Thus, Israel transitioned from one escalation to another as if chasing an illusion without pause. The second factor was the successive involvement of Iranian allies in the war to support the Palestinian resistance under the banner of “unity of fronts,” which itself constituted a form of escalation through the expansion of the conflict.
The Al-Aqsa Flood operation and its aftermath tested the term “unity of fronts” more than ever before; this led to greater interconnectedness and complexity of regional issues. The entry of Hezbollah into the fray the day after the Al-Aqsa Flood operation connected the fronts of Gaza and southern Lebanon, and as the repercussions of this connection evolved into an open confrontation between Hezbollah and Israel, some Israeli officials added the release of Israeli hostages held by Hamas to the conditions for a ceasefire in Lebanon; thus, the developments on both fronts were treated as a single package.
On the other hand, the Houthi engagement with Israel in support of the Gaza front and their missiles reaching Tel Aviv prompted Israel to repeatedly attack several targets deep inside Yemen, thereby linking fronts separated by over two thousand kilometers.
As for the Syrian front, which had long been a platform for Israeli attacks well before the Al-Aqsa Flood operation, its inclusion as a support front for Gaza has resulted in an unprecedented development in Israeli strikes, as it involved targeting the Iranian consulate in Damascus for the first time. In other words, if Iranian influence in Syria had been continuously targeted by Israel, linking the Syrian arena to the Palestinian one has added a new justification for Israel to escalate these attacks.
The Israeli attack on the Iranian consulate in Damascus led to Iran being dragged into direct military confrontation with Israel, through Iran conducting a controlled and limited missile attack against Israeli military targets in April 2024. It was noticeable that Iran was keen to deny any connection to the attack or even knowledge of its timing from the outset of the Al-Aqsa Flood operation, suggesting its desire to distance itself from direct involvement. However, this stance changed following the bombing of the consulate in Damascus and the deaths of some senior Iranian Revolutionary Guard leaders in the Israeli raid.
Israel then escalated its actions against Iran again by targeting Ismail Haniyeh, the head of Hamas’s political bureau, while he was in Tehran celebrating the inauguration of the new president of the Islamic Republic. Iran responded, albeit after some time, with a more powerful response in early October 2024, followed by an Israeli retaliation for the Iranian response on the 26th of the same month.
Iran’s shift from waging war against Israel indirectly through its allies to fighting it directly is seen as one of the most significant changes in the region after October 7.
On Another Note:
The Gulf states, with the exception of Bahrain, did not respond to the U.S. call in December 2023 to form a maritime Prosperity Guardian Force to secure freedom of navigation in the Red Sea against Houthi attacks. This stance also represents a new position compared to the Gulf stance at the U.S.-Islamic-Gulf Summit in Riyadh in May 2017, when they agreed to form the “Middle East Strategic Alliance,” which aimed to combat terrorism, indirectly referring to Iranian threats among other types of threats.
This difference can be attributed to several changes that occurred between 2017 and 2023, including the return of Gulf-Iranian relations and the adoption of a policy by Gulf states aimed at achieving a certain balance in their relationships with both Iran and the United States. Although Benjamin Netanyahu spoke at the United Nations General Assembly on the eve of Ismail Haniyeh’s assassination about two axes in the Middle East—one called the “Axis of Malice,” which included Iran and its allies, and the other termed the “Axis of Blessing,” which included Gulf states alongside Egypt and others—this Israeli conception has not been practically reflected as a Gulf alignment against Iran.
Remaining Elements of the “Unipolar” International System:
Ultimately, what hasn’t changed includes the absolute and unwavering U.S. commitment to support Israel, regardless of whether the administration is Republican or Democratic. Indeed, the current Democratic administration has made unprecedented statements, such as President Joe Biden asserting that if there were no Israel, the United States would be keen to establish it, and repeatedly stating that he is a Zionist, albeit not Jewish. This narrative was echoed by his Secretary of State Antony Blinken, who visited Israel shortly after the Al-Aqsa Flood operation, stating he came to Israel as a Jew.
In such a context where ideology mixes with interests and religion with foreign policy, the Biden administration deployed all military, economic, diplomatic, and media tools to affirm Israel’s right to defend itself against the terrorist threats it faces, going as far as getting directly militarily involved in the conflict.
In the aftermath of what is termed the Islamic Resistance in Iraq targeting the Tower 22 base on the Jordan-Syria border last January, the United States carried out raids on the positions of some factions of this resistance inside Iraq. On another level, the United States played a coordinating role in the conflicts stemming from the Al-Aqsa Flood operation, as well as in the course of the war in Gaza itself. While the Biden administration unleashed Israel to deal with both the Gaza and Lebanon files, it also played a key role in rationalizing Iranian military responses against Israel, and vice versa. However, the language of the U.S. administration was clear in affirming its complete commitment to defend Israel should a war break out between it and Iran.
Equally, the inactive stances of both Russia and China regarding the dynamics of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and its extensions to several Arab arenas, not to mention the Iranian arena, became clear. The political and diplomatic support for the Palestinians and the call for adherence to international resolutions formed the essence of both Russia’s and China’s positions, highlighting a significant gap between these two stances and that of the United States. This can be interpreted in the light of the complex considerations Moscow had to base its position on. Moscow capitalized on the situation in Gaza to highlight the failure of U.S. policy in the region while benefiting from the shift of international focus to the Middle East instead of Eastern Europe, compounded by the transition of Western weapon flows from Ukraine to Gaza—these are two contradictory considerations.
The first consideration indirectly affects Russian-Israeli relations due to Israel’s benefit from the clear U.S. bias in its favor. The second consideration influences Russia’s relationship with Hamas and, more significantly, its relationship with Iran. It is well-known that Russia has a complex web of interests with both Israel and Iran, both inside and outside Syria, and that Iran has played a significant role in supplying Russia with drones to use in the Ukraine war.
Turning to China, despite its steadfast position on the Palestinian issue, it lacks a historical record of political engagement in the region, which limits its maneuverability. Furthermore, China maintains good relations with both Israel and Iran, presenting another constraint. In conclusion, the Gaza War has underscored that the era of multipolarity at the pinnacle of the international system has yet to materialize, despite all attempts to diminish U.S. influence.
Finally, we arrive at the issue of Palestinian divisions, which have remained unchanged despite the significant developments that have occurred in both Gaza and the West Bank. Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas was quick to state, just a few days after the Al-Aqsa Flood, that Hamas’s policies and actions do not represent the Palestinian people. Although he later modified his remarks, he returned at the complex Arab summit held in Bahrain in May 2024 to accuse Hamas of providing Israel with more justifications to continue killing, destroying, and displacing. Such a stance was bound to add fuel to the already raging fire of disputes between Fatah and Hamas.
The Beijing Declaration that emerged from a meeting of fourteen Palestinian factions, including Fatah and Hamas, failed to achieve reconciliation in reality, as the differences in both parties’ positions regarding the details of the situation in Gaza after the war ended has remained an insurmountable obstacle to any progress.
The general conclusion is that a full year after the Al-Aqsa Flood has changed situations and interactions that had established themselves over many years, while reinforcing another set of situations and interactions that demonstrated their ability to resist all winds of change. It must be said that the complete picture will not become clear until the sounds of gunfire and the buzz of airplanes subside and the war’s outcomes impose themselves on politics and politicians.
